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The Gay Panic Defense
Cynthia Lee*
In this Article, Professor Lee examines the use of gay panic defense
strategies in the criminal courtroom. “Gay panic” refers to the situation
when a heterosexual man charged with murdering a gay man claims he
panicked and killed because the gay man made an unwanted sexual
advance upon him. Professor Lee argues that gay panic arguments are
problematic because they reinforce and promote negative stereotypes
about gay men as sexual deviants and sexual predators. Gay panic
arguments are also troubling because they seek to capitalize on
unconscious bias in favor of heterosexuality, which is prevalent in today’s
heterocentric society. In light of such concerns, most critics of the “gay
panic defense” have proposed that judges or legislatures bar gay panic
arguments from the criminal courtroom. Professor Lee takes a contrary
position and argues that banning gay panic arguments from the criminal
courtroom is not the best way to undermine the damaging effects of such
arguments, and may have the unintended consequence of bolstering their
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corrosive potential. Rather than precluding defendants from making gay
panic arguments, Professor Lee argues that the criminal courtroom is the
place where such arguments can and should be aired and battled.
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On February 12th, an openly gay 15-year-old boy named Larry
who was an eighth-grader in Oxnard, California was murdered
by a fellow eighth-grader named Brandon. Larry was killed
because he . . . was gay. Days before he was murdered, Larry
asked his killer to be his Valentine . . . . And somewhere along
the line the killer Brandon got the message that it’s so
threatening and so awful and so horrific that Larry would want
to be his Valentine that killing Larry seemed to be the right
thing to do. And when the message out there is [that it is] so
horrible . . . to be gay you can be killed for it, we need to
change the message.
Ellen DeGeneres (Feb. 29, 2008)1
INTRODUCTION
Americans today have mixed feelings about homosexuality.2 A 2007
Gallup/USA poll found that while 48% of those polled felt
homosexuality was an acceptable alternative lifestyle, 46% felt the
opposite way.3 Another 2007 poll found that 51% of those polled
thought homosexual behavior is morally wrong, and only 35% felt
homosexual behavior is acceptable.4 Americans are also deeply
divided over whether gays and lesbians should be allowed to marry.5
1
DeGeneres spoke about the killing of Lawrence King on the Ellen DeGeneres
show during an opening segment on February 29, 2008. For footage of this clip see The
Ellen DeGeneres Show, A Tragedy That Should Never Have Happened,
http://ellen.warnerbros.com/2008/07/a_tragedy_that_should_never_ha.php (last visited
Oct. 16, 2008).
2
Toni Lester, Adam and Steve v. Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme Court Grant
Gays the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 253, 254 (2006) (noting
that “[w]hile studies indicate that most Americans support the adoption of laws that
grant gays the most basic of civil rights, like the right to the kind of privacy in the
bedroom that Lawrence [v. Texas] envisioned, many also believe that homosexuality is
immoral”).
3
Gallup & USA Today, iPOLL Databank, Gallup/USA Today Poll (Sept. 7-8,
2007), available at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html (basing poll on
telephone interviews with national adult sample of 1,028 individuals).
4
Quinnipiac Univ. Polling Inst., Polling the Nations, Quinnipiac University Poll
(Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://poll.orspub.com (reflecting views of Florida voters).
The same poll found similar results in Pennsylvania and Ohio. Id. (finding 53% of
Pennsylvania voters felt homosexual behavior morally wrong versus 34% who found it
acceptable, and 55% of Ohio voters felt homosexual behavior morally wrong versus
30% who found it acceptable).
5
According to a 2007 survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 55%
of Americans oppose same-sex marriage while 36% percent support it. Press Release,
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While there is more acceptance of lesbians and gays today compared
to just a few years ago,6 gays and lesbians still experience a significant
amount of prejudice and discrimination.7 Approximately threequarters of gays and lesbians have been the target of verbal abuse and
approximately one-third have been the target of physical violence
based on their sexual orientation.8 Violence against gays and lesbians
Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press & Pew Forum on Religion & Public
Life, Clinton and Giuliani Seen as Not Highly Religious; Romney’s Religion Raises
Concerns 15 (Sept. 6, 2007), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/353.pdf.
In 2004, after Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage, see
Pam Belluck, Same-Sex Marriage: The Overview; Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Wed in
Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/05/18/national/18MARR.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5070&en=727bcbb424713e7a
&ex=1225339200 (last visited Oct. 16, 2008); Move to Ban Gay Marriage Is Killed in
Massachusetts, WASH. POST, June 15, 2007, at A12, 11 states passed constitutional
referendums banning same-sex marriage. Jonathan Rauch, Saying No to ‘I Do,’ THE
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at A8 (“On Nov. 2, 11 out of 11 states passed
constitutional referendums banning same-sex marriage”). In May of 2008, the
California Supreme Court became the second state in the nation besides
Massachusetts to legalize same-sex marriage. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,
453 (Cal. 2008); Maura Dolan, California Supreme Court Overturns Gay Marriage Ban,
L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-megaymarriage16-2008may16.0,6182317.story.
Almost immediately, opponents of
same-sex marriage began collecting signatures to place an initiative amending the
California Constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage on the November ballot. See
Justin Ewers, California Court Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 15, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/05/15/californiacourt-legalizes-same-sex-marriage.html; Rauch, supra note 5, at A8. On November 4,
2008, a majority of California voters passed Proposition 8, amending the California
Constitution to ban same-sex marriage in California. Randal C. Archibold & Abby
Goodnough, California Voters Ban Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/06ballot.html?partner+rssnyt&emc+r
ss (last visited Nov. 19, 2008). On October 10, 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court
reversed a legislative ban on same-sex marriage. William Branigan, Conn. Ban on Gay
Marriage Reversed, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2008, at A2. As of the writing of this Article,
Massachusetts and Connecticut are the only two states in the nation that allow samesex marriage.
6
See Jeni Loftus, America’s Liberalization of Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, 1973
to 1998, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 762, 765 (2001).
7
See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUBL’N. NO. 3194, INSIDE-OUT: A REPORT ON
THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIANS, GAYS AND BISEXUALS IN AMERICA AND THE PUBLIC’S VIEWS
ON ISSUES AND POLICIES RELATED TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 19 (2001), available at
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/New-Surveys-on-Experiences-of-Lesbians-Gaysand-Bisexuals-and-the-Public-s-Views-Related-to-Sexual -Orientation-Report.pdf.
8
Id.; see also Dominic J. Parrott & Amos Zeichner, Effects of Sexual Prejudice and
Anger on Physical Aggression Toward Gay and Heterosexual Men, 6 PSYCHOL. OF MEN &
MASCULINITY 3, 3 (2005) (“Alarmingly, over one third of gay men and lesbians have
been victims of interpersonal violence, and up to 94% report some type of
victimization related to their sexual orientation.”). In 2006, 1,415 of the 9,080 hate
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is a problem even in cities with sizable gay and lesbian populations.
In a survey of young adults in the San Francisco Bay Area, “almost 1 in
5 men admitted to physically assaulting or threatening people whom
they believed were homosexual.”9
When a heterosexual man kills a gay man and faces a murder
charge, a common defense strategy is to use the concept of “gay panic”
to explain the killing.10 There is no officially recognized “gay panic”
defense, but many use the term to refer to defense strategies that rely
on the notion that a criminal defendant should be excused or justified
if his violent actions were in response to a (homo)sexual advance. 11
Such strategies include using gay panic to bolster claims of insanity,
diminished capacity, provocation, and self-defense. In this paper, I
use the term “gay panic defense” as shorthand for these strategies.
Initially, the term “homosexual panic” was used to promote “the
idea that a latent homosexual — and manifest ‘homophobe’ — can be

crimes reported to the FBI were based on the victim’s sexual orientation. FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2006 HATE CRIME STATISTICS 1 (2007),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2006/table1.html (last visited June 17, 2008). In
2007, the number of reported bias incidents nationwide fell 1.3 percent. Hate Crimes:
Good news on bias incidents based on race and religion. Bad news on those based on
sexual orientation, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2008, at A22. This decrease was driven by a
4.2 percent reduction in the number of reported bias crimes based on religion and a
3.2 reduction in those based on race. Id. These decreases were accompanied by a 5.5
percent increase in reported hate crimes based on the victim’s perceived sexual
orientation. Id.
9
Karen Franklin & Gregory M. Herek, Homosexuals, Violence Toward, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIOLENCE, PEACE, CONFLICT 139, 144 (Lester Kurtz & Jennifer
Turpin eds., 1999).
10
See Duncan Osborne, The Homosexual Panic Defense: Are Juries Really Buying
It?, LGNY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1999, at 4; see also Gary David Comstock, Dismantling the
Homosexual Panic Defense, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 81, 81-82 (1992) [hereinafter
Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense]; Developments in the Law —
Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1542-46 (1989); Joshua
Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections On Provocation
Law, Sexual Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 726, 726-32 (1995) [hereinafter Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill
“Homosexual” Men]; Robert Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual
Advance As Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 133-34 (1992); Martha C.
Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF
LAW 30, 35-38 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999); Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Note, Provocation’s
Privileged Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, “Homosexual Panic,” and the Non-Violent
Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 201-03, 210-13
(2000); Kara S. Suffredini, Note, Pride and Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic Defense,
21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279, 279, 302 (2001).
11
Gay panic arguments have been called the Homosexual Advance Defense, the
Homosexual Panic Defense, and the Homosexual Rage Defense.
OF
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so upset by a homosexual’s advances to him that he becomes
temporarily insane, in which state he may kill the homosexual.”12
More recently, the term “gay panic” has been deployed to refer to the
alleged loss of self-control provoked in a heterosexual man by a gay
man’s unwanted sexual advance.
In this Article, I examine the use of gay panic defense strategies in
the criminal courtroom. I argue that such strategies are problematic
because they reinforce and promote negative stereotypes about gay
men as sexual deviants and sexual predators.13 Gay panic defense
strategies are also troubling because they seek to capitalize on
unconscious bias in favor of heterosexuality that is prevalent in today’s
heterocentric society.14
Most critics of the gay panic defense have proposed that judges or
legislatures should bar gay panic arguments from the criminal
courtroom.15 I take a contrary position and argue that banning gay
12

Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 893 (7th Cir. 1983).
See Gregory M. Herek, The Social Context of Hate Crimes: Notes on Cultural
Heterosexism, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
96 (1992) (noting that gay sexuality is stereotyped as “pathological, predatory, and
compulsively promiscuous”); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?
Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 511, 541-44 (1992) (discussing portrayals of gay people as child molesters
and predatory, promiscuous sex addicts); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and
Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 66 n.170 (1995) (discussing images of
gay men as sexual predators who exploit children, lust after non-gay men, and are
indiscriminately promiscuous with each other); Suffredini, Pride and Prejudice, supra
note 10, at 312 (noting that “men who engage in homosexual behavior are stereotyped
as sexual predators”); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay
Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358,
1382 (2000) (discussing “gay as white and privileged” stereotype); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Out yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Theory and Political
Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 608-09 (1997) (discussing “gay as promiscuous”
stereotype and “gay as white and wealthy” stereotype).
14
See Kathy Miriam, Toward a Phenomenology of Sex-Right: Reviving Radical
Feminist Theory of Compulsory Heterosexuality, 22 HYPATIA 210, 211 (2007) (noting
that “most people cleave to the idea that heterosexuality is natural”); Mison, supra
note 10, at 147 (“American society is heterocentric in that it is dominated by and
centers around a heterosexual viewpoint.”); see also DEREK MCGHEE, HOMOSEXUALITY,
LAW AND RESISTANCE 3 (2001) (“[H]eteronormativity is . . . the term used to specify
the tendency in the contemporary Western sex-gender system to view heterosexual
relations as the norm, and all other forms of sexual behaviour as deviations from this
norm.”) (citation omitted); Tiina Rosenberg, Out Of the National Closet: Show Me
Love, in SEX, BREATH, AND FORCE: SEXUAL DIFFERENCE IN A POST-FEMINIST ERA 111
(Ellen Mortensen ed., 2006) (“Heteronormativity is the supposition that everyone is
heterosexual, and that the natural way of life is heterosexual.”).
15
See Mison, supra note 10, at 176-77 (arguing that judges should rule as matter
13
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panic arguments from the criminal courtroom is a bad idea. When gay
panic arguments are forced to take a covert turn — when they are not
explicit or out in the open — they may actually be more effective than
they would be if out in the open. Social science research on implicit
bias suggests that making race salient can diminish the otherwise
automatic effect of racial stereotypes on perception and beliefs.16
Conversely, pretending that race is irrelevant allows unconscious
racism to operate without any constraints.17 It appears the same is
true of other types of bias, including sexual orientation bias.18 Rather
than precluding defendants from making gay panic arguments, I argue
that the criminal courtroom is the place where such arguments can,
and should, be aired and battled.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I review the historical
origins of the concept of gay panic. Gay panic — the idea that a nonviolent homosexual advance by a gay man can cause a heterosexual man
to panic and respond with fatal violence — has roots in theories about
latent homosexuality as a mental disorder. The term “homosexual
panic” was coined in 1920 by a psychiatrist who saw a pattern in many
of his patients who self-identified as heterosexual but were attracted to
individuals of the same sex.19 These patients experienced a heightened
sense of anxiety in same-sex environments between their feelings of
attraction to others of the same sex and what they felt were the socially
acceptable feelings they were supposed to have.20
In the 1960s, criminal defense attorneys representing male
defendants charged with murdering male victims began using the idea
of gay panic to explain why decision makers should find their clients
not guilty.21 They argued that their clients panicked and killed only
of law that non-violent homosexual advances do not constitute legally adequate
provocation); Victoria L. Steinberg, Book Note, A Heat of Passion Offense: Emotions
and Bias in “Trans Panic” Mitigation Claims, 25 B.C. THIRD WORD L.J. 499, 523-24
(2005) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY (2004)) (arguing
that judges should not allow gay or trans panic arguments); Suffredini, supra note 10,
at 309-13 (arguing that use of Homosexual Panic Defense should either be limited by
application of new evidentiary rules or eliminated altogether). But cf. Dressler, When
“Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men, supra note 10, at 726-29 (arguing against
Mison’s proposal).
16
See infra text accompanying notes 378-419.
17
See infra text accompanying notes 378-419.
18
See infra text accompanying notes 425-37.
19
EDWARD J. KEMPF, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 477 (1921).
20
Id. at 479.
21
Joshua Hammer, The ‘Gay Panic’ Defense, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, at 40,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/90113/page/2 (last visited Oct. 16, 2008)
(noting that gay panic defense “often resulted in acquittals or reduced charges in the
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after the victim made a homosexual advance.22 I explain why
importing the concept of Homosexual Panic Disorder into the criminal
arena to excuse or justify the killing of a gay man is problematic.
In Part II, I first examine the doctrinal underpinnings of the gay
panic defense. Initially, heterosexual male defendants charged with
murdering gay men linked claims of gay panic to criminal law
defenses based on mental deficiency, such as temporary insanity or
diminished capacity. More recently, such defendants have used gay
panic to bolster claims of provocation and self-defense. I also examine
the “trans panic” defense,23 a fairly recent modification of the gay
panic defense under which a male murder defendant charged with
murdering a male-to-female transgender individual claims that he
panicked upon learning that his sexual partner was biologically male,
not female. Just as the defendant claiming gay panic tries to blame the
gay male victim for his own death (“if he hadn’t made a pass at me, I
wouldn’t have killed him”), the defendant claiming trans panic tries to
blame the transgender victim by claiming the victim’s deceit provoked
him (“if he hadn’t lied about being a woman, I wouldn’t have killed
him”).24 Gay panic arguments linked to claims of mental defect have
largely been unsuccessful,25 whereas gay panic arguments linked to
claims of provocation have been relatively successful.26
Next, I theorize about why gay panic provocation arguments have
enjoyed relative success in the criminal courtroom. First, lenient
verdicts in gay panic provocation cases may reflect the jury’s view that it
is reasonable for a heterosexual man to react violently to a non-violent
homosexual advance. Given that reasonableness in the context of
provocation doctrine is usually understood to mean typicality, if the
jury believes that the average man would have been provoked by a nonviolent homosexual advance, then the jury might conclude that the
defendant was reasonably provoked. I question whether the current
understanding of reasonableness as that which is typical makes sense.
Related to the above argument, lenient verdicts in gay panic
provocation cases may be a reflection of dominant norms of
murders of homosexuals during the 1960s and 1970s”).
22
Suffredini, supra note 10, at 292 (noting that first reported judicial mention of
homosexual panic disorder came in 1967 case of People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr.
253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)).
23
See Steinberg, supra note 15, at 501 (arguing that judges should decline to
instruct juries on manslaughter when trans panic is claimed because trans panic does
not fulfill requirements of heat of passion).
24
See infra text accompanying notes 211-34.
25
See infra text accompanying notes 118-32.
26
See infra text accompanying notes 140-210.
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masculinity that legitimize the use of physical violence in response to
non-violent homosexual advances. Men in this society are supposed
to be attracted to women, not other men. Men in this society are
supposed to be the sexual aggressors, not the ones aggressed upon.
When a heterosexual man is the object of a homosexual advance, the
tables are turned. The heterosexual man’s masculinity is called into
question. He is not the sexual aggressor in this situation; instead, he is
the target. In rejecting the homosexual advance in a physically violent
manner, the heterosexual man attempts to reclaim his masculinity in a
socially acceptable way.
Additionally, lenient verdicts in gay panic cases may reflect the
influence of negative stereotypes about gay men as sexual deviants and
sexual predators. Despite positive advancements in the recognition of
civil rights for gays and lesbians, negative stereotypes about
homosexuals still persist. In gay panic cases, the defendant seeks to
use such stereotypes to his advantage.
In Part III, I strike a different path from that of other critics of the
gay panic defense. Other critics have proposed essentially the same
remedy: barring defendants from arguing gay panic. In contrast, I
argue that judges should as a general rule allow such arguments as
long as some evidence supports the traditional criminal law defense
that the defendant is asserting through the gay panic lens. This is the
same standard many jurisdictions currently use to decide whether a
trial court must allow a proffered defense.27
To bolster this potentially unpopular position, I start with a microargument: attempts to ban gay panic from the criminal courtroom will
not work because gay panic arguments can and will be made sub rosa.
I use the Matthew Shepard case to show how defendants can still
promote gay panic arguments even when a judge formally bans a gay
panic defense. In the Shepard case, the judge ruled against the defense
presenting a “homosexual rage” defense.28 Nonetheless, the defense
promoted a gay panic argument by calling two witnesses to the stand
who testified that Shepard made sexual advances upon them, which
made them uncomfortable.29 The defense also included reference to
Shepard’s alleged homosexual advance upon defendant Aaron
McKinney in closing arguments.30
I then turn to several macro-arguments to support my theory that
banning gay panic defense strategies from the criminal courtroom is a
27
28
29
30

See infra text accompanying notes 470-80.
See infra text accompanying notes 285-88.
See infra text accompanying notes 289-305.
See infra text accompanying note 307.
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bad idea. Three broader frameworks support my position: (1) First
Amendment theory; (2) recent social science research on implicit bias;
and (3) institutional competency arguments.
First Amendment scholars often argue that banning offensive speech
is not good policy because this merely allows bad ideas to fester below
the surface.31 Open discussion of pernicious ideas is a better way to
deal with such ideas than banning such discussion outright. Along the
same lines, banning gay panic arguments from the criminal courtroom
is not a good idea because this simply allows bias against
homosexuality to fester in the subconscious realm. Open discussion
about whether it is reasonable for a heterosexual man to respond to a
non-violent homosexual advance with fatal physical violence is a
better way to ensure that such bias is mediated by cognitive processes.
Recent social science research indicates that despite a marked decline
over the last several decades in self-reported expressions of racial bias,
implicit bias is still very prevalent today.32 Even individuals who selfidentify as egalitarian tend to respond more negatively toward Blacks
than Whites when racial stereotypes are activated and there is little or
no time to consciously recognize that such stereotypes have been
activated.33 Several studies, however, have found that when race is
made salient, most individuals are able to consciously mediate their
responses and, instead of invoking automatic stereotype-congruent
responses, respond in egalitarian ways.34
I suggest that if making race salient — bringing race to the surface
and making people conscious of the racial aspects of the situation —
helps individuals to act in less biased ways, the same may also be true
when sexual orientation is made salient.35 One recent study, which
measured the effect of making non-prejudiced norms about sexual
orientation salient, provides support for this position.36 This study
found that hearing another person publicly express positive opinions
about gay-related issues influenced subjects to express positive
31

See infra text accompanying note 337.
See infra text accompanying notes 351-78.
33
See infra text accompanying notes 351-78.
34
See infra text accompanying notes 378-419.
35
Here, I am not making the claim that gays and lesbians are the “same as” Blacks
and other racial minorities. See Catherine Smith, Queer as Black Folk?, 2007 WIS. L.
REV. 379, 382 (2007) (critiquing mainstream lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
or LGBT political advocacy that invokes “same as” mantra by comparing LGBT rights
to Black civil rights). Rather, I am merely suggesting that insights from social
cognition research on race and implicit bias may suggest helpful ways to deal with
sexual orientation bias against gays.
36
See infra text accompanying notes 426-37.
32
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opinions about gay-related issues themselves, even when completing a
questionnaire form in private.
Finally, I consider which institutional actor — the legislature, the
judge, or the jury — is best suited to determine whether to grant
leniency to the criminal defendant who claims gay panic. I argue that
the legislature is the least competent to make this determination
because it cannot imagine all possible factual scenarios in advance.
The legislature can only enact one-size-fits-all rules, which are
particularly ill suited for criminal matters where factual context is
critical to a fair adjudication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
As between judge and jury, I argue that a jury of twelve individuals
is better suited to weigh the issues when a heterosexual man charged
with murdering a gay man claims gay panic. At least with a twelveperson jury, chosen after each side has had a chance to strike jurors on
either extreme, there is a good chance that some jurors will have a
positive attitude about homosexuality and express that attitude,
making non-prejudiced norms about sexual orientation salient.
It is also better to let twelve individuals deliberate the merits of such
claims than to leave this power in the hands of one lone judge. This is
because questions such as whether it is reasonable for a heterosexual
man to be provoked into a heat of passion by a gay man’s non-violent
sexual advance, or whether it is likely that a non-violent sexual
advance caused the defendant to go temporarily insane, are the kinds
of matters about which reasonable minds may disagree. In the end,
our society will be better off if juries representing the conscience of
the community decide these volatile issues. If we want to rid society
of the cultural norms that make gay panic arguments persuasive, we
need to openly battle the assumptions that underlie such claims. The
best way to engage in this battle is to allow defendants to raise such
arguments, make sure prosecutors expose the flaws in such
arguments, and encourage jurors to deliberate consciously on these
arguments and their underlying assumptions.
In Part IV, I offer some tentative suggestions for reform. To
encourage jurors to leave stereotypes and prejudice outside the jury
room, I suggest that prosecutors adopt a two-pronged strategy. On the
front end, during jury selection, the prosecutor should request specific
questions aimed at both reminding egalitarian jurors of their
commitment to fairness and equality and ferreting out closet
homophobes. During opening statements, the prosecutor should
make sexual orientation salient by warning jurors that the defense may
try to appeal to stereotypes about gay men as sexual deviants and
sexual predators. The prosecutor should ask jurors to guard against
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any unconscious bias they might have against the victim on the basis
of sexual orientation.
On the back end, after the jury has heard all the evidence and before
it retires to deliberate, prosecutors should suggest during closing
arguments that jurors engage in sexual orientation and gender
switching by imagining the same facts but with the victim a female
making a sexual advance upon a gay man who responds by killing her.
The prosecutor should also ask the trial court to give a role-reversal
jury instruction. This jury instruction would warn jurors against
allowing sexual orientation bias to influence their decision-making
and encourage jurors to imagine the facts of the case with the
defendant as a gay man (rather than a heterosexual man) who kills a
heterosexual woman (rather than a gay man) after she makes a nonviolent sexual advance upon him. The judge could also instruct jurors
to imagine the same facts but with the defendant as a heterosexual
woman who kills a heterosexual man after he makes a non-violent
sexual advance upon her. The judge would tell jurors that if they
come to a different conclusion about the culpability of the defendant
in either of these role-reversal exercises, they should go back to the
case to make sure they have not allowed sexual orientation bias to
influence their decision-making.
I.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF GAY PANIC

The use of gay panic in murder cases has its roots in theories about
latent homosexuality as a mental disorder. The term “homosexual
panic” was coined by Dr. Edward Kempf, a clinical psychiatrist, in
After treating many patients who exhibited similar
1920.37
characteristics, Kempf came to the conclusion that certain troubled
individuals who thought of themselves as heterosexuals were actually
latent homosexuals.38 These individuals suffered from an internal
conflict between their feelings of attraction to individuals of the same
sex and societal views of such feelings as perverse.39 They also
experienced a heightened sense of anxiety in same-sex environments,
caused by this tension between their true feelings of attraction to
members of the same sex and what they perceived as the socially

37
KEMPF, supra note 19, at 477; see also Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual
Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 82 (citing KEMPF, supra note 19, at 477).
38
KEMPF, supra note 19, at 477-515.
39
Id.
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acceptable feelings they were supposed to have — attraction to
members of the opposite sex.40
According to Kempf, the male patient afflicted with homosexual panic
would be attracted to same-sex associations and horrified by the
amorous female.41 After heterosexual failure, the patient would become
anxious, depressed, and sometimes suicidal.42 Interestingly, separation
from an individual of the same sex to whom the patient was attracted,
rather than a homosexual advance, would precipitate a panic state.43
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the
official list of psychiatric disorders published by the American
Psychiatric Association, listed “Homosexual Panic Disorder” in its
1952 edition, but the term has not appeared in that Manual since
then.44 Even in 1952, many of the standard psychiatric and
psychological dictionaries did not recognize Homosexual Panic
Disorder as a psychiatric disorder.45
While Kempf’s original theory has been stretched almost beyond
recognition in its use as a defense in the criminal courtroom today,
modern support does exist for the idea that men who self-identify as
heterosexual and express hostility toward gays may actually be latent
homosexuals. In 1996, Henry Adams conducted a study to find out
whether heterosexual men who exhibited strong anti-gay sentiments
would be aroused by homosexual erotica.46 Adams started by measuring
sixty-four Caucasian male participants’ feelings toward gays.47 All
participants self-identified as heterosexual.48 After evaluating their
responses, Adams divided the participants into two groups which he
labeled “homophobic” (those who seemed hostile toward gays) and “not
homophobic” (those who were not hostile toward gays). He then placed
a sensor on the penises of all the participants, and measured penile
response to erotic videotapes involving heterosexuals, lesbians, and gay
men engaging in sexual activity. Only the men in Adams’s homophobic
40

Id.
Id. at 511.
42
Id.
43
Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 87-88
(citing LELAND E. HINSIE & ROBERT J. CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 348-49
(1970)).
44
Id. at 83 (citation omitted).
45
Id.
46
Henry E. Adams et al., Is Homophobia Associated With Homosexual Arousal?, 105
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 440, 440 (1996); see also Michael Segell, Homophobia Doesn’t
Lie, ESQUIRE, Feb. 1, 1997, at 35.
47
Adams, supra note 46, at 441.
48
Id.
41
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category showed an increase in penile erection in response to male
homosexual erotic stimuli.49
Even if some self-identified straight men who express strongly
negative feelings about homosexuality are actually latent homosexuals
repressing their own homoerotic desires, the idea that gay panic
should excuse the killing of a gay man is problematic for several
reasons. First, treating gay panic as a mental disorder suggests that
homophobia50 linked to latent homosexuality is a mental illness.51
49
Id. at 442-43. In contrast, heterosexual women do not appear to display the
same kind of physiological bias against gay men as heterosexual men. Amanda L.
Mahaffey et al., Sex Differences in Affective Responses to Homoerotic Stimuli Evidence for
an Unconscious Bias Among Heterosexual Men but Not Heterosexual Women, 34
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 537, 543-44 (2005). In another study, Jeffrey Bernat
measured physical aggression toward gay and straight individuals after self-identified
heterosexual college males viewed a homoerotic videotape. Jeffrey A. Bernat,
Homophobia and Physical Aggression Toward Homosexual and Heterosexual Individuals,
110 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 179, 179 (2001). Bernat found that after watching the
video, the homophobic males were significantly more aggressive toward gay male
opponents than the non-homophobic men. Id. at 185. It is not clear whether these
men were actually unable to control their aggressive behavior or whether they simply
chose not to do so.
50
Critics of the term “homophobia” note that attaching the prefix “homo” to the
word “phobia” suggests that individuals with negative attitudes about homosexuality
are fearful of homosexuals when anti-homosexual sentiments are often driven more by
prejudice than fear. See generally Colleen R. Logan, Homophobia? No, Homoprejudice,
31 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 31 (1996) (investigating nature of anti-homosexual responses in
male and female undergraduate university students). Colleen Logan warns that “the
continued use of homophobia as a descriptor for anti-homosexual responses may be
seen by society as implicit permission to continue the oppression of homosexuals,
excused by its being the result of inescapable fear.” Id. at 32. Similarly, Gregory
Herek remarks, “Characterizing hostility toward homosexual persons in terms of a
phobia implies that those attitudes are based upon an irrational fear, similar to the fear
some people experience when confronted with snakes, spiders, or open spaces.”
Gregory M. Herek, Beyond “Homophobia”: A Social Psychological Perspective on
Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men, 10 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1, 2 (1984). Stephanie
Shields and Robert Harriman note:

The great difference between the unreasonable fear of spiders (or mutilation,
snakes, etc.) and fear of homosexuality lies in the assignment of
responsibility for such acquired pathologies. Whereas spider phobics
typically accept responsibility for their fear and even seek treatment,
homophobics do not. To the homophobic it is homosexual men who are
“sick.”
Stephanie A. Shields & Robert E. Harriman, Fear of Male Homosexuality: Cardiac
Responses of Low and High Homonegative Males, 10 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 53, 66 (1984);
see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Dissecting Axes of Subordination: The Need for a
Structural Analysis, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 15-16 (2002) [hereinafter
Hutchinson, Dissecting Axes of Subordination] (differentiating “homophobia” which
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Studies, however, indicate that negative attitudes about homosexuality
tend to come from two sources: sexual conservatism and prejudice.52
Although some mental health practitioners might feel otherwise,53
sexually conservative individuals and prejudiced individuals are not
necessarily mentally ill.
The idea that homosexuality, latent or otherwise, is a mental illness
has long been discredited. In December 1973, after a review of the
scientific literature and consultation with experts in the field, the
Board of Trustees for the American Psychiatric Association deleted
homosexuality from the second edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.54 The Board recognized that
“[a] significant proportion of homosexuals are apparently satisfied
with their sexual orientation, show no significant signs of manifest
psychopathology . . . and are able to function quite effectively.”55 The
American Psychological Association followed suit in January 1975,
adopting the following resolution: “Homosexuality per se implies no
impairment in judgement [sic], stability, reliability, or general social
and vocational capabilities; Further, the American Psychological
Association urges all mental health professionals to take the lead in
removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been associated
with homosexual orientations.”56
Even though more than thirty years have passed since both the
American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological
Association rejected the characterization of homosexuality as a mental
illness, the idea that it might be normal for someone to be sexually
attracted to another person of the same sex is not yet accepted
universally. For example, the Boy Scouts of America, which boasts
nearly 2.9 million youth members and more than 1.1 million adult
involves “pronounced emotional animus” and “heterosexism” which involves
“institutionalized domination of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals”).
51
See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 34 (Harvard Law Review eds., 1990).
52
See Thomas J. Ficarrotto, Racism, Sexism, and Erotophobia: Attitudes of
Heterosexuals Towards Homosexuals, 19 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 111, 115 (1990).
53
In 2005, some mental health practitioners began arguing that extreme forms of
racism, homophobia, and other prejudice ought to be recognized by the American
Psychiatric Association as mental disorders. Shankar Vedantam, Psychiatry Ponders
Whether Extreme Bias Can Be an Illness, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2005, at Al.
54
Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Homosexuality and Sexual Orientation Disturbance: Proposed
Change in DSM-II, 6th Printing, page 44, Position Statement (Retired), APA Document
Reference No. 730008, at 2 (1973), available at http://www.psychiatryonline.com/
DSMPDF/DSM-II_Homosexuality_Revision.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
55
Id.
56
APA Online, APA Policy Statement: Discrimination Against Homosexuals,
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/policy/discrimination.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
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members,57 openly prohibits gay males from membership in the
organization because it believes “homosexual conduct is inconsistent
with the traditional values espoused in the Scout Oath and Law.”58
According to the Boy Scouts of America: “homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout oath that a Scout be
morally straight and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word
and deed.”59
Apparently, the Department of Defense also considers
homosexuality a mental abnormality. In June 2006, a think tank at
the University of California at Santa Barbara discovered a 1996
Department of Defense Instruction that classified homosexuality as a
mental disorder, along with mental retardation, impulse control
disorders, and personality disorders.60 Both the American Psychiatric
Association and the American Psychological Association wrote to the
Department of Defense, pointing out that homosexuality is no longer
regarded as a mental disorder and requesting that the Instruction be
corrected.61 The Department of Defense subsequently released a
57
Boy Scouts of Am., BSA at a Glance, http://www.scouting.org/Media/FactSheets/
02-501.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
58
Press Release, Boy Scouts of Am., Boy Scouts of America Resolution (Feb. 6,
2002), available at http://www.scouting.org/Media/PressReleases/2002/resolution.aspx
(last visited May 19, 2008).
59
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 652 (2000). James Dale
unsuccessfully attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the Boy Scouts of
America’s anti-gay policy. Dale joined the Boy Scouts when he was eight years old and
remained a Boy Scout until he turned 18. Id. at 644. Dale was an exemplary Scout
and achieved the rank of Eagle Scout, one of the Boy Scouts’ highest honors, in 1988.
Id. In 1989, Dale applied for adult membership in the Boy Scouts and a position as an
assistant scoutmaster. The Boy Scouts approved Dale’s application for adult
membership and made him an assistant scoutmaster. About this time, Dale left home
to attend Rutgers University where he came out of the closet. He eventually became
Vice President of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance. When the Boy Scouts
of America found out that Dale was gay, they revoked his adult membership. Dale
sued the Boy Scouts, arguing that they had violated New Jersey law prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.
While the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with Dale, the United States Supreme
Court did not. In a closely divided 5-4 opinion, the Court in 2000 held that applying
New Jersey’s public accommodation law to require the Boy Scouts to readmit Dale
would violate the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association. Id.
60
Press Release, Ctr. for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, Lawmakers
Dispute Pentagon Document Calling Gays Mentally Ill (June 20, 2006), available at
http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/lawmakers_dispute_pentagon_docume
nt; see also DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION NO. 1332.38 (Nov. 14, 1996).
61
Beyond Homophobia: A Weblog About Sexual Orientation, Prejudice, Science,
and Policy by Gregory Herek, http://www.beyondhomophobia.com/blog/2006/11/19/
military-psychology/ (Nov. 19, 2006, 13:49 PST).
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revised Instruction, which removed homosexuality from the category
Nonetheless, the Instruction still lists
of mental disorders.62
homosexuality as a “defect” along with dyslexia, motion sickness,
enuresis (bed-wetting), and repeated venereal disease infections.63
Another problem with using Kempf’s Homosexual Panic Disorder
theory to support a mental defect defense in a murder case is that not
one of Kempf’s patients was aggressive toward another because of a
sexual advance.64 Indeed, separation from an individual of the same sex
to whom the patient was attracted would often cause the onset of
“homosexual panic” and lead to increased passivity and an inability to
function.65 Moreover, if physical at all, Kempf’s patients tended to inflict
punishment upon themselves, not others.66 Adrian Howe observes:
[T]here was a considerable discrepancy between cases
reported in the psychiatric literature and the cases involving
immediate reaction or sudden panics described in the legal
defences. Patients diagnosed with acute homosexual panic
demonstrated a helplessness, passivity, and inability to be
aggressive far removed from the picture of the explosively
violent man constructed by lawyers deploying a HPD
[Homosexual Panic Disorder] defence. The legal argument
that this disorder was likely to result in extreme violence
therefore had no psychiatric basis.67
Similarly, Gary Comstock notes:
As a psychological disorder in which neither sexual advance to
the patient by another person nor violent attack by the patient
of another person are causal or symptomatic, acute
homosexual panic would seem to be inappropriate as the basis
of a legal defense for men who claim to have killed another
man to ward off his sexual advance.68

62

Id.
Id.
64
See Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 84.
65
See id. at 87-88 (citing LELAND E. HINSIE & ROBERT J. CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC
DICTIONARY 348-49 (1970)).
66
Id. at 87.
67
Adrian Howe, More Folk Provoke Their Own Demise (Homophobic Violence and
Sexed Excuses – Rejoining the Provocation Law Debate, Courtesy of the Homosexual
Advance Defence), 19 SYDNEY L. REV. 336, 342 (1997).
68
Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 86.
63
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A final discrepancy between Kempf’s theory and the use of gay panic
in the criminal courtroom is that the murder defendants who claim
gay panic made them kill have been almost exclusively male,69
whereas Kempf’s patients were both male and female.70 Comstock
questions why we should accept claims of gay panic made by men who
kill in response to gay male sexual advances when women apparently
do not kill in response to lesbian sexual advances:
[I]f the homosexual panic defense is premised on the
disorder’s causing murderous behavior in those it afflicts, why
have female patients not been driven to kill? . . . To be used
convincingly as a cause for killing, the disorder would have to
be documented with evidence that both male and female
patients have killed.71
While it is not inconceivable that a woman might panic and respond
violently to a lesbian sexual advance, homicide cases involving claims
of lesbian panic are rarely seen. In one unusual case, a woman named
Melissa Burch Harton argued that she killed her friend Natasha
Bacchus in self-defense after Bacchus told Harton that she was in love
with Harton and wanted to kiss her.72 The jury rejected Harton’s
claim of self-defense, but showed leniency by finding her guilty of
involuntary manslaughter, rather than murder.73 While it is certainly
possible that Homosexual Panic Disorder, if it exists at all, manifests
differently in men and women,74 the dearth of lesbian panic cases
suggests that gay panic is not the product of a mental disease or defect.
Instead, gay panic seems to stem from a specific construction of
masculinity, one that values heterosexism and violence as traits of the
masculine and implicitly rejects homoerotic desire.

69

See id. at 89.
KEMPF, supra note 19, at 506-11.
71
Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 89-90.
72
Amit R. Paley, Murder Jury Will Hear A Claim of Obsession, WASH. POST, Jan. 31,
2006, at B5.
73
Amit R. Paley, Md. Woman Convicted of Killing Female Friend, WASH. POST, Feb.
11, 2006, at B4.
74
It is undisputed that men are responsible for most violent crime. See UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: ARRESTS BY SEX (2006), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_42.html (reporting that of 10,472,432
persons arrested in 2006, 7,985,505 were male and only 2,486,927 were female). See
generally Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes
and What Might We Do About It?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 (1996) (noting that in
1993, one man out of every 50 men in workforce was incarcerated).
70
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GAY PANIC IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM

Borrowing from Kempf’s Homosexual Panic Disorder theory, male
defendants charged with murdering gay men have sought mitigation
or exoneration by claiming gay panic, either as a manifestation of
mental disease or defect or as support for a claim of provocation or
self-defense. In this part, I first consider whether gay panic, if allowed
as a defense, should be recognized as an excuse or a justification.
Next, I unpack the doctrinal underpinnings of gay panic defense
arguments. Finally, I theorize about why gay panic provocation
claims have enjoyed relative success compared to gay panic arguments
linked to mental incapacity defenses.
A. Excuse or Justification?
A preliminary question is whether gay panic, if allowed as a defense
argument, should be recognized as an excuse or a justification. An
excuse defense is one in which the actor’s conduct is viewed as
wrongful, but the actor himself is not seen as morally blameworthy.75
A justification defense, in contrast, focuses on the actor’s conduct
more than the individual characteristics of the actor.76 A justification
defense says the actor’s conduct was appropriate under the
circumstances.77 Examples of excuse defenses include insanity,
duress, and intoxication. Necessity, self-defense, and defense of others
are usually considered justification defenses.
It is difficult to argue that gay panic should be called either a
justification or an excuse. Justification suggests the defendant did the
right thing or took the course of action that society would have
wanted him to take. A man who kills a gay man just because that man
made a pass at him does not act the way a civilized society should
want its men to act.78 Gay panic should not be recognized as a
justification defense.
75
Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men, supra note 10, at 763
n.17 (“[A]n excuse is in the nature of a claim that although the actor has harmed
society, she should not be blamed . . . for causing that harm . . . . [A]n excuse negates
the moral blameworthiness of the actor for causing the harm.”).
76
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978) (“A justification
speaks to the rightness of the act . . . .”); Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the
Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and
Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 66, 68 n.37 (1984) (discussing distinction between
justifications and excuses).
77
FLETCHER, supra note 76, at 759 (“A justification speaks to the rightness of the act.”).
78
If the victim does more than just make a pass — if, for example, the victim tries
to forcibly rape the defendant, then ordinary self-defense principles would allow the
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An excuse defense suggests that the defendant is not as morally
blameworthy as one who does the same action without the excusing
condition. It is difficult to say that the man who kills a gay man in
response to a non-violent homosexual advance is not as morally
blameworthy as someone who kills for any other reason.
In any event, answering the justification-excuse question is
unnecessary because gay panic is not a separate, freestanding
defense,79 and I do not argue that courts should recognize it as such.
Gay panic is merely an argument used to bolster a traditional criminal
law defense such as insanity, diminished capacity, provocation, or selfdefense. Therefore, whether a gay panic argument will operate as an
excuse or a justification will depend on which traditional defense it is
used to support. While one can debate whether the doctrine of
provocation is appropriately characterized as a partial excuse (as I
have done in previous work),80 the general consensus is that
provocation is a partial excuse defense, self-defense is a justification
defense, and insanity and diminished capacity are excuse defenses.
defendant to protect himself from the imminent threat of grievous bodily injury.
79
There are numerous examples of other defenses, which, like the gay panic
defense, are not officially recognized defenses but are known in the popular culture.
See, e.g., PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 2 (1997) (“The black rage
defense is a legal strategy used in criminal cases.”); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE
CULTURAL DEFENSE 5 (2004) (“This study analyzes the cultural defense, which, were it
to be established, would require judges to consider the cultural background of litigants
in the disposition of cases before them.”) (emphasis added); Anne M. Coughlin,
Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1994) (discussing “battered woman
syndrome defense” even though not a freestanding, officially-recognized, defense); see
also Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and
Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 62-65, 72-73 (1999) (evaluating when
identity impact evidence, such as cultural defense evidence, evidence of black rage,
and battered woman syndrome evidence, should be admissible).
80
See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 227-30 (2003) [hereinafter LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE
MAN] (arguing that doctrine of provocation contains elements of both justification
and excuse); see also A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
292, 307 (1976) (arguing that provocation has elements of both justification and
excuse); Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD.
L. REV. 467, 469 (1987) (arguing that provocation is generally viewed as partial
excuse); Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense? Some Reflections on a
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 971 (2002) (arguing that provocation should
not be understood in justficatory terms); Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate
(Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse not Justification, 42 MICH. J. L. REFORM
(forthcoming 2009) (on file with author) (arguing that provocation is excuse, not
justification); Finbarr McAuley, Anticipating the Past: The Defence of Provocation in
Irish Law, 50 MOD. L. REV. 133, 133 (1987) (arguing that provocation ought to be
viewed as partial justification).
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B. Insanity
Beginning in 1967, male defendants charged with murdering gay
men began to utilize the concept of homosexual panic to support
mental defect defenses such as insanity and diminished capacity.81
Insanity, a complete defense which results in a not guilty by reason of
insanity (“NGI”) verdict, is defined differently depending on whether
the jurisdiction follows the M’Naghten test or the American Law
Institute’s (“ALI”) test, also known as the Model Penal Code (“MPC”)
test. Under the M’Naghten test, the accused can be found not guilty by
reason of insanity if, at the time of the act, the accused “was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”82 The ALI test,
found in Section 4.01 of the MPC, provides a defense when, as a result
of mental disease or defect, the actor “lacks substantial capacity . . . to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct.”83
Heterosexual men charged with killing gay men have argued that the
victim’s (homo)sexual advance triggered in them a violent psychotic
reaction, causing them to lose control over their mental abilities.84
There are several problems with defense attempts to claim insanity
linked to gay panic. First, to be found not guilty by reason of insanity,
a defendant must not have understood the nature and quality of his
act or appreciated that what he was doing was wrong. In other words,
either he did not know that he was stabbing, choking, or kicking the
victim, or he did not know that it was wrong to do so. The male
defendant claiming that a homosexual advance made him lose his selfcontrol often cannot claim convincingly that he did not know that he
was kicking, beating, or punching the victim or that he did not
understand what he was doing was illegal or immoral.
81
See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
(describing how psychiatrist testified for defense that defendant did not know nature
and quality of his act at time of attack and was acting as result of acute homosexual
panic brought on by fear that victim was sexually molesting him); People v. Parisie,
287 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (noting proffered defense was “insanity
based on ‘homosexual panic’”); State v. Thornton, 532 S.W.2d 37, 44 (Mo. 1975)
(noting that psychiatric evidence offered by defense suggested defendant was in state
of “homosexual panic” at time of stabbing).
82
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1966). Seventeen states
and the federal government have adopted a version of the M’Naghten test. Clark v.
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-50 (2006).
83
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2001). Fourteen states have adopted tests for
insanity inspired by the MPC. Clark, 548 U.S. at 751-52.
84
Osborne, supra note 10, at 4.

492

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:471

Second, to be found not guilty by reason of insanity, the defendant
must have been suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of
his act. The male defendant claiming that a homosexual advance
made him crazy often cannot prove he was suffering from a mental
disease or defect at the time of his act because the American
Psychiatric Association does not recognize Homosexual Panic
Disorder as a mental disease.85 Additionally, the American Psychiatric
Association no longer considers homosexuality a mental disorder.86
This makes it difficult for a defendant to claim latent homosexuality as
a mental disease or defect.
Most claims of insanity based on homosexual panic have not been
successful.87 In People v. Parisie,88 for example, the defendant, John
Parisie, was charged with murder and argued he should be found not
guilty by reason of insanity based on “homosexual panic.”89 Parisie
testified that he was walking down the road when the victim, whom
he had met some time earlier at an automobile dealership, offered him
a lift. According to Parisie, after he got in the car, the victim drove a
while before turning down a gravel road. He then parked, turned off
the lights, slid the seat back, and made an unspecified sexual advance,
telling Parisie that if he refused, he would have to walk.90 Parisie
claimed he went crazy and vaguely remembered struggling with the
victim and hearing a noise that sounded like gunshots.91
At trial, the defense called a clinical psychologist who testified that
Parisie was a highly latent homosexual with strong feelings of
inferiority. The defense also called a psychiatrist who testified that
“‘homosexual panic’ is severe panic or fear reaction that is provoked
by extreme anxiety or psychological trauma, and this often takes the
form of a state of amnesia, in which the person sets aside or forgets
unconsciously something that his conscious mind cannot tolerate.”92

85

Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 83.
Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 54, at 1-3.
87
Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the
Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497, 501 (1984) (asserting that “[c]ases involving the defense of
homosexual panic which have reached the appellate level have never resulted in a
defendant’s acquittal by reason of insanity”).
88
287 N.E.2d 310, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
89
Id. at 313.
90
Id. at 313-14.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 314.
86
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The jury rejected Parisie’s claim of insanity,93 finding him guilty of
murder, and Parisie’s conviction was affirmed on appeal.
A more recent example of a failed attempt to link gay panic to an
insanity defense is reflected in the killing of Billy Jack Gaither. In the
summer of 1998, Charles Butler and his friend, Steven Mullins, beat an
openly gay man named Billy Jack Gaither to death and set his body on
fire atop a pyre of tires. The men claimed they killed Gaither because
he propositioned them.94 At his arraignment on capital murder
charges, Butler pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.95
Before trial, however, Butler withdrew his mental defect defense,96
arguing instead that it was Mullins who actually killed Billy Jack
Gaither. Even though Butler formally withdrew his mental defect
defense, gay panic was prominently featured at his trial. Butler
claimed he hit Gaither only after Gaither told him he was interested in
a sexual threesome with Butler and Mullins. Mullins too asserted that
the reason he killed Gaither was because Gaither had propositioned
him two weeks earlier.
Gaither’s friends, however, said it was highly unlikely that Gaither
would proposition either man. According to one friend: “[Billy Jack]
didn’t walk around acting, looking, or talking gay. If anybody was
asking for sex, it wasn’t him — it was them. We’ve got a lot of
rednecks in here. You don’t make advances with them around.”97
Marian Hammonds, owner of The Tavern, a straight bar which Gaither
frequented, described Gaither as a likeable man who, while never
denying he was gay, “made a point of never doing the gay thing when
he was at our place . . . My husband, Larry didn’t even know he was
93

Id. at 315.
See Trial of Man Accused of Gay Hate Crime Slaying Begins with Defendant Blaming
His Cohort, COURT TV ONLINE, Aug. 4, 1999, http://www.courttv.com/trials/
butler/080499_ctv.html; see also Phillip Rawls, Man Convicted of Capital Murder in Slaying
of Homosexual, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Aug. 5, 1999; Phillip Rawls, Skinhead
Describes Beating Death of Gay Man, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Aug. 4, 1999; Phillip
Rawls, Witness Describes Defendant in Gay Murder as Joking Afterwards, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, Aug. 6, 1999; Jay Reeves, Prosecutor to Recommend Life Without Parole in
Killing of Gay Man, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, June 25, 1999 [hereinafter Jay Reeves,
Prosecutor to Recommend Life Without Parole in Killing of Gay Man].
95
Val Walton, Two Plead Not Guilty in Killing of Gay Man, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, May
21, 1999, at A1 (noting that “Gaither’s sister gasped when Butler’s attorney, William
R. Hill Jr., told Circuit Court Judge John Rochester that his client pleaded not guilty
and not guilty by reason of mental defect”).
96
Jay Reeves, Prosecutor to Recommend Life Without Parole in Killing of Gay Man,
supra note 94.
97
Daniel Pedersen, A Quiet Man’s Tragic Rendezvous with Hate, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
15, 1990, at 65.
94
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gay until about a year ago, and I had to tell him.”98 Hammonds
further remarked, “He [Gaither] didn’t ever put anybody in [an
awkward] position.”99
Mullins’s claim that he killed Gaither because Gaither propositioned
him is suspect for another reason. Friends of Gaither asserted that
Mullins and Gaither had had a sexual relationship which Mullins did
not want anyone to know about, and that Mullins wanted Gaither dead
to ensure that he never would tell anyone about their homosexual affair.
At Butler’s trial, Mullins adamantly denied having sex with Gaither or
any other man. Butler’s attorneys, however, presented several witnesses
who testified that Mullins had a secret gay sex life. One man, Jimmy
Lynn Dean, testified that he and Mullins had had oral sex about four
months before Billy Jack Gaither was killed.100
In Butler’s case, neither gay panic nor the “it wasn’t me” argument
worked. The jury convicted Butler of capital murder. Gaither’s
family, however, requested that Butler be spared the death penalty.101
Accordingly, the judge sentenced Butler to life in prison without the
possibility of parole.102
C. Diminished Capacity
Another doctrinal hook for defendants charged with murdering a
gay man is the diminished capacity defense. Diminished capacity, a
partial defense to murder, generally requires proof that the defendant
was acting under the influence of a mental disease or defect which
affected his capacity to premeditate and deliberate or form the
requisite intent to kill. There are two variants of the diminished
capacity defense. Under the mens rea variant, “evidence that [the
defendant] suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of his
conduct is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that he lacked a
mental state that is an element of the charged offense.”103 Under the
partial responsibility variant, the charge is reduced from murder to
98
Sue Anne Pressley, 2 Accused of Killing, Burning Gay Man, WASH. POST, Mar. 5,
1999, at A1.
99
Cops: Men Plotted Gay Man’s Grisly Slaying, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 5, 1999, at 26.
100
Frontline, Assault on Gay America: The Life and Death of Billy Jack Gaither, Steve
Mullins’ Homosexual Behavior?, Aug. 5, 1999, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/assault/billyjack/mullet.html.
101
Killer of Gay Man in Alabama Gets Life in Prison Without Parole, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
17, 1999, at A14.
102
Id.
103
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 26.02[B][2], at 320 (3d ed.
2001) [hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW].

2008]

The Gay Panic Defense

495

manslaughter because the defendant is seen as “less blameworthy and
therefore less deserving of punishment, than a killer who acts with a
normal state of mind.”104
A diminished capacity defense was successfully used in the Jenny
Jones murder case in which a heterosexual man named Jonathan
Schmitz killed his gay friend Scott Amedure after an appearance on the
Jenny Jones Show in 1995.105 Schmitz had been invited to appear on the
show and knew the show’s theme that day was Secret Admirers. Schmitz
thought an ex-girlfriend was going to be revealed as his secret admirer.
In fact, Schmitz’s male friend Scott Amedure appeared on the show as
his secret admirer.106 Even though he was surprised and apparently
embarrassed to find that his secret admirer was a man, Schmitz hugged
Amedure on the air and even laughed when Amedure recounted a
fantasy that involved Schmitz, whipped cream, strawberries, and
champagne.107 Schmitz even offered to give Amedure and Donna Riley,
Schmitz’s neighbor who had arranged Schmitz and Amedure’s
appearance on the Jenny Jones Show, a ride home.108 Before they left
the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Amedure snatched a flashing
construction light and stashed it in Schmitz’s car.109
On March 9, 1995, three days after appearing on the show, Schmitz
came home from work and found the flashing construction light and
an unsigned note in front of his apartment that read, “John. If you
want it ‘off’ you’ll have to ask me. P.S. It takes a special tool. Guess
Who.”110 Believing the note to be a crude sexual come-on from
104

Id. § 26.03[A][2], at 325-28.
See People v. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (noting
Schmitz was initially charged with first-degree murder, argued diminished capacity, and
was found guilty of second-degree murder); Court TV Online, Court TV Verdicts:
Michigan v. Schmitz (Aug. 25, 1999), http://www.courttv.com/archive/verdicts/
schmitz.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (noting that jury on November 12, 1996 opted
against finding Schmitz guilty of first-degree murder, instead finding him guilty of
second-degree murder and illegal possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony).
106
See Keith Bradsher, Talk-Show Guest is Guilty of Second-Degree Murder, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1999, at A14.
107
See Court TV Online, Court TV Verdicts: Michigan v. Schmitz (Aug. 25, 1999),
http://www.courttv.com/archive/verdicts/schmitz.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
108
See Michelle Green, TV’s Fatal Attraction: A Surprise Meeting on ‘Jenny Jones’
Ends in a Shocking Shotgun Murder, PEOPLE, Mar. 27, 1995, at 40, available at
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20105369,00.html (last visited Oct.
15, 2008).
109
See id.
110
Aldina Vazao Kennedy & Bryan Robinson, Schmitz Found Guilty of SecondDegree Murder, COURT TV ONLINE, Aug. 26, 1999, http://www.courttv.com/
archive/trials/schmitz/082699_verdict_ctv.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008); see also
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Amedure, Schmitz drove to his bank, withdrew money from his
savings account, then purchased a twelve-gauge pump action shotgun
and some ammunition.111 He drove to Amedure’s house, and after
Amedure admitted to writing the note, Schmitz shot Amedure twice in
the chest, killing him.112
Schmitz was charged with first-degree murder. At trial, Schmitz’s
attorney argued Schmitz was suffering from diminished capacity when
he shot and killed Scott Amedure, stemming from his embarrassment
on the Jenny Jones Show when Amedure appeared as his secret
admirer.113 At that time, diminished capacity was allowed in Michigan
as a partial defense to first-degree murder.114
Despite the
overwhelming evidence of premeditation and deliberation, the jury
found Schmitz’s claim of diminished capacity stemming from
homosexual panic credible and found him guilty of second-degree
murder rather than first-degree murder.115
Karen Franklin and Gregory Herek have opined that the verdict in
the Jenny Jones case reflected “[t]he sense of cultural permission to
engage in antigay violence.”116 Offering another possible explanation
Jenny Jones with Patsi Bale Cox, Fatal Attraction, TORONTO SUN, Nov. 30, 1997, at 48.
111
L.L. Brasier, Jury Hears Tape of 911 Confession Schmitz Upset During Call,
Dispatcher Says, DET. FREE PRESS, Oct. 16, 1996, at B1; Megan Garvey, The Aftershock
of Shock TV, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1995, at D1; Stephen Seplow, Talk TV on Trial: A
Taping, a Killing, One Guest Killed the Man Who Liked Him. The Jury is Still Out.,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 10, 1996, at A1.
112
Frazier Moore, Critics Blame ‘Jenny Jones’ Show for Murder, BALT. SUN, Mar. 11,
1995, at D1; Frazier Moore, ‘Retailing of Emotional Conflict’ Blamed in TV Talk-Show
Tragedy, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at A3; Frazier Moore, Talk Show Is Blamed
After Guest Shot to Death Critics Charge that Programs Place Subjects in Unexpected,
Upsetting Situations for Lively TV, AKRON BEACON J., Mar. 11, 1995, at A1; Police Say
Talk Show Led to Murder, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1995, at N8.
113
People v. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); see also Teresa
Wiltz & David Farhi, Death Follows Ugly Scene Played out on ‘Springer,’ WASH. POST,
July 27, 2000, at C1.
114
Diminished capacity is no longer recognized as a defense to first-degree murder
in Michigan. People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 283 (Mich. 2001).
115
Jonathan appealed his second-degree murder conviction and was granted a retrial
because the trial court had not allowed the defense to remove a juror they found
problematic. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d at 769-72. On retrial, the defense was not able to
argue diminished capacity again because that defense was only available against a firstdegree murder charge. People v. Biggs, 509 N.W.2d 803, 805-06 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
Instead, Jonathan’s attorney argued that Jonathan was provoked into a heat of passion by
Amedure’s sexual advance in an attempt to reduce his conviction to voluntary
manslaughter. The jury rejected Jonathan’s provocation defense and he was again found
guilty of second-degree murder. Talk Show Guest Convicted of Murder for a 2nd Time:
Jury Rejects Killer’s Crime-of-Passion Defense, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 27, 1999, at 6.
116
Franklin & Herek, supra note 9, at 148.
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for the second-degree murder verdict, Franklin and Herek comment,
“[p]articularly revealing in that case was the popular perception that
the television show’s producers had humiliated the heterosexual man
and thus were responsible for the murder.”117
Over time, the use of mental defect defenses in gay victim homicide
cases has fallen out of favor for a number of reasons, not the least of
which is the difficulty of securing a favorable jury verdict with a mental
defect defense.118 Jurors are often skeptical of defense claims of
insanity.119 Even if the defendant is able to convince jurors that he was
suffering from a mental disease or defect, it is often difficult to prove
that the defendant did not know that what he was doing (killing the
victim) was wrong or that the defendant could not control his actions.120
Additionally, a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (temporary
or otherwise) does not mean the defendant goes free. The defendant
who is found insane is usually committed to a mental institution for
an indefinite period of time. This period of confinement can exceed
the length of the prison sentence the defendant would have received if
he had been convicted.121 Many individuals would rather serve a
definite prison sentence than endure the stigma and uncertainty of an
indefinite period of commitment in a mental institution. Moreover,
asserting a mental defect defense is often seen as an unacceptable
admission of mental deficiency in the eyes of the defendant.122
Another possible reason for the gradual shift away from the use of
gay panic to support a mental defect defense may be the unavailability
of those defenses in certain jurisdictions. At least three states do not
117

Id.
Lisa A. Callahan, The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An
Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 331, 337 (1991) (“Although there
was considerable variation among the eight states in the acquittal rate (percentage of
successful pleas), overall, just one-quarter of [defendants] who raised the [insanity]
defense were successful.”).
119
JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 89 (1992) (noting that “[o]ne study found
that out of about two million criminal cases dealt with in American criminal courts in
a single year, only 1,625 produced verdicts of not guilty on the basis of insanity”).
120
See Suffredini, supra note 10, at 295.
121
See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (noting that when criminal
defendant establishes that he is not guilty of crime by reason of insanity, government
may commit him to mental institution until he regains his sanity or is no longer
danger to himself or society and that this period of commitment may exceed time he
could have been incarcerated had he been convicted).
122
Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, for example, refused to plead not guilty by reason
of insanity even though his attorneys told him this was the best defense possible.
William Glaberson, Lawyers Drop Mental Defense for Kaczynski, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
1997, at A1.
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recognize the defense of insanity.123 A number of states have either
abolished the defense of diminished capacity or substantially restricted
its use. For example, California124 and Wyoming125 do not recognize
the defense of diminished capacity. In Michigan, diminished capacity
was allowed as a defense to first-degree murder126 until 2001 when the
Supreme Court of Michigan ruled that “evidence of mental incapacity
short of insanity cannot be used to avoid or reduce criminal
responsibility by negating specific intent.”127 The United States
Supreme Court has encouraged these restrictions on the use of mental
defect or deficiency evidence, ruling that states are free to fashion their
own rules regarding the admissibility of evidence of mental disease or
defect and can bar a defendant’s use of such evidence to negate the
requisite mens rea without violating due process.128
A final reason why there might be fewer gay panic claims linked to
insanity or diminished capacity today compared to thirty years ago
could be because the American Psychiatric Association removed
homosexuality from its list of mental disorders in 1973, “thus
stripping homosexual panic of its medical-scientific legitimacy as a
defense and as an illness premised upon homosexual latency.”129
Christina Pei-Lin Chen explains that “[u]nder both the insanity and
diminished capacity variants of the homosexual panic defense, the
defendant’s acute psychotic reaction of homicidal violence was
explained by the medical-scientific discourse as directly premised
upon the latent homosexual’s mental disorder of repressed sexual
123
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2004) (providing that “mental condition
shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220
(1995) (allowing defendant to present evidence of mental disease or defect to prove he
lacked mental state required for commission of offense, but otherwise mental disease
or defect not a defense); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-102 to -311 (2005) (permitting
mental disease or defect evidence only to prove defendant lacked necessary mens rea,
or for consideration at sentencing); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (2003)
(allowing “guilty but mentally ill” verdict). But see Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84
(Nev. 2001) (holding that abolition of insanity defense violates due process).
124
CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(b) (2003). But see Miguel A. Mendez, Diminished
Capacity in California: Premature Reports of Its Demise, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 216,
222 (1991) (arguing that while diminished capacity is not available as defense, very
similar defense of diminished actuality is still possible).
125
Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 643-45 (Wyo. 1983).
126
People v. Biggs, 509 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that
“diminished capacity is not a defense to general intent crimes such as second-degree
murder”).
127
People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 283 (Mich. 2001).
128
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 779 (2006).
129
Chen, supra note 10, at 202.
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perversion.”130 According to Chen, once the psychiatric community
stopped recognizing homosexuality as a mental disease or defect,
insanity and diminished capacity stopped being useful vehicles to
transport the message of gay panic.131
Because of the above-described difficulties, male defendants charged
with murdering gay victims today tend to assert the defense of
provocation rather than insanity or diminished capacity, claiming that
they were provoked into a heat of passion by the victim’s homosexual
advance.132 Some even claim they acted in self-defense to protect
against a violent sexual assault. Both provocation and self-defense
require a showing of reasonableness.133 The defendant who claims
provocation will not succeed unless the jury finds that the defendant
was reasonably provoked into a heat of passion. The defendant who
claims self-defense will not succeed unless the jury finds that a
reasonable man in the defendant’s shoes would have believed it
necessary to use deadly force in self-defense.
Using the concept of gay panic to support a claim of provocation or
self-defense is even further removed than insanity or diminished
capacity from Kempf’s original idea of Homosexual Panic Disorder,
which suggested that some men have secret homosexual desires they
try to repress, causing psychiatric disorder. Claims of provocation and
self-defense suggest the defendant acted the way most men would
have acted. One problem with this move is that the reasonableness
requirement in the doctrines of provocation and self-defense allows
male defendants claiming gay panic to rely on social norms that favor
heterosexuality over homosexuality to bolster their claims of
provocation and self-defense.134
D. Provocation
Under the provocation doctrine, a defendant charged with murder can
be convicted of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter if the jury
finds that the defendant was actually and reasonably provoked into a heat
of passion. At early common law, only certain acts constituted legally

130

Id.
Id.
132
See generally Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men, supra
note 10; Mison, supra note 10 (discussing provocation defense in homosexual advance
prosecutions).
133
LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 80, at 3.
134
See id. at 67-95.
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adequate provocation.135 One of the categories of legally adequate
provocation was a serious crime committed against a close relative.136
Perhaps foreshadowing the use of gay panic in future provocation cases,
early English courts limited this category to cases in which a father
discovered someone committing sodomy on his son.137
Today,
provocation is considered legally adequate if the reasonable person in the
defendant’s shoes would have been provoked into a heat of passion.
Some jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code’s extreme
emotional disturbance test for provocation, under which “a homicide
which would otherwise be murder is [mitigated to manslaughter if]
committed under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.”138
The Code goes on to explain that “[t]he reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be.”139
In several cases, heterosexual men who have killed gay men in
response to an unwanted non-violent homosexual advance have
successfully argued either that a non-violent homosexual advance
reasonably provoked them into a heat of passion or that they acted
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse — a gay man’s
sexual advance. For example, in Schick v. Indiana, seventeen-year-old
Timothy Schick met thirty-eight-year-old Stephen Lamie while trying
to hitchhike.140 Schick climbed into Lamie’s car, and asked if Lamie
knew where they could find some girls.141 When Lamie said he could
not help him with this, Schick then asked Lamie if he knew where he
could get a blow job.142 Lamie told Schick, “No, but I will,”143 and
then drove to a local high school baseball field.144

135

DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 103, § 31.07.
Id. §31.07[8][2][a].
137
Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, [1978] A.C. 705 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Crim. App.) (U.K.).
138
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2001).
139
Id.
140
570 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); see also Fran Jeffries, Teen Convicted in
Dugout Death, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 19, 1988, at 6A.
141
Schick, 570 N.E.2d at 921.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 922.
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According to Schick, as the two men were walking toward the field,
Lamie pulled off his shorts and pulled his underwear down to his
ankles, grabbed Schick around the waist, and tried to touch Schick’s
penis.145 Schick responded by kneeing Lamie in the stomach and
hitting Lamie in the face.146 Lamie fell to the ground, and Schick
continued to kick and beat Lamie until he heard gurgling sounds
coming from Lamie’s chest and throat.147 Schick then removed
Lamie’s watch, some cigarettes from Lamie’s pocket, and twenty-six
dollars from Lamie’s wallet.148 He raced back to Lamie’s car and wiped
the dashboard and seat to get rid of his fingerprints, then ran away.149
At approximately 2:30 a.m., Schick knocked on the door of a
friend’s house.150 He told his friend and his friend’s father that he had
met a man while hitchhiking, asked the man where he could get a
blow job, and the man offered to provide the service requested.151
Schick said they went to a local high school baseball field and he tried
to run away, but the man caught up to him and a struggle ensued.152
The friend’s father placed an anonymous call to the police, reporting
that there was a dead or injured person at the baseball field.153 Police
found Lamie’s body at the field.154
Schick was charged with murder and other offenses.155 At his 1991
trial, Schick claimed Lamie’s unwanted sexual overture provoked him
into a heat of passion and, therefore, the jury should convict him of
manslaughter rather than murder.156 The jury found this argument
persuasive and found Schick guilty of voluntary manslaughter.157
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Id.
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 921.
149
Id. (describing Schick’s statement to police). In a post-trial statement, Schick
provided another version of the events. In this version, Schick stated that initially,
Lamie knocked him unconscious. When Schick awoke, Lamie was trying to force his
penis into Schick’s mouth. Schick had to fight Lamie off to avoid the sexual attack.
Schick eventually broke free and while Lamie was stumbling toward him with his
underwear around his ankles, Schick knocked Lamie down. As Lamie lay on the
ground, Schick beat and kicked him to death. Id. at 927.
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Id. at 921.
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Id.
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Id.
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In analyzing the jury’s verdict, it is important to consider the
relative ages of the defendant and victim. More than 50 % of the
perpetrators of anti-gay and anti-lesbian violence are under the age of
twenty-nine years.158 Given the stereotype of the gay man as a violent
sexual predator who preys on young boys, Lamie’s status as a gay man
more than twice Schick’s age may have influenced the jury to see
Schick’s violent reaction as reasonable. Additionally, Lamie’s explicit
sexual advance (as described by Schick) may have convinced the jury
that Schick’s violent acts were necessary to protect himself from a
sexual assault. If an older man pulled down his underwear, and
grabbed a teenage girl around the waist in an attempt to engage in
sexual relations, we would probably sympathize with the girl if she
used non-lethal force, perhaps a kick or a punch, to escape the older
man’s sexual advance.
The problem is that even under Schick’s version of events, Schick
did more than simply use violence to escape Lamie’s alleged sexual
advance. After Lamie was down on the ground with his underwear
around his ankles, Schick proceeded to punch, kick, and stomp Lamie
to death. If Schick had been a teenage girl, it is doubtful that a jury
would find such a response ordinary or reasonable. Moreover, in light
of the fact that Schick had sufficient presence of mind to take Lamie’s
watch, cigarettes, and cash, and wipe his fingerprints from Lamie’s car
before fleeing the scene, one might question Schick’s claim that the
alleged homosexual advance provoked him into such a heat of passion
that he completely lost his self-control.
In Mills v. Shepard, another seventeen-year-old named David Mills
successfully argued he was provoked into a heat of passion by an older
man’s attempt to have sex with him.159 Mills met forty-three-year-old
Billy Francis Brinkley at a bar.160 According to Mills, Brinkley offered
to pay Mills twenty dollars if Mills would “commit a homosexual act”
with Brinkley.161 Mills agreed, and the two men drove to Paw Creek
Cove in Brinkley’s car.162 Once there, according to Mills, Brinkley
158
NAT’L COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, ANTI-LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER VIOLENCE IN 2004: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTIVIOLENCE PROGRAMS 33 (2005), available at http://www.ralliance.org/files/
2004NCAVPReport.pdf (reporting that 20% of anti-gay violence offenders were 18
years or younger and 37% were between ages of 18 to 29 years of age); see also GARY
DAVID COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 59-60 (1991) [hereinafter
COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN].
159
445 F. Supp. 1231, 1232 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
160
Id. at 1234.
161
Id.
162
Id.
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proceeded to grab Mills’s privates.163 Mills demanded his twenty
dollars, but Brinkley said he did not have twenty dollars with him, so
Mills pushed Brinkley out of the car, chased him, knocked him down,
kicked him, and pulled Brinkley’s clothes down to hinder his
escape.164 Mills then took Brinkley’s jewelry and fled in Brinkley’s car.
Brinkley’s body was later found in a cove in Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina.165 Brinkley had died from head injuries and a massive
crushing injury to his chest consistent with having been kicked and
then thrown against rocks.166 According to one of Mills’s roommates,
Mills came home around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. that night with Brinkley’s
automobile, watch, ring, and bracelet.167 Mills told his roommate that
he met Brinkley at a bar, Brinkley offered him twenty dollars to
commit a homosexual act, they drove out to Paw Creek Cove in
Brinkley’s car, Brinkley did not have as much money as he had
promised, Brinkley made a pass at him, and he fought Brinkley off.168
Mills was charged with second-degree murder.169 At trial, Mills
maintained the older man’s attempt to have sex with him provoked
him into a heat of passion.170 Despite the fact that Mills had agreed to
“commit a homosexual act” with Brinkley and beat Brinkley only after
Brinkley refused to pay Mills the agreed upon twenty dollars, the jury
found Mills’s claim credible and convicted him of voluntary
manslaughter.171
Mills’s voluntary manslaughter verdict is troubling for several
reasons. First, it suggests that the jury believed it was reasonable for
Mills to become enraged at Brinkley’s conduct (grabbing Mills’s private
parts and making a pass at him), even though Mills had previously
agreed to engage in sexual activity with Brinkley. Mills willingly
accompanied Brinkley to Paw Creek Cove, knowing that the purpose
of the trip was sex. Generally speaking, the criminal law does not
excuse a defendant who creates the conditions of his own defense.172
163
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Second, the verdict suggests the jury believed Mills’s claim that he
was genuinely afraid of being sexually assaulted by Brinkley, even
though Mills’s behavior — pushing Brinkley out of the car, chasing
him, knocking him down, kicking him, and pulling his pants down to
hinder his escape — seems more consistent with the behavior of
someone who intends to kill or seriously injure than the behavior of
one who is afraid. If Mills had truly been afraid of Brinkley, he might
have tried to get away by driving off in Brinkley’s car as soon as he
pushed Brinkley out of the car. Instead, Mills chased after Brinkley,
knocked him down, and kicked him repeatedly. Once Brinkley was
down, he no longer posed an immediate threat to Mills. Nonetheless,
Mills proceeded to pull down Brinkley’s clothes to hinder his escape.
He then either pushed or threw Brinkley into the rocks in the cove
where his body was later found.
Finally, Mills’s claim that the alleged sexual advance by Brinkley so
provoked him that he lost his ability to control his actions is belied by
his having the presence of mind to take several of Brinkley’s
possessions, including his watch, ring, bracelet, and car. Given all of
these inconsistencies, the jury’s willingness to acquit Mills of murder
suggests the influence of deeply rooted negative feelings about
homosexuality, which enabled the jury to empathize with the
defendant rather than with the victim.
One pattern that emerges from gay panic cases is that the
perpetrator who claims he was provoked into a heat of passion often
takes money or other items of value from the victim after killing him.
Stealing the victim’s belongings suggests an economic motivation for
the killing, rather than panic or fear. Timothy Schick took Steven
Lamie’s watch, cigarettes, and money, then wiped off his fingerprints
from the dashboard of Lamie’s car in an attempt to avoid detection and
arrest. David Mills took Billy Francis Brinkley’s watch, ring, bracelet,
and car. As one observer of gay panic killings has noted, “the number
of cases where [gay] murders have been accompanied by robbery
suggests that criminal opportunism is a frequent motive for these
killings.”173
Further undermining claims of provocation in gay homicide cases is
that the defendant often places himself in a situation in which a
173
Steve Tomsen, Hatred, Murder & Male Honour: Gay Homicides and the
“Homosexual Panic Defence,” 6 CRIMINOLOGY AUSTL. 2, 4 (1994). Lu-in Wang notes
that gay men are often targeted for robbery because of the perception that gays are
wealthy and “would prefer to part with their property than to fight back or report the
crime and risk revealing their sexual orientation.” Lu-in Wang, Recognizing
Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1399, 1416, 1431-32 (2000).
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homosexual advance is likely. Timothy Schick hitched a ride from
Stephen Lamie, a total stranger, and stayed in the car even after Lamie
suggested he could handle Schick’s request for a blow job. David Mills
agreed to have sex with Billy Francis Brinkley in exchange for twenty
dollars. Yet in case after case, jurors overlook facts that undermine
the defendant’s claim that he was actually and reasonably provoked.
Why might gay panic provocation claims resonate with juries?
First, lenient verdicts in gay panic provocation cases may reflect the
jury’s view that it is reasonable for a heterosexual man to react
violently to a non-violent homosexual advance. If the average
heterosexual man would react violently to a gay man’s sexual advance,
then arguably such a response is reasonable.
Given that reasonableness in provocation doctrine is usually
understood to mean that the average or typical person in the
defendant’s shoes would have been provoked into a heat of passion,174
this argument has much persuasive value. One can see how a juror
might think that the average heterosexual man might become incensed
if another man were to make a pass at him. Equating reasonableness
with typicality, however, is problematic because it enables entrenched
social norms that may embody messages of bias based on race, gender,
or sexual orientation to govern outcomes in provocation cases.175 As I
have argued elsewhere, I believe the currently employed positivist
conception of reasonableness, which equates reasonableness with
typicality, should be supplemented with a normative conception of
reasonableness.176
Normative reasonableness asks the “should”
question: should society call what the defendant did reasonable? If
the jury asks whether the beliefs and acts of the heterosexual man who
kills a gay man in response to a non-violent sexual advance are
normatively reasonable, they will likely reach a different conclusion
than if they just ask whether the defendant’s acts are reasonable in an
empirical sense.177
One might question whether a normative conception of
reasonableness is fair to the individual defendant, invoking the
174

Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men, supra note 10, at 753.
See generally LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 80 (discussing
problems with positivist conception of reasonableness).
176
Id. at 226-59.
177
This is particularly likely to occur if the jury is given an instruction directing
them to consider the reasonableness (or unreasonableness) of the defendant’s acts if
the defendant had been a heterosexual woman who responded with fatal violence to a
heterosexual man’s unwanted non-violent sexual advance or a gay man who
responded with deadly force to a heterosexual woman’s unwanted non-violent sexual
advance. See infra text accompanying note 498.
175
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longstanding debate over whether the criminal law should reflect
current societal mores or push individuals to behave better than they
might otherwise choose.178 While reasonableness standards reflect the
view that the criminal law should be lenient towards those who act the
way ordinary people in their shoes would have acted, the criminal law
often holds individuals to a higher standard than the one that ordinary
persons might choose. For example, in the famous cannibalism case,
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, the court rejected the defendants’
necessity defense while acknowledging that the defendants had acted
the way any ordinary man in their shoes would have acted.179 As
178
Introducing a normative conception of reasonableness raises the question
whether the criminal law should reflect empirical (positive) realities or be more
normative. In support of positivist (empirical) reasonableness, one might argue that
certain men, such as the homophobic men in the Adams and Bernat studies, see
generally Adams, supra note 46 (studying whether heterosexual men who exhibited
strong anti-gay sentiments would be aroused by homosexual erotica); Bernat, supra
note 49 (measuring physical aggression toward gay and straight individuals after selfidentified heterosexual college males viewed homoerotic videotape), may in fact be so
repulsed by a non-violent homosexual advance that they actually would lose their selfcontrol. One might ask whether it is really fair to punish such men as murderers
when the provocation doctrine exists to mitigate in cases where the defendant
succumbed to human weakness. On the other hand, if we want the criminal law to be
more normative, barring gay panic arguments might be the best way to express
society’s disapproval of killings in response to non-violent (homo)sexual advances.
My proposal can be viewed as a compromise between these two views. In recognition
of the argument that some men may in fact be so repulsed by a non-violent
homosexual advance that they might lose their self-control, my proposal allows such
defendants to present a gay panic-provocation argument to the jury. On the other
hand, in recognition of the fact that gay panic arguments rely on misguided
masculinity norms and negative stereotypes about gay men, my proposal includes a
role-reversal jury instruction that seeks to make jurors aware of the double-standard
that a gay panic argument seeks to employ. My proposal does not depend on the
adoption of a normative conception of reasonableness. In other words, even if
provocation doctrine continues to utilize a positivist conception of reasonableness, I
still believe it is better to allow defendants to make gay panic-provocation arguments
than to bar such claims.
179
R. v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273, 287-88 (U.K.). In Regina v.
Dudley & Stephens, two seamen, Thomas Dudley and Edwin Stephens, were indicted
for the murder of Richard Parker, a 17-year-old crew member. The defendants,
Parker, and Ned Brooks, a fourth crewmember, were cast away in a storm on the high
seas, 1,600 miles from the Cape of Good Hope. They were able to survive for 20 days
on a dinghy with no supply of water and no food except for two one-pound cans of
turnips and a turtle which they caught. On day 12, they finished eating the turtle and
had nothing to eat for the next eight days. On day 20, Dudley and Stephens suggested
that someone should be sacrificed to save the rest. Dudley proposed that lots should
be cast to determine which of them would be sacrificed, but Brooks refused to
consent. Ultimately, Dudley and Stephens decided it would be best to kill Parker
since he was the only one with no family and was already weak and sickened from
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Chief Justice Lord Coleridge explained, “We are often compelled to set
up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which
we could not ourselves satisfy . . . .”180
Another problem with this argument is that it is not clear that the
average heterosexual man would, in fact, respond to a non-violent
homosexual advance with fatal violence. The ordinary man’s reaction
to a non-violent homosexual advance might well stop short of physical
force. I can think of many reasonable men who would simply say,
“No, I’m not interested,” and walk away, rather than respond to a nonviolent homosexual advance with physical force.
Lenient verdicts in gay panic cases might also be understood to reflect
dominant norms of masculinity.181 A male-on-male sexual advance
threatens a heterosexual man’s sense of identity as a man in several
ways.182 First, men in this society are supposed to be interested in
women, not men.183 Second, men are supposed to be the sexual
aggressors, not the ones aggressed upon.184 A gay man making a sexual
drinking seawater. Dudley, with Stephens’s help, killed Parker. Dudley, Stephens,
and Brooks ate Parker’s remains for the next four days. Four days after Parker’s
demise, the men were rescued by a passing ship. Id. at 273-74. “If the men had not
fed upon the body of the boy when they did, they would have died of famine within a
few days.” PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASE STUDIES 15-19 (3d ed. 2007).
180
Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. at 288.
181
See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities and Police
Stops (Aug. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (applying
insights from field of masculinity studies to Terry v. Ohio); see also Jennifer Dumin,
Superstition-Based Injustice in Africa and the United States: The Use of Provocation as a
Defense for Killing Witches and Homosexuals, 21 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 145, 174 (2006)
(noting that strong cultural and religious beliefs explain leniency shown in South
Africa to those who kill witches and in United States to men who kill gay men and
claim homosexual provocation).
182
As others have noted, gays and lesbians “threaten the differentiation between
genders and the social roles associated with them.” William A. Jellison et al., Implicit
and Explicit Measures of Sexual Orientation Attitude: Ingroup Preferences and Related
Behaviors and Beliefs Among Gay and Straight Men, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 629, 631 (2004). “By derogating gay men who . . . do not conform to . . .
cultural standards of masculinity, straight men can affirm their own beliefs that these
cultural expectations are appropriate.” Id.
183
MICHELLE MARY LELWICA, STARVING FOR SALVATION: THE SPIRITUAL DIMENSIONS OF
EATING PROBLEMS AMONG AMERICAN GIRLS AND WOMEN 25 (2002) (“[M]en are
supposed to be sexually attracted (to women), women are supposed to be sexually
attractive (to men).”); AYALA MALAKH-PINES, FALLING IN LOVE: WHY WE CHOOSE THE
LOVERS WE CHOOSE 114 (1999) (“Men are supposed to be attracted to ‘feminine’
women, and women are supposed to be attracted to ‘masculine’ men.”).
184
See SARA L. CRAWLEY ET AL., GENDERING BODIES 102 (2007) (“So there is a
general surveillance for all men to be sexually aggressive and for all women to be
sexually passive or guarded.”); Deborah S. David & Robert Brannon, The Male Sex
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advance upon a heterosexual man violates both of these conditions.185
In doing so, the gay man turns the tables on the heterosexual man, who
The
finds himself acted upon, rather than the one acting.186
heterosexual man’s feelings of fear and loathing are thus viewed as
reasonable in the context of a pervasively heterosexist social world.
Masculinity norms also work to bolster the heterosexual male’s
claim that he was reasonably outraged by the non-violent homosexual
advance. Angela Harris notes that “not being a ‘faggot’ is as important
to being a man as not being a woman.”187 Men in this society are
supposed to be “fearful and disdainful of homosexuals,” and “are also
taught to reject any personal same-gender sexual feelings.”188 Many
heterosexual men are so terrified of being perceived as gay that they
avoid expressing qualities that they think seem feminine, like the
enjoyment of beauty or a loving, caring, gentle or nurturing nature.189
Role: Our Culture’s Blueprint of Manhood and What It’s Done for Us Lately, in THE
FORTY-NINE PERCENT MAJORITY: THE MALE SEX ROLE 31 (Deborah S. David & Robert
Brannon eds., 1976) (“Both men and women grow up in our culture thinking of male
aggressiveness as natural and normal, and of men as the sexual aggressors . . . .”);
Cynthia Petersen, Envisioning a Lesbian Equality Jurisprudence, in LEGAL INVERSIONS:
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE POLITICS OF LAW 118, 120 (Didi Herman & Carl Franklin
Stychin eds., 1995) (“Heterosexual men are supposed to be sexually aggressive, and
heterosexual women are supposed to be ingratiatingly submissive.”).
185
See CRAWLEY, supra note 184, at 102 (“[M]en are expected to be always sexually
aggressive, but not toward other men.”) (citation omitted).
186
Pepper Schwartz notes that in some cultures, men who have sex with both
women and men are not considered gay as long as they are the sexual aggressors.
Pepper Schwartz, The Social Construction of Heterosexuality, in THE SEXUAL SELF: THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL SCRIPTS 80, 86 (Michael Kimmel ed., 2007) (“If you are a
man who wants to have sex with men in Greece, yet do not want to be thought of as
homosexual, you can accomplish this goal, as long as you do not blunder into the
‘female’ sexual role.”). As one Greek man explained, “The queers are the ones who get
fucked.” Id.
187
Angela P. Harris, Gender Violence, Race and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV.
777, 786-87 (2000); see also David Wyatt Seal & Anke A. Ehrhardt, Masculinity and
Urban Men: Perceived Scripts for Courtship, Romantic, and Sexual Interactions with
Women, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND SEXUALITY: A READER 375, 393 (Richard Parker &
Peter Aggleton eds., 2007) (“Men also have traditionally been socialized to avoid
evaluative disclosure so as not to appear weak or homosexual.”) (citations omitted).
188
Roy Scrivner, Gay Men and Nonrelational Sex, in MEN AND SEX: NEW
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 229, 233 (Ronald L. Levant & Gary R. Brooks eds.,
1997); see also John Ibson, Don’t Look Gay: Why American Men are Afraid of Intimacy
with Each Other, AM. SEXUALITY MAG., July 4, 2007, available at
http://www.alternet.org/story/55816 (noting that “countless American boys and the
men that they become are afraid of intimacy with each other, fearful of how intimacy
might be construed — of what others and maybe even they themselves might decide
that the closeness suggests”).
189
See James Harrison, Roles, Identities, and Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality,
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When a gay man makes a sexual advance upon a heterosexual man,
the heterosexual man may fear that others will think he is gay if he
does not do something to clearly express his heterosexuality.
Responding with violence, in the heterosexual man’s mind, is a clear
and unambiguous rejection of homosexuality.190
Masculinity norms also help legitimize the use of physical violence
in response to non-violent homosexual advances. Men in this society
who are physically strong, aggressive, and willing to use force when
necessary are generally admired.191 When a heterosexual man finds
his masculinity threatened by a homosexual advance, aggression and
violence are considered appropriate ways to respond.192 The feeling of
threat in such cases is analogous to the threat to male identity and
honor that allegedly arises when a wife is unfaithful.193
Heterosexuality, and Bisexuality, in A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF MEN 359, 378-79 (Ronald F.
Levant & William S. Pollack eds., 1995) (citation omitted); see also Susan M.
Alexander, Stylish Hard Bodies: Branded Masculinity in “Men’s Health” Magazine, 46
SOC. PERSP. 535, 538 (2003) (“Masculinity, then, stems from the fear of being seen as
sissy, feminine, or anything less than a man.”); Cooper, supra note 181, at 19 (citing
Michael S. Kimmel, Macsulinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the
Construction of Gender Identity, in THE GENDER OF DESIRE: ESSAYS ON MALE SEXUALITY
25, 30 (2005)) (noting that “masculinity” is repudiation of “femininity”).
190
See BARBARA PERRY, IN THE NAME OF HATE: UNDERSTANDING HATE CRIMES 108
(2001) (noting that “violence against gays provides visible, documented proof of
offenders’ unquestionably straight sexuality”); Cooper, supra note 181, at 19 (noting
that “the repudiation of homosexual men is part and parcel of the hegemonic
masculinity”). As Jana Bufkin notes, “the offender becomes what the victim is not by
attacking him/her.” Jana L. Bufkin, Bias Crime as Gendered Behavior, 26 SOC. JUST.
155, 159 (1999).
191
See PERRY, supra note 190, at 108 (noting that gay-basher “proves, by his
actions, that he is unafraid to fight, as any real man must be”); Harrison, supra note
189, at 378; see also Alexander, supra note 189, at 538 (noting that “men today wear
the mask of the ‘Tough Guise’ . . . a performance in which violent masculinity is the
norm.”); Seal & Ehrhardt, supra note 187, at 393 (“[M]any men learn by a very young
age that part of being a man is to compete and to conquer, as well as to be ‘strong’ and
to suppress emotional expression or feelings.”) (citations omitted). For a historical
account of male identity norms, see John M. Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2008) (discussing image of man as
hypermasculine brute consumed by propensity for atavism, violence, and domination
as reflected in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan).
192
See DEBORAH CAMERON & DON KULICK, LANGUAGE AND SEXUALITY 39 (2003) (“To
a heterosexual man, such an advance is said to constitute a kind of assault, and acts of
violence committed in the resulting state of panic must therefore be regarded as
justifiable self-defence.”); Franklin & Herek, supra note 9, at 148 (noting that
assumption underlying claims of gay panic is “that violence is the appropriate
response to any type of sexual advance from a person of one’s same sex”); Tomsen,
supra note 173, at 2, 5.
193
Schwartz, supra note 186, at 88 (commenting that Dustin Hoffman who plays
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The perceived threat to male identity may be heightened if the
advance occurs in front of other people, rather than in a private
setting.
Writer JoAnn Wypijewski recounts the following
conversation she had with a young man from Laramie, Wyoming, the
town where Matthew Shepard was killed:
“If a guy at a bar made some kind of overture to you, what
would you do?”
“It depends on who’s around. If I’m with a girl, I’d be worried
about what she thinks, because, as I said, everything a man
does is in some way connected to a woman, whether he wants
to admit it or not. Do I look queer? Will she tell other girls?”
“If my friends were around and they’d laugh and shit, I might
have to threaten him.”
“If I’m alone and he just wants to buy me a beer, then okay,
I’m straight, you’re gay – hey, you can buy me a beer.”194
The claim of reasonableness linked to anti-gay violence is the
product of a culture that privileges heterosexual male violence over
other types of violence.195 A man who responds to a (homo)sexual
advance with deadly violence claims he acted as the average
heterosexual man would have acted. A woman who tries to make a
similar claim would find it extremely difficult to succeed. A woman
who responds with deadly force to a man who kisses her or fondles
her breasts is not at all typical. Women in this society are supposed to
accept a certain amount of unwanted male attention, and while they
might frown, struggle, or protest, they are not supposed to use
violence to dissuade or thwart men who suggest sexual interest.
Moreover, women are taught to believe that a man who aggressively
expresses his sexual attraction for a woman is merely behaving the
way a man is supposed to behave.196 The woman who is the target of
main character in film, Straw Dogs, is perceived as not adequately heterosexual
because he cannot control his flirtatious wife).
194
JoAnn Wypijewski, A Boy’s Life: For Matthew Shepard’s Killers, What Does it
Take to Pass As a Man?, HARPER’S MAG., Sept. 1999, at 61, 74.
195
See Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 99.
196
David & Brannon, supra note 184, at 31 (“Both men and women grow up in our
culture thinking of male aggressiveness as natural and normal, and of men as the
sexual aggressors . . . .”); Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, in APPLICATIONS
OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES:
SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK AND
REPRODUCTION 484, 486-87 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996) (discussing normal
aggressiveness of male sexuality); see also Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual
Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 99-100 (noting that “approval of violence against gay
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male attention is supposed to be flattered. Even if the woman is just
as offended by a non-violent heterosexual advance as a heterosexual
male might be by a non-violent homosexual advance, she is unlikely
to convince the average juror that a violent response is reasonable
because women just are not expected to be violent.
David
Wertheimer, former Executive Director of the New York City Gay and
Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, wryly points out, “If every heterosexual
woman who had a sexual advance made to her by a male had the right
to murder the man, the streets of this city would be littered with the
bodies of heterosexual men.”197
The heterosexual man’s claim of reasonableness does more than
privilege men over women. It privileges heterosexual men over gay
men. If a heterosexual man responds violently to a homosexual
advance, he enjoys a presumption of reasonableness. A heterosexual
man is supposed to be disgusted and outraged when another man
attempts a sexual advance.198 If, however, a gay man were to respond
violently to a heterosexual female’s sexual advance, he would have a
difficult time convincing anyone that he was reasonably provoked into
a heat of passion, even if a heterosexual woman’s sexual advance is
just as disgusting to him as a gay man’s sexual advance might be to a
heterosexual man. Men in this society are supposed to be happy if a
woman shows she is sexually attracted to him. If a man, however,
shows his sexual interest in another man by acting in a similar
manner, he supposedly is asking for a violent response.
Charles Butler, the man convicted of capital murder for his part in
the slaying and burning of Billy Jack Gaither on a pyre of tires,
admitted he would have reacted differently had Gaither been a
woman.199 In an interview with Frontline, Butler admitted that Billy
men contrasts sharply with the freedom and lack of vulnerability to attack with which
heterosexual men make sexual advances toward women”); Francisco Valdes,
Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender and Sexual
Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 179 (1996).
197
Peter Johnson, ‘More Than Ordinary Men Gone Wrong’: Can the Law Know the
Gay Subject?, 20 MELB. U. L. REV. 1152, 1178 (1996) (quoting Kendall Thomas,
Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1466 n.188 (1992)). To be
precise, the male defendant who claims that a non-violent homosexual advance
constitutes legally adequate provocation and is convicted of manslaughter rather than
murder is not justified in having killed another person. Provocation is generally
considered an excuse defense, which means that the act is still considered wrong.
198
See Suffredini, supra note 10, at 284-85 (arguing that American culture suggests
that violence is appropriate and necessary response to any homosexual advance
because heterosexual men are supposed to be aggressors in all sexual interactions).
199
Interview with Charles Butler, in Kilby Prison, Ala., PBS Frontline (Feb. 15,
2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/assault/interviews/
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Jack did not attempt to grab him.200 It was Billy Jack’s verbal
suggestion of a sexual threesome that made Butler feel disrespected
and led him to beat Billy Jack. Butler admitted that had a woman
made a similar suggestion, he would not have viewed her remarks as
disrespectful.201 Because the verbal come-on came from a man, Butler
felt he had to react with physical violence.
Race, gender, and age also seem to play a part in gay homicide cases.
The perpetrators of anti-gay violence tend to be White and male.202
The majority are in their teens or twenties.203 In many cases, the
victim is much older than the defendant.204 These young White males
are often described at their murder trials as well-liked, normal, young
men.205 Jurors may be more inclined to view the claims of these young
White men as reasonable because they seem to represent the ordinary
all-American boy next door.
A final reason why gay panic provocation claims may resonate with
juries is the prevalence of negative stereotypes about gay men as
butler.html.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
See COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 158, at 59,
61 (reporting that 67% of perpetrators of anti-gay violence are White and 94% are
male); see also NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 158, at 34-35
(reporting that 47% of anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender violence offenders in
2004 were White and 82% were male). According to the Uniform Crime Report
published by the Department of Justice, approximately 44% of the perpetrators of antigay hate crimes in 2006 were White. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 8 (noting that 620 of 1,415 anti-gay offenses in 2006 were committed
by White offenders).
203
See COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 158, at 59
(“[N]early one half of all perpetrators [of anti-gay/lesbian violence] are twenty-one
years of age and younger, with the great majority less than twenty-eight years old.”);
see also NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 158, at 33 (reporting that
57% of all offenders whose age was known were under age of 30: 20% of offenders
were 18 years or younger and 37% were between ages of 18 and 29).
204
See COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 158, at 78
(“Consistent with findings reported earlier in this chapter, the perpetrators are fifteen to
twenty-two years of age; they are predominantly white; and their victims are older.”).
205
COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 158, at 82
(“Typical of the defenses for middle-class perpetrators was the use of character
witnesses to provide anecdotal evidence of ‘good family backgrounds,’ exemplary
behavior in school, and participation in organized athletics.”); see also Stephen
Tomsen, Hate Crimes and Masculinity: New Crimes, New Responses and Some Familiar
Patterns, AUS. INST. OF CRIM., June 2001, at 1, 5, available at http://www.aic.gov.au/
conferences/outlook4/Tomsen.pdf (noting that “[r]esearch indicates that most acts of
racist or ‘homophobic’ harassment and violence are perpetrated by psychologically
normal offenders . . .”).
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sexual deviants and sexual predators.206 Even though cultural
representations of gay men and lesbians in the popular press have
changed dramatically over the past fifty years, criminal defense
narratives today continue to invoke the “specter of the pathological,
predatory, sexually violent deviant” in an attempt to encourage jurors
to find that a young heterosexual male defendant’s violent response to
an older homosexual male’s sexual advance is reasonable.207 The
underlying theme is that gay men are sexual deviants208 who prey on
young boys and cannot be trusted to work in positions of supervisory
authority209 — the message of both the Religious Right and the Boy
Scouts.210 Even though the concept of reasonableness is usually
associated with reason and calm deliberation, the opposite of violence
driven by emotion, a young heterosexual man nonetheless is
considered reasonable if he responds violently to an older man’s nonviolent homosexual advance.
E. “Trans Panic”
Gay panic has recently morphed into another defense strategy called
the “trans panic” defense.211 In such cases, a male defendant charged
with murdering a male-to-female transgender person claims he was
provoked into a heat of passion upon discovering that the person with
whom he had sexual relations was biologically male rather than female.
Michael Magidson and José Merel, charged with first-degree murder
in the killing of Gwen Araujo (born Edward Araujo) used such an

206
PERRY, supra note 190, at 110-11 (noting that contemporary stereotypes
resurrect historical construction of homosexuality as sinful and deviant and gays as
predatory and menacing).
207
Michael A. Smyth, Queers and Provocateurs: Hegemony, Ideology, and the
“Homosexual Advance” Defense, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 903, 904 (2006); see also supra note
13 (listing sources that discuss common stereotypes about gay men).
208
See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 19, 43 (1990).
209
See PERRY, supra note 190, at 115 (noting common refrain, “We don’t want
‘them’ teaching our children, since they might seduce them”).
210
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding that forcing
Boy Scouts to reinstate gay assistant scoutmaster who was expelled after he publicly
declared he was gay would violate Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of association).
211
See Steinberg, supra note 15, at 500-01; see also Bradford Bigler, Comment,
Sexually Provoked: Recognizing Sexual Misrepresentation as Adequate Provocation, 53
UCLA L. REV. 783, 798 (2006) (proposing that sexual misrepresentation be
considered legally adequate provocation if defendant engages in sexual act while
reasonably deceived regarding fact reasonably material to consent, discovery of which
would cause reasonable person severe mental or emotional crisis).
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argument at their murder trial.212 Magidson and Merel met the
seventeen-year-old Araujo in the summer of 2002 and engaged in
intimate relations with her.213 Araujo, who was biologically male,
lived as a female and had assumed the name of her favorite singer,
Gwen Stefani.214 At a party in October 2002, Merel and Magidson
began to suspect that Araujo was not biologically female.215 Magidson
took Araujo into the bathroom and tried to hike up her skirt to check
whether she was a man or a woman.216 When Araujo told Magidson
not to touch her, Magidson got a woman from the party named Nicole
Brown to check.217 Brown went into the bathroom and felt Araujo’s
genitals. When she discovered Araujo had a penis, Brown screamed
212

Initially, four men — Michael Magidson, José Merel, Jaron Chase Nabors, and
Jason Cazares — were charged with murder and a hate crime enhancement. See Julian
Guthrie, Why Did it Take a Murder for the People of Newark to Wake up to the
Harassment of One of Their Own?, S.F. CHRON., CHRON. MAG., Dec. 22, 2002, at 12.
Nabors pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for a promise to testify
against the three others, and was sentenced to 11 years in prison for his role in the
killing of Araujo. See Henry K. Lee, 11 Years for Defendant in Araujo Killing, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 26, 2006, at B2. Cazares pled no contest to a lesser charge and received
a six-year sentence. See Henry K. Lee, Prison for 3 in Transgender Teen’s Slaying, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 28, 2006, at B1 [hereinafter Lee, Prison for 3]. After a second trial,
Magidson and Merel were found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15
years to life. Id. The jury rejected the hate crime enhancement which could have
added another four years to their sentence. See Henry K. Lee, Manslaughter Ruled Out,
Araujo Juror Says, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 2005, at B1 [hereinafter Lee, Manslaughter
Ruled Out] (“The jury ultimately rejected hate crime enhancements against Merel and
Magidson because some panelists believed that the defendants killed Araujo not
necessarily because of her gender orientation, but simply to ‘cover up a situation that
had gotten out of control.’”); Kelly St. John & Henry K. Lee, Slain Newark Teen
Balanced Between Two Worlds, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2002, at A1 (noting that hate
crime enhancement could have added as many as four more years in prison).
213
Michelle Locke, Jurors Deliberate in Slaying of Transgender Teen, HOUS. CHRON.,
June 4, 2004, at A7, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=
2004_3769144.
214
See John M. Glionna, Murder Trial Nears End: Closing Arguments Begin in the
Slaying of a Transgender Teenager with the Prosecutor Lashing Out at One of the Alleged
Killers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at B4.
215
See Daisy Hernandez, Young and Out: Anything but Safe, COLORLINES, Dec. 22,
2004, at 26. The question of whether Magisdson knew or suspected Araujo was
transgender before the attack was a key point in the case because prosecutors argued
the killing was a premeditated murder while the defense argued it was a crime of
passion. See Kelly St. John, Heavy Drinking, Outrage, Man Testifies He’s Accused of
Killing Transgender Teenager, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 16, 2005, at B3.
216
See John M. Glionna, Keeping Focus on Victim in Retrial: Transgender Advocates
Publicize the Details of the Latest Proceeding Against Three Men Accused in the Slaying of
Teenager Gwen Araujo, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2005, at B1.
217
See id.
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and ran from the bathroom.218 Magidson allegedly flew into a rage and
proceeded to punch, choke, and kick Araujo.219 Merel joined in the
attack, beating Araujo with a frying pan and soup can.220 Merel,
Magidson, and two others carried Araujo into the garage where
Magidson strangled Araujo with a rope and someone else struck
Araujo with a shovel.221
Magidson’s attorney, Michael Thorman, told the jury that
Magidson’s shock at discovering that Araujo was transgender
provoked him into a heat of passion and therefore the jury should
convict Magidson of manslaughter, not murder.222 According to
Thorman, Magidson’s discovery that he had unknowingly engaged in
homosexual sex incited revulsion and rage in him.223 Thorman
explained, “This crime didn’t occur because Mike [Magidson] had a
bias. It happened because of the discovery of what Eddie [Araujo] had
done.”224 He continued, “This is a case that tells a story about . . . the
tragic results when that deception and betrayal were discovered.”225
The jury, a panel of eight men and four women, deadlocked, and the
judge declared a mistrial.226
The claim that a transgender individual’s deception about his or her
biological sex should constitute legally adequate provocation, like the
claim that a non-violent homosexual advance should constitute legally
adequate provocation, rests upon dominant norms of hegemonic

218

See id.
See id.; Ivan Delventhal, Prosecutor Cross-Examines Suspect in Araujo Murder
Trial, TRI-VALLEY HERALD (Pleasanton, Cal.), May 20, 2004 (noting that “Cazares
testified Tuesday that he intervened repeatedly as Magidson, Merel and Nabors
punched and kicked Araujo in the Merel home on Oct. 4, 2002”); Transgender Slaying
Case Ends Without a Verdict, MARIN INDEP. J. (Marin, Cal.), June 23, 2004 (noting that
“Nabors said Merel hit Araujo with a can and a skillet and Magidson punched, choked
and kicked her”); Yomi S. Wronge, Judge Reaffirms No-Bail Ruling, S.J. MERCURY NEWS,
July 25, 2003, at C1 (“According to Nabors, it was Magidson who repeatedly choked,
hit and kicked Araujo.”).
220
See Marisa Lagos, Mistrial Declared in Teen’s Killing: Prosecutor Says He Will Move
to Retry Three Men Accused of Killing the Transgender Student, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2004,
at B1 (noting that Merel struck Araujo’s head so hard that he dented soup can).
221
See id.
222
See id.
223
See Vicki Haddock, ‘Gay Panic’ Defense in Araujo Case, S.F. CHRON., May 16,
2004, at E1.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
See Janine DeFao & Kelly St. John, Retrial in Araujo Case Presents Challenges,
S.F. CHRON., June 28, 2004, at B3; Lagos, supra note 213, at B1.
219
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masculinity.227 Magidson’s attorney was trying to appeal to the
masculinity norm that suggests real men prefer women, not other
men, when he claimed Magidson was disgusted and enraged upon
discovering that he had unknowingly engaged in homosexual sex.228
There is good reason to reject the argument that a transgender
person’s deception about his or her biological sex constitutes legally
adequate provocation. Under current rape law, a man can use deceit
to get a woman to have sex with him. Even if the woman had sex with
the man only because of a false promise of marriage or a lie about the
man’s true identity (he pretended to be rich and famous when he was
actually unemployed), the woman’s consent to intercourse is
considered valid under the law. When a man uses fraud-in-theinducement to achieve sexual intercourse, the intercourse is not
considered rape.229 The trans panic theory suggests that the victim’s
deception about his or her “true” identity should be grounds to
partially excuse a murder even though using deception to get someone
to consent to sex is not considered a crime.230
At their second trial, Magidson and Merel again argued they were
provoked into a heat of passion upon discovering that Araujo had
male genitalia and that Araujo’s deception about her true sexual
identity was what sparked their rage. This time, after deliberating for
seven days, the jury rejected the defendants’ claim of provocation and

227
See PERRY, supra note 190, at 106 (citing ERVIN GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 128 (1963)) (explaining ideal or “hegemonic”
masculinity is reflected in “a young, married, white, urban, northern, heterosexual
Protestant father, of college education, fully employed, of good complexion, weight
and height, and a recent record in sports”).
228
See Haddock, supra note 223, at E1.
229
See Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that fraud-in-the-inducement does not invalidate consent).
230
Courts are divided over whether pretending to be a woman’s husband in order
to have sex with her constitutes fraud-in-the-factum or fraud-in-the-inducement. See
Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54, 54 (1857) (finding that even though woman’s consent to
sexual intercourse was procured by defendant’s fraudulent impersonation of woman’s
husband, act of intercourse did not constitute rape); Ledbetter v. State, 26 S.W. 725,
725-26 (Tex. 1894) (affirming conviction for rape where defendant fraudulently
impersonated victim’s husband). The rationale for treating the impersonating-ahusband case as fraud-in-the-inducement (and not rape) is that the woman knew she
was engaging in sexual intercourse, and therefore her consent was valid. Boro, 210
Cal. Rptr. at 124 (citing PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW ch. 9, § 3, 1079 (3d ed.
1982)). Other courts have held that husband impersonation to obtain consent to
sexual intercourse constitutes fraud-in-the-factum (and therefore rape) on the theory
that “the woman’s consent is to an innocent act of marital intercourse while what is
actually perpetrated upon her is an act of adultery.” Id.
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found both men guilty of second-degree murder.231 Magidson and
Merel were sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison.232
The second jury’s verdict is comforting. Apparently, the jury felt it
was not reasonable for the defendants to have acted the way they did
upon discovering that Araujo was transgender. According to Max
Stern, a San Francisco lawyer who served on the second jury, “This
was not a manslaughter, because it is not reasonable to accept this
behavior in response to the circumstances here.”233 Stern continued,
“Even if the defendants believed they had been sexually deceived, that
would be ‘no basis, no justification for beating and murder.’”234
F.

Self-Defense

Gay panic arguments linked to claims of self-defense, although less
common than gay (or trans) panic arguments linked to claims of
provocation, are also sometimes successful.235 Self-defense requires a
231
See John M. Glionna, 2 Guilty of Killing Transgender Teen, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2005, at B1.
232
Lee, Prison for 3, supra note 212, at B1.
233
Lee, Manslaughter Ruled Out, supra note 212, at B1.
234
Id. On September 28, 2006, the Gwen Araujo Justice for Victims Act was signed
into law. Assemb. B. 1160, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). Assembly Bill 1160,
introduced by Assemblywoman Sally Lieber (D-San Jose), added a new section 1127h
to the California Penal Code, which requires the judge to give the following jury
instruction upon request of either party: “Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or
public opinion influence your decision. Bias includes bias against the victim or
victims, witnesses, or defendant based upon his or her disability, gender, nationality,
race or ethnicity, religion, gender identity, or sexual orientation.” Id. Recent social
science research suggests that merely telling jurors not to be biased is inadequate.
Shari Seidman & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1857, 1864 (2001). Jurors need to be given tools they can use to counter hidden
biases. One such tool is a role-reversal jury instruction, which I propose in Part IV of
this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 498-503.
235
In a recent case, a 21-year-old man named Stephen Scarborough argued he killed
a 62-year-old man named Victor Manious by hitting him with a baseball bat to ward off a
homosexual assault. Scarborough claimed that Manious walked into Scarborough’s
friend’s apartment while Scarborough was there alone, knocked him out, and when
Scarborough came to, Manious was in his underwear on top of Scarborough sexually
assaulting him. See Barton Dieters, Opening Statements in Stephen Scarborough’s Murder
Trial Described Two Scenarios in Victor Manious’s Death, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 26,
2008, http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/2008/03/opening_statemets_in_steve_s.html; Barton
Dieters, Scarborough Testifies in Own Defense, Says He Was Being Sexually Assaulted by
Slaying Victim, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 7, 2008, http://blog.mlive.com/gpress/
2008/04/scarborough_testifies_in_own_d.html. Scarborough was charged with felony
murder, but was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter on April 10, 2008. See Verdict
in Stephen Scarborough Case: Guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter of Victor Manious, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 10, 2008, http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/2008/04/verdict_
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showing that the defendant honestly and reasonably believed deadly
force was necessary to protect against an imminent threat of death or
serious bodily injury.236
Just as in the provocation cases discussed above, the defendant
claiming self-defense draws upon masculinity norms, heterosexuality
norms, and stereotypes about gay men to bolster his claim of
reasonableness.
For example, thirty-year-old Stephen Bright argued that he killed
fifty-eight-year-old Kenneth Brewer in self-defense after Brewer tried
to force him to have sex.237 Bright met Brewer at a gay bar on
September 30, 1997.238 Brewer bought Bright some drinks and the two
men chatted.239 Bright accompanied Brewer back to his Hawaii Kai
condominium for more drinks.240 According to Bright, he was sitting
in Brewer’s bedroom having a gin vodka mixed drink when Brewer left
the room for a short time.241 When Brewer came back into the
bedroom, he was completely naked with an erection, and said he
wanted to f ___ Bright.242 Then, Brewer grabbed his throat and
crotch.243 Bright claimed he got up and started swinging to get Brewer
off of him.244 Bright said he did not intend to kill Brewer; he just did
not want to be raped or hurt.245 Bright also testified that he was “in a

in_steven_scarborough.html. It is unclear whether the jury mitigated the charges
because they felt Scarborough was reasonably provoked into a heat of passion or because
they could not agree on a verdict and simply compromised.
236
See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New
Dual Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 198-99 (1998)
[hereinafter Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine].
237
Susan Kreifels, Blood in Jeans Evidence of Murder, Says Prosecutor, HONOLULU
STAR-BULL., Oct. 1, 1998, available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/1998/10/01/
news/briefs.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Kreifels, Blood in Jeans
Evidence of Murder].
238
See id.
239
See id.
240
See id.
241
See Partial Transcript of Proceedings in State v. Bright, Cr. No. 97-2720, at 2325 (September 28, 1998) (direct examination of defendant Stephen Bright by John
Tonaki).
242
Id. at 25-27.
243
Id.
244
Id. at 27-28, 30 (“All I remember is just swinging out of fear of this man.”).
245
Id. at 31 (“I was just thinking of getting this man off me and leaving, getting out
of this room. I didn’t want to get raped or hurt.”).
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panic state.”246 When Bright later heard that Brewer had died, he
surrendered to police.247
Bright was charged with second-degree murder.248 At trial, Bright
claimed he acted in self-defense, beating Brewer to ward off a sexual
assault.249 Self-defense as a defense to murder requires proof that the
defendant honestly and reasonably believed it was necessary to use
deadly force to protect against an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily injury.250 If the defendant could have avoided the threatened
harm by taking less fatal action, ordinarily the defendant is not
exonerated.251 Self-defense doctrine also requires proportionality. An
individual cannot use deadly force to counter non-deadly force.252
Interestingly, Bright’s attorney, Deputy Public Defender Jack
Tonaki, did not argue that his client’s fear of sexual assault was
somehow worse because his attacker was a man. Instead, in a
sophisticated appeal to the women on the jury, Tonaki argued that
fighting back in self-defense against the threat of sexual assault is the
same whether by a man or a woman.253 Engaging in a bit of gender
and sexual orientation switching,254 Tonaki further argued that it
246

Id. at 32 (“I was in such a panic state.”).
Id. at 34-35.
248
See Murder Suspect to be Arraigned, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Nov. 6, 1997,
available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/1997/11/06/news/briefs.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2008) (noting that Stephen Bright was charged with second-degree murder in
beating death of Kenneth Brewer).
249
See Susan Kriefels, Beating Death of Hotel Worker Was Self-defense, Defendant Says,
HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Sept. 17, 1998, available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/1998/
09/17/news/story9.html (“Stephen Bright attacked a homosexual man because of sexual
advances, killing him in self-defense, his defense attorney says.”).
250
See Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine, supra note 236, at 198-99.
251
Id.
252
Deadly force is generally defined as force intended or likely to cause death or
grievous bodily injury. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 103, at
239 (citing Commonwealth v. Klein, 363 N.E.2d 1313, 1316 (Mass. 1977)). Many
jurisdictions consider rape grievous bodily injury, such that a woman would be
allowed to use deadly force to ward off an impending rape. See, e.g., People v. Maria
de L.A., 61 Cal. 188, 189-90 (1882) (opining that “[t]he defendant would be justified
in using a deadly weapon, if the prosecuting witness was attempting to commit any
rape . . .”); see also Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867, 876 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding trial
court erred in failing to instruct jury that defendant would have been justified in using
deadly force to stop imminent rape).
253
Susan Kreifels, Jury Tainted by Homophobia?, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Oct. 7,
1998, available at http://starbulletin.com/98/10/07news/story2.html.
254
In Murder and the Reasonable Man, I propose race, gender, and sexual
orientation switching as one way to reduce bias in cases involving race, gender and
sexual orientation. See LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 80, at 253.
247
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makes no difference whether the sexual assailant is gay or straight,
because an individual has a right to fight off an unwanted sexual
attack.255 In his closing argument, Tonaki told the jury:
If a woman were in the same position faced with a man
coming at them naked, saying the things Kenneth Brewer said,
and that female pulls out a gun and shoots the guy dead, we’d
be giving that lady an award for stopping a rape. There’s no
double standards under the law, ladies and gentlemen. . . .
This case is not about homosexuality. . . . It’s about a danger
of being assaulted, sexually assaulted. That’s what it’s all
about.256
The jury, encouraged to imagine Bright as a woman being sexually
attacked by an older man, was primed to sympathize with Bright.
It is true that a woman threatened with imminent rape or other
forcible sexual assault would be justified in using deadly force in selfdefense if necessary to avoid being killed or seriously injured.257 Use
of deadly force to protect against death or serious bodily injury is
considered proportionate force. It is doubtful, however, that Stephen
Bright had to kill Kenneth Brewer to avoid the alleged sexual advance.
Bright was younger by almost thirty years and much stronger than
Brewer. According to Wayne Tashima, the prosecutor who tried the
case, Bright’s body was muscular and stocky.258 Moreover, Bright’s job
as a construction worker required him to lift heavy objects.259 Brewer,
in contrast, was overweight and weak.260 Most likely, Bright did not
have to beat Brewer to death to avoid a sexual assault.
Further undermining Bright’s claim of self-defense was that police
found Brewer’s blood on the inside of Bright’s jeans, suggesting Bright
had his pants off during the beating and may have engaged in some
form of consensual sexual activity before the killing.261 Bright, however,
denied taking off his pants during the evening. His attorney suggested
255

Kreifels, Jury Tainted by Homophobia?, supra note 253.
Partial Transcript of Proceedings in State v. Bright, Cr. No. 97-2720, at 29
(September 30, 1998) (Deputy Public Defender John Tonaki’s Closing Argument).
257
See supra note 252.
258
Telephone Interview with Wayne Tashima, Senior Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, in Honolulu, Haw. (Oct. 20, 2007).
259
Id.
260
Id. See also Partial Transcript of Proceedings in State v. Bright, Cr. No. 97-2720,
at 13 (September 20, 1998) (Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Wayne Tashima’s Closing
Argument) (noting that defendant agreed during his testimony that victim was
overweight and not physically built in comparison to defendant).
261
See Kreifels, Blood in Jeans Evidence of Murder, supra note 237.
256
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Brewer’s blood could have gotten on the inside of Bright’s jeans after he
took off his clothes and threw them together in a laundry basket.262
According to the prosecutor, however, Bright did not remove his clothes
until at least four hours after the killing.263 Any blood from the beating
probably would have dried by that time, and could not have transferred
from one piece of clothing to another.264
The jury deliberated for three-and-a-half days before acquitting
Bright of murder, finding him guilty of only third-degree assault, a
misdemeanor.265 The maximum punishment for third-degree assault
was one year in jail.266 Bright was sentenced to time served and 400
hours of community service.267 Because Bright had already been in jail
for one year pending trial, he was released from jail the same day he
was convicted.268
III. WHY GAY PANIC DEFENSE STRATEGIES SHOULD NOT BE
CATEGORICALLY BARRED
In light of the troubling stereotypes reinforced by gay panic
narratives and the obvious attempt by defendants asserting gay panic
to tap into unconscious homophobia, it is tempting to join calls for
abolition of gay panic defense strategies. In 1992, Robert Mison
issued just such a call. In his article, Homophobia in Manslaughter:
The Homosexual Advance As Insufficient Provocation, Mison argues that
the use of gay panic to support a provocation defense should be
disallowed because such an argument appeals to irrational fears,
revulsion, and hatred against gay men, which are prevalent in our
heterocentric society.269 According to Mison, when judges allow
262

Telephone Interview with Wayne Tashima, supra note 258.
Id.
264
Id. The blood on the inside of Bright’s jeans suggests Bright may have allowed
Brewer to engage in sexual relations with him before he beat Brewer to death. If so,
Bright’s claim that he was afraid of Brewer and only beat him to ward off a sexual
attack is suspect. It seems more plausible that Bright went back to Brewer’s home,
knowing that Brewer expected some kind of sexual activity in exchange for all the
drinks he had purchased for Bright that evening. The two may have started to engage
in sexual activity. Bright may have started feeling disgusted with himself, then took
his feelings of shame and guilt out on Brewer.
265
Killer Gets Community Service Hours, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., July 7, 1999,
available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/07/07/news/briefs.html.
266
HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-663 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-712 (2008).
267
Killer Gets Community Service Hours, supra note 265.
268
Id.
269
Mison, supra note 10, at 157-58 (discussing common negative stereotypes about
gays, including image of loathsome addict who spreads AIDS and other venereal
263
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defendants to make such arguments, they reinforce and
institutionalize violent prejudices at the expense of norms of selfcontrol, tolerance, and compassion, which the law should
encourage.270 Therefore, Mison argues, judges should rule as a matter
of law that a non-violent homosexual advance does not constitute
legally adequate provocation.271 In short, Mison asks judges to take
the question of whether a reasonable man would be provoked into a
heat of passion by a non-violent homosexual advance away from the
jury and disallow the provocation defense in such cases. Most critics
of gay and trans panic arguments have echoed Mison’s call, proposing
legislative or judicial action barring defense appeals to gay panic.272
While I agree that claims of gay panic are problematic for all the
reasons outlined in Parts I and II of this Article, I believe the criminal
law should not categorically bar gay panic arguments linked to claims
of provocation.273 In this Part, I provide a defense of this potentially
unpopular position. I start with a micro-argument: attempts to ban
the argument that a non-violent homosexual advance constitutes
legally adequate provocation from the criminal courtroom will not
work because defense attorneys will find more subtle ways to get the
same idea across to the jury. When a message that relies on negative
stereotypes is conveyed covertly, it will often have a more powerful
impact than if the message had been aired overtly. This is because an
explicit argument allows individuals to consciously correct or counter
otherwise automatic stereotype-congruent responses, while more
subtle insertions of bias are harder to defend against.
I then turn to several macro-arguments to support my theory that it
is better to allow defendants to assert claims of gay panic than to
diseases).
270
See id. at 176-77.
271
Id. But see Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men, supra
note 10, at 728-29 (arguing against Mison’s proposal).
272
See, e.g., Steinberg, Book Note, supra note 15, at 502 (arguing that judges
should not allow gay or trans panic arguments); Suffredini, supra note 10, at 279
(arguing that use of Homosexual Panic Defense should either be limited by
application of new evidentiary rules or eliminated altogether).
273
I am less opposed to barring gay panic arguments linked to claims of mental
defect because there is no identifiable mental disease or defect that could support such
a claim. Homosexual Panic Disorder is not a recognized mental disease or defect
today. Therefore, I would support a categorical ban on claims of gay panic linked to
insanity or diminished capacity. With respect to self-defense, a defendant who claims
he reasonably believed he was threatened with imminent death or serious bodily
injury has an arguable claim of self-defense. Being threatened with rape, heterosexual
or homosexual, generally is considered a threat of serious bodily injury. Therefore, I
would not categorically bar all gay panic self-defense claims.
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preclude such arguments. Three broad frameworks illustrate why
allowing defendants to argue gay panic better serves the dual purposes
of ensuring a fair trial to the defendant and achieving the ends of
justice that the State seeks: (1) First Amendment theory; (2) recent
social science research on race and implicit bias; and (3) institutional
competency arguments in favor of allowing juries to decide whether to
be lenient towards a defendant claiming gay panic.
A. Lessons from the Matthew Shepard Trial
Formally barring gay panic provocation arguments from the
criminal courtroom is not a good idea because it will not keep the jury
from considering gay panic arguments. The Matthew Shepard case
illustrates this point. Matthew Shepard was the openly gay student at
the University of Wyoming whose bloodied and beaten body was
found tied to a wooden fence about one mile outside Laramie,
Wyoming in October 1998. Police responding to a 911 call about a
fight between Aaron McKinney and two Latino youths the same night
found Shepard’s credit card, one of Shepard’s shoes, and the bloody
gun used to beat Shepard in McKinney’s truck.274 Police arrested
McKinney and his friend Russell Henderson.
McKinney and
Henderson were charged with first-degree murder, aggravated robbery,
and kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily injury or terrorize the
victim.275 Rather than go to trial, Henderson pled guilty to murder.276
McKinney decided to take his chances with a jury.
One of McKinney’s attorneys, Jason Tangeman, raised the specter of
the gay man as deviant sexual predator during his opening statement
before the jury of seven men and five women.277 Tangeman argued
that Matthew Shepard made an unwanted sexual advance upon
McKinney when they were in McKinney’s truck, allegedly grabbing

274
BETH LOFFREDA, LOSING MATT SHEPARD: LIFE AND POLITICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF
ANTI-GAY MURDER 152-54 (2000).
275
See Robert W. Black, Brutal Death of Gay Man Stirs Nation, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Oct. 14, 1998, at 3.
276
2nd Trial Starts in Gay Man’s Death, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 10, 1999,
at 18.
277
See Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, No. 6381, at
16-17 (Oct. 11, 1999) (defense attorney Jason Tangeman’s opening statement) (on file
with author) (alleging that “Mr. Shepard reached over and grabbed [Aaron
McKinney’s] genitals and licked his ear” which made McKinney very upset and caused
him to beat Shepard); Tom Kenworthy, Wyo. Jury to Weigh Motives in Gay Killing,
WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1999, at A3 (noting that jury consisted of seven men and five
women).
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McKinney’s crotch and licking McKinney’s ear.278 Tangeman argued
that this sexual advance was particularly upsetting to McKinney
because of his history with unpleasant homosexual encounters.
According to Tangeman, when McKinney was seven years old, a
neighborhood bully forced him to suck his penis and commit sexual
acts with another little boy.279 At the age of twenty, McKinney was
traumatized when he accidentally entered a gay and lesbian church in
Florida and saw men holding hands and kissing.280 Tangeman
concluded that Shepard’s unwanted sexual advance, McKinney’s
history of traumatic homosexual encounters, and McKinney’s use of
alcohol281 and methamphetamines combined to cause McKinney to
lose his self-control:282
The evidence is going to show that it is the advance of Mr.
Shepard — the homosexual advance of Mr. Shepard that was
significant to Aaron McKinney. That humiliated him in front
of his friend, Russell Henderson. His past bubbled up in him.
He was fuelled [sic] by drugs. He was fuelled [sic] by alcohol.
And in his own words, he left his body.283
Tangeman’s opening statement was unexpected.
McKinney’s
attorneys had not mentioned plans to use a gay panic defense in any of
the pretrial hearings.284 Judge Barton Voigt quickly called a hearing to
decide whether to allow the defense to introduce evidence of gay panic
in support of either a provocation or mental disorder defense. After
hearing arguments from both sides, the judge did what Robert Mison
would like all judges to do — he ruled against the defense.285 Judge
Voigt observed that, despite their protests to the contrary, the defense

278
Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, supra note 277, at
16-17.
279
Id. at 19.
280
Id. at 20.
281
Jana Bufkin notes that alcoholic consumption “is practically universally
associated with being a man or achieving manhood.” Bufkin, supra note 190, at 166
(noting that “males equate drinking with masculinity and, perhaps more importantly,
this male bonding exercise is often laced with violence”).
282
Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, supra note 277, at
9-11 (discussing McKinney’s addiction to methamphetamine), 16-18 (discussing
Shepard’s alleged homosexual advance), and 19-20 (discussing McKinney’s history of
traumatic homosexual encounters).
283
Id. at 22.
284
See LOFFREDA, supra note 274, at 132.
285
Decision Letter, State v. McKinney, No. 6381 (D. Wyo. Oct. 30, 1999).
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was in fact trying to assert what he called a “homosexual rage”
defense. He explained:
Defense counsel have tried valiantly to convince the Court that
their defense is not a homosexual rage defense. But what they
hope to do is to present testimony that, because of
homosexual experiences in the Defendant’s past, he flew into a
rage and killed Matthew Shepard, without specific intent to
kill, but voluntarily in a sudden heat of passion. This is the
homosexual rage defense, nothing more, nothing less. The
fact that the Defendant attempts to raise it through lay
witnesses, rather than through experts, is inconsequential.286
In barring the defense from asserting a provocation defense based on
a gay panic argument, the judge ruled that the jury could not consider
McKinney’s prior homosexual experiences on the issue of provocation.
He explained that provocation is supposed to be based upon an
objective reasonable person standard and McKinney’s personal
experiences bore only upon his subjective state of mind.287 The judge
also ruled that Wyoming law did not recognize the defenses of
temporary insanity and diminished capacity, and accordingly those
defenses were unavailable to the defense.288
This, however, was not the end of the matter. Despite the judge’s
ruling, McKinney’s defense attorneys called two witnesses and used
their testimony to convey the idea that Matthew Shepard was sexually
aggressive289 and deserved the beating he got, playing on stereotypical
images of gay men as sexual deviants and sexual provocateurs.290 One
witness, Mike St. Clair, testified that he was at the Fireside Lounge Bar
the night Shepard was killed. According to St. Clair, Shepard

286

Id. at 4.
Id.
288
Id.; see Michael Janofsky, Gay-Panic Defense Ruled Out, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2,
1999, at A3, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1999/11/02/
MN90537.DTL&hw=nancy+gay&sn=064&sc=265 (last visited Oct. 22, 2008);
Wyoming Judge Bars ‘Gay Panic’ Defense, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1999, at A7.
289
It is interesting that Shepard’s supposed sexual aggressiveness was used to
convey the idea that he deserved to die when sexual aggressiveness is usually a
coveted manly trait. See supra note 184. Apparently, sexual aggressiveness is viewed
as a positive manly trait only in heterosexual interactions.
290
See Kevin T. Berril & Gregory M. Herek, Primary and Secondary Victimization in
Anti-Gay Hate Crimes: Official Response and Public Policy, in HATE CRIMES:
CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 289, 295 (1992); Lou
Chibbaro, Jr., ‘Gay Panic’ Defense Used Despite Ban by Judge, Second Witness Says
Shepard Made Pass, WASH. BLADE, Nov. 3, 1999.
287
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approached him and asked if he could sit with him.291 After he agreed
to let Shepard sit with him, St. Clair testified that he “began to feel really
uncomfortable.”292 A short time later, Russell Henderson approached
the table, leaned down towards Shepard, and whispered something in
Shepard’s ear.293 Shepard then gathered up his things, stood up, and
said he would be back.294 When St. Clair responded with “what?”
Shepard “leaned down” and “licked his lips like . . . it was him trying to
be sexy.”295 St. Clair continued, “I believe it was him showing he was
interested in me, hitting on me.” 296 St. Clair concluded that Shepard
“was blatantly gay, and he made advances on me.”297
A second witness, Chris Hoogerhyde, testified that Shepard made a
homosexual advance upon him when they went on a midnight trip to
a lake with others on August 21, 1998.298 According to Hoogerhyde,
Shepard asked him to go for a walk around the lake.299 Hoogerhyde
declined, but Shepard persisted and asked him why not.300
Hoogerhyde told Shepard that he did not want to go because it was a
big lake and there were bears out there.301 Shepard told him, “[Y]ou’re
just afraid I’m going to try something.”302 Hoogerhyde testified that he
took this as a homosexual advance.303 After Hoogerhyde told Shepard
“no” again, Shepard gave him a little tug on his shirt and said, “Come

291

Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, supra note 277, at
30 (direct examination of Mike St. Clair).
292
Id. at 31; see also LOFFREDA, supra note 274, at 135. Loffreda notes that this
comment suggests the witness was more afraid of his own homosexuality than of
Shepard. Id.; see also Chibbaro, supra note 290 (reporting that defense witness who
testified that Shepard made sexual advance toward him at Fireside Lounge minutes
before Shepard met McKinney and Henderson was 23-year-old University of
Wyoming student Mike St. Clair).
293
Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, supra note 277, at
32-34.
294
Id. at 35.
295
Id.
296
Id.; see also Bryan Robinson, Final Ruling on So-Called “Gay Panic” Theory Hangs
in Balance as Shepard Murder Defense Begins, COURT TV ONLINE, Oct. 29, 1999,
http://www.courttv.com/trials/mckinney/102999_pm_ctv.html.
297
Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, supra note 277, at 38.
298
Id. at 42-45 (direct examination of Chris Hoogerhyde).
299
Id. at 44.
300
Id. at 45.
301
Id.
302
Id.
303
Id.

2008]

The Gay Panic Defense

527

on,” as if nagging him to go with him.304 Hoogerhyde responded by
hitting Shepard with his fist twice, knocking him out.305
It appears that the defense called these two witnesses not only to
give credibility to McKinney’s claim that Shepard had made a sexual
advance upon him — a claim which McKinney later admitted was
false306 — but also to suggest it was reasonable for McKinney to be
offended by Shepard’s alleged homosexual advance and to respond to
it with violence. During closing arguments to the jury, Dion Custis,
McKinney’s other attorney, repeatedly argued that Shepard’s sexual
advance upon McKinney triggered the subsequent beating.307
One might object to using the Shepard case as an example of why
attempts to ban gay panic defense strategies will not work on the
304

Id.
Id. at 45-46.
306
In a televised interview from prison in 2004, Aaron McKinney admitted to
Elizabeth Vargas of ABC News that he made up the story about going into a rage
because Shepard made a pass at him. McKinney and Russell Henderson claimed
Shepard’s death was simply a robbery gone bad by two men high on
methamphetamine. The Matthew Shepard Story: Secrets of a Murder (ABC television
broadcast Nov. 26, 2004). McKinney’s admission that there was no homosexual
advance raises the question whether McKinney’s attorneys violated any ethical rules
by promoting what we now know was a false gay panic defense. Rule 3.3 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3
(2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_3_3.html. First, it is not
clear whether McKinney’s attorneys knew at the time of McKinney’s trial that Shepard
had not made a sexual advance upon McKinney. If McKinney told his attorneys that
Shepard made a sexual advance and the attorneys did not know that he was lying, the
attorneys would not be in violation of Rule 3.3 because Rule 3.3 requires knowledge
of falsity. Second, while knowingly eliciting perjured testimony would be a violation
of Rule 3.3, arguably McKinney’s lawyers did not knowingly elicit perjured testimony
when they presented the testimony of the two defense witnesses, who were merely
describing their previous interactions with Matthew Shepard. Aaron McKinney did
not testify at trial. Finally, as far as the references to Shepard’s alleged sexual advance
in the defense’s opening and closing statements, a lawyer’s statements during opening
and closing arguments are not under oath and do not in and of themselves constitute
evidence. As law professor Peter Margulies has noted, imposing discipline upon
lawyers for what they say in opening and closing statements could chill advocacy in
ways that would undermine the Sixth Amendment. Conversation with Peter
Margulies, in Seattle, Wash. (Oct. 5, 2008); see also Peter Margulies, Lawyers’
Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct,
Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 939, 955 (2006) (“[D]efense
counsel has no . . . obligation to . . . present the truth.”) (citing United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., concurring and dissenting)).
307
Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, supra note 277, at
68 (defense attorney Dion Custis’s closing statement); see also Patrick O’Driscoll, Jury
Begins Deliberations in Slaying of Gay Student, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 1999, at 9A.
305
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ground that the prosecutor and judge may have simply been asleep at
the switch. Presumably, a prosecutor who was paying attention would
have strenuously objected to the introduction of testimony designed to
bolster a defendant’s claim of gay panic, and a judge who had ruled
that the defense could not argue gay panic would sustain such an
objection. It is unclear why the judge permitted this testimony in
light of his earlier ruling.308
However, even if an alert prosecutor objects and the judge sustains
the objection, the defense attorney will have largely achieved his goal.
The defense attorney will have conveyed the message that a male-onmale sexual advance is something that would offend and disgust the
average heterosexual man by simply asking the male witness, “And
how did you feel when Shepard sat down beside you and licked his
lips suggestively?” In strenuously objecting, the prosecutor just helps
the defense by highlighting the question and raising its significance in
the eyes of the jury. Even if the judge sustains the objection and
instructs the jury to disregard the question, the judge cannot unring
the bell that the jury has just heard.309 The defense attorney may ask
leave to rephrase the question, which simply gives him another
opportunity to hammer home his point. When he then asks the
witness, “Tell me, in your own words, how you felt when this man
came up to you,” the defense attorney does not need an answer
because the question has conveyed the point he wishes to make. If the
prosecutor objects again, she just helps the defense by calling
attention to the fact that the witness, an average man just like the
defendant, felt uncomfortable having another man expressing sexual
interest in him.
308
The prosecutor did not object to having these witnesses testify. See Partial
Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, supra note 277, at 23-47 (direct
examination of Mike St. Clair and Christopher Hoogerhyde). During Mike St. Clair’s
direct examination, the prosecutor objected only twice, and neither of these objections
went directly to St. Clair’s testimony that he felt Shepard had made a homosexual
advance upon him. See id. at 31-32 (objecting when Mike St. Clair started to say,
“[O]ne of my friends told me he apparently introduced . . .”), 33 (objecting to
question, “You saw [Russell Henderson] and you said he was appearing to be drunk
and running around” because leading). During Hoogerhyde’s direct examination, the
prosecutor did object to a question that alluded to Shepard having made a homosexual
advance, but this was only after the witness had already testified that he took
Shepard’s invitation to go for a walk around the lake as a homosexual advance. Id. at
46 (objecting when defense started to ask, “Was that in response to what you
perceived as a homosexual. . .”).
309
As Shari Diamond and Neil Vidmar note, “[S]imple admonitions that instruct
the jury to disregard psychologically compelling but inadmissible testimony . . . often
fail to unring the bell.” Seidman & Vidmar, supra note 234, at 1864.
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One might also object to using the Matthew Shepard case as
evidence that defense attorneys will disregard explicit court orders not
to use gay panic on the ground that in most cases, when a judge rules
that an attorney cannot make a particular argument, the attorney will
follow the judge’s instructions. One might further argue that perhaps
because the Matthew Shepard case was under such intense public
scrutiny, it is more of an outlier than a typical case.
The fact that the case received so much public attention, however,
makes it all the more remarkable that the defense openly flouted the
judge’s order. Despite all the media attention, the judge not only
allowed the two witnesses to testify, but also allowed the defense to
refer to Shepard’s alleged (homo)sexual advance again in closing
arguments. If this could happen in a case like the Matthew Shepard
case, where all eyes were watching, it could happen in any case.
Recent behavioral research on juries suggests that attempts to
control the matters that a jury considers by prohibiting the
introduction of specific topics at trial simply do not work. In one of
the only studies to date based on actual jury deliberations, Shari
Diamond and Neil Vidmar reviewed videotaped jury deliberations in
forty civil cases, in an attempt to examine the effectiveness of
“blindfolding” — the commonly employed technique of withholding
certain information from the jury.310 Blindfolding is fairly common in
both civil and criminal cases and includes withholding from juries
information about the prior criminal convictions of a defendant who
chooses not to testify, statements made by either party during plea
bargaining or settlement negotiations, and subsequent remedial
measures taken by a party after an accident.311 One rationale behind
blindfolding is the fear that exposing juries to the prohibited
information may improperly bias them. The reason juries are not told
about a non-testifying defendant’s prior convictions is because we fear
they might find the defendant guilty based on his presumably bad
character rather than on the evidence presented at trial.312
Blindfolding may also encourage certain behaviors which society views
For example, statements during settlement
as beneficial.313
negotiations are not admissible at trial, in part to encourage the parties
to engage in attempts to settle the case.314 A rule that precludes the
310
Id. at 1858 (noting cases filmed with consent of parties, judge, and jurors as
part of Arizona Jury Project).
311
See id. at 1863.
312
See id.
313
See id.
314
See id.
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admission of evidence of remedial measures is designed to encourage
defendants to take remedial measures without having to fear that those
actions will be used against them.315
Despite evidentiary rules prohibiting the admission of certain types
of evidence, Diamond and Vidmar found that prohibited evidence
often finds its way into the deliberation room. Sometimes such
evidence is inadvertently introduced when a witness innocently
mentions a forbidden subject in response to a question.316 Sometimes
an attorney is able to convince the judge that she is introducing the
evidence for an allowable purpose.317 For example, despite the rule of
evidence that disallows evidence of prior bad acts, a prosecutor might
argue that she is introducing the prior bad act to show motive, an
acceptable reason. Finally, jurors, who bring their prior experiences,
beliefs and attitudes to the jury room, may think of a forbidden topic
on their own.318
Diamond and Vidmar found that despite the general evidentiary
prohibition reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 411 and numerous
state evidence codes precluding the introduction of evidence that a
party carried liability insurance,319 conversations amongst jurors about
insurance occurred in 85% of the forty tort cases they studied.320 In
several of the cases in which the jury discussed insurance during
deliberations, the subject of insurance came up directly or indirectly at
trial.321 In four-fifths of the remainder of the cases, even though there
was no mention of the subject of insurance at trial, the jurors
themselves spontaneously initiated discussions about it.322 Diamond
and Vidmar also found that despite an absolute prohibition on
mentioning attorneys’ fees, the topic of whether or how much the
attorneys would be paid came up in 83% of the cases observed.323
Diamond and Vidmar’s research suggests that attempts to ban gay
panic arguments from the criminal courtroom will not keep jurors
from considering gay panic as a reason for the killing. Either the

315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323

See id.
See id. at 1864.
See id.
See id. at 1865-66.
Id. at 1875.
Id. at 1876.
Id. at 1877-82.
Id. at 1884.
Id. at 1897-98.
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subject will come up inadvertently or purposefully during trial, or the
jurors may think of the argument on their own.324
It is unclear whether the gay panic defense strategy used in the
Matthew Shepard case influenced the jury which found McKinney
guilty of felony murder. On the one hand, one could read this verdict
as a repudiation of the defense’s attempt to paint McKinney’s actions
as a reasonable response to an unwanted homosexual advance. Had
the jury bought this argument, they probably would have found
McKinney guilty of voluntary manslaughter. On the other hand, the
jury did not give the government the first-degree murder conviction it
sought. They instead found McKinney guilty of felony murder, an
offense that does not require proof of premeditation or deliberation.
Regardless of which interpretation is correct, the Matthew Shepard
case illustrates how easily a claim of gay panic can be made sub rosa
even when the judge tries to bar the defense.
The outcome in the Matthew Shepard case may even support my
argument that making sexual orientation salient can help jurors
cognitively process and reject the stereotypic assumptions about gay
men underlying claims of gay panic. Sexual orientation can be made
salient in various ways, including through pretrial publicity, questions
asked during voir dire, opening and closing statements, trial
testimony, and jury instructions.325 In the Matthew Shepard case, gay
and lesbian groups made sexual orientation salient when they decried
the killing as a hate crime based on the victim’s sexual orientation.
Extensive pretrial publicity and the defense’s promotion of a gay panic
defense strategy further helped to make sexual orientation salient.
The jury responded by rejecting McKinney’s claim of gay panic. In
finding McKinney guilty of felony murder rather than manslaughter, it
appears the jury did not resort to stereotypical thinking about gay men
as sexual deviants, but instead saw Shepard as a human being who had
suffered a particularly cruel and senseless death.
324
Id. at 1865-66 (noting that most common situation in which blindfolding
attempt fails “occurs when the jurors’ pretrial experiences, attitudes, or beliefs provide
them with a foundation of potentially relevant information that makes the forbidden
topic likely to come to mind”).
325
See generally Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the
Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 1371 (2000) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the
Courtroom] (“During the course of a trial, racial issues may become salient in any
number of ways, including, for example, pretrial publicity, voir dire questioning of
potential jurors, opening and closing arguments, the nature of police testimony,
attorneys’ demeanors, and sometimes the nature of the crime itself, as in a Ku Klux
Klan confrontation.”).
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B. First Amendment Theory
This country has a long history of tolerance for dissent. Under the
“marketplace of ideas” theory of free speech,326 the expression of both
good and bad ideas is encouraged on the ground that lively debate and
discussion can help both those listening and those arguing determine
the truth. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in his
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States,327 “[T]he ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — . . . the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”328
Another reason for allowing individuals to express even speech
thought to be dangerous to a free society is the idea that suppression
of speech breeds hate, and “hate menaces stable government.”329
Under the “safety valve” theory, 330 the best way to deal with the threat
of radical action is to allow individuals to express radical ideas out in
the open and to permit others to challenge and debate those ideas. As
Justice Brandeis explained in his concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California, “[T]he path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies . . . . [T]he fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”331
In one of the most eloquent defenses of the right to freedom of
speech, Thomas Emerson explains that suppression of discussion
allows force to replace reason.332 The process of open discussion, on
the other hand,
promotes greater cohesion in a society because people are
more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they
have a part in the decision-making process . . . Freedom of
expression thus provides a framework in which the conflict

326
Anna M. Taruschio, The First Amendment, The Right Not to Speak and the
Problem of Government Access Statutes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1009 (2000)
(noting “[t]he concept of the marketplace of ideas entered American jurisprudence as
a principle of First Amendment liberty in Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United
States”) (citation omitted).
327
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
328
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
329
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
330
See generally Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America’s
“First Freedom,” 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557, 609 (1999).
331
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
332
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
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necessary to the progress of a society can take place without
destroying the society.333
When a heterosexual male murder defendant argues gay panic, he
seeks to appeal to societal norms that value heterosexuality over
homosexuality.334
He further seeks to promote the idea of
homosexuality as deviant and abnormal.335 Such norms are in conflict
with norms that recognize that gays and lesbians are human beings
and that responding to a non-violent sexual advance (whether
heterosexual or homosexual) with fatal physical violence is
inappropriate. Though critics of the gay panic defense have argued
that gay panic arguments should be barred, trying to change social
norms by suppressing norms with which one disagrees is not the best
way to bring about lasting change. As Emerson explains: “The
principle that the government cannot restrict expression in order to
coerce conformity to social norms means that freedom of expression
must receive full protection in this context. No matter how deviant
the expression may be — how obnoxious or intolerable it may
seem — the expression cannot be suppressed.”336
Moreover, suppressing speech to enforce conformity to social norms
can further entrench the existing retrograde norms. Suppressing
speech is “likely to bottle up the frustrations, hide the underlying
grievances, and ultimately end in explosion.”337
Just as the suppression of obnoxious ideas can give those ideas more
power by forcing them underground where they can fester and gain
persuasive force, banning gay panic arguments from the criminal
courtroom simply forces these arguments below the surface where
they may actually have more influence. As explained in the next
section, recent social science research on race and implicit bias
suggests that racial stereotypes can automatically influence perception,
thought, and action when unmediated by an individual’s cognitive
processes. Making race salient — that is, calling more, not less,
attention to race — can encourage individuals to suppress what would
otherwise be automatic stereotype-congruent responses. The same is
likely true when sexual orientation is at issue.338 Open debate about
333

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 14.
335
See supra note 207.
336
EMERSON, supra note 332, at 45.
337
Id.
338
Margo J. Monteith et al., The Effect of Social Norm Activation on the Expression of
Opinions Concerning Gay Men and Blacks, 18 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 267, 277
(1996) [hereinafter Monteith et al., The Effect of Social Norm Activation on the
334
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the divergent perceptions and feelings heterosexual men have about
sexual advances by gay men is a better way to deal with potential bias
against a gay male victim than pretending such bias does not exist.
Open discussion also allows judges and jurors to consciously mediate
their attitudes and beliefs about homosexuality, sexual deviance, and
whether violence is an appropriate response to a non-violent
homosexual advance.
Addressing “the selective receptivity of the law to the ‘homosexual
panic’ defense,”339 Dan Kahan argues that when disgust sensibilities
are pushed down below the surface of the law, disgust’s influence is
harder to detect.340
On the other hand, “when we force
decisionmakers [sic] to be open about the normative commitments
that underlie their disgust sensibilities, members of the public are fully
appraised [sic] of what those commitments are.”341 If defendants are
disgusted by non-violent homosexual advances, it is best that these
disgust sensibilities be out in the open, so they can become the source
of open interrogation and inquiry.
One objection to my First Amendment argument is that adjudicative
speech, speech which “is both intended and received as a contribution
to [a court’s] deliberation about some issue,”342 is “regularly and
systematically constrained by rules of evidence, canons of professional
Criminal
ethics, judicial gag orders, and similar devices.”343
defendants have no right to insist on being free to argue whatever they
like in court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that the right
to proffer a defense is not absolute.344 As Frederick Schauer explains:
Trials, of course, are highly structured affairs, in which there
appears to be quite little free speech. There are elaborate rules
about who goes when, about who speaks, and about who does
not speak. There are rules about how to speak, and there are
rules about what not to say. All of that part of the law of
Expression of Opinions Concerning Gay Men and Blacks] (finding that when nonprejudiced norms were made salient, both egalitarian and conservative individuals
expressed less prejudiced opinions about gay men).
339
Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621,
1654 (1998).
340
Id. at 1655.
341
Id.
342
Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 705, 725 n.81 (2004) (citing CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH 130 (1993)).
343
Id. at 705.
344
See infra text accompanying note 469.
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evidence that deals with relevance and materiality can be
thought of as a prohibition on speech, a prohibition on saying
what (a judge believes) is irrelevant to the particular matter at
hand. Those who persist in saying irrelevant things after a
ruling by the judge risk punishment for contempt, and thus it
is no exaggeration to describe a trial as a place in which people
run the risk of imprisonment for saying things that a
government official, a judge, believes to be unrelated to the
matter at hand.345
This objection, however, misses the point. I am not arguing that
criminal defendants have a First Amendment right to assert gay panic
arguments in their defense. Rather, I am simply using traditional First
Amendment theories to bolster my claim that, apart from promoting
reprehensible messages, allowing defendants to argue gay panic can serve
valuable purposes, including defeating the gay panic defense strategy.
Another possible objection is that encouraging the expression of
obnoxious views about gay men who allegedly make unwanted sexual
advances is like hate speech, and can be extremely damaging to the
gay community at large.346 Hate speech has been defined as “speech
that degrades an individual or group on grounds such as race, gender,
nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or sexual orientation.”347 A
gay panic defense, one could argue, is akin to hate speech because in
suggesting that gay men are deviant sexual predators to be feared and
loathed, it degrades and disparages gay men on the basis of their
sexual orientation.
Allowing such arguments in the criminal
courtroom lends a judicial stamp of approval to hate speech.
I have two responses to this argument. First, even if a gay panic
defense is akin to hate speech in the ways outlined above, hate speech
is generally considered protected speech.348 Therefore, equating a gay
panic defense with hate speech is not a persuasive reason to ban it.

345
Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV.
687, 689 (1997).
346
Hate speech “arguably cause[s] harms that cannot be remedied by more speech”
because it disempowers those who are its targets. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 835 (2008).
347
John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
752 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006).
348
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (striking down
ordinance used to prosecute individuals who burned cross on black family’s lawn on
First Amendment grounds). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 795, 822-33 (1993) (critiquing reasoning in R.A.V. and arguing that some
hate speech can and should be regulated without violating First Amendment).

536

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:471

Hate speech ordinarily cannot be banned unless it falls into the
category of fighting words.349
Second, use of a gay panic defense can be distinguished from hate
speech. When a defendant utilizes a gay panic defense strategy, there
are a number of institutional players, including the judge, the
prosecutor, and even the jurors, who are in a position to either
counter the gay panic argument or engage in dialogue about its merits.
In contrast, a victim of hate speech may be in an isolated setting where
it would be dangerous to respond or may feel so demoralized by the
speech that he or she cannot respond.350 Given our adversarial system
of justice, a prosecutor in a case in which gay panic is asserted is more
likely to challenge a claim of gay panic than an individual on the street
is likely to counter hate speech directed at him.
C. Social Science Research on Implicit Bias
In this section, I borrow from social science research on race and
implicit bias. This research suggests that making race salient (i.e.,
calling attention to race) can help individuals to overcome what would
otherwise be automatic stereotype-congruent responses. I argue that if
making race salient makes it easier for individuals to battle racial
stereotypes, then making sexual orientation salient may similarly make
it easier for individuals to battle sexual orientation bias. Disallowing
defendants from arguing gay panic simply forces such arguments
underground and into the subconscious where stereotypes about gay
men as deviant sexual predators, and norms that favor heterosexuality
over homosexuality, are likely to have a greater impact.
Over the last several decades, self-reported expressions of
prejudicial attitudes toward minority groups have declined
substantially.351 It is extremely rare to find an individual who
349
The Supreme Court has held that states may prohibit fighting words, words
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). This is
because fighting words do not contribute to the expression of ideas and have no social
value in the search for the truth. Id. at 572.
350
See generally Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (examining
harms caused by hate speech and arguing for recognition of independent tort action
for racial insults).
351
HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 191 (1997) (“[T]here has been a strong and generally steady
movement of white attitudes from denial to affirmation of equality – so much so that
some questions have been dropped by survey organizations because answers were
approaching 100 percent affirmation.”); Monica Biernat & Christian S. Crandall,
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expresses racist beliefs. Most Americans today pride themselves on
being egalitarian-minded. It is common to hear people of all political
persuasions saying that race does not matter; we are all just
individuals.
Despite these public pronouncements, social science research on race
and implicit bias indicates that Americans today are not in fact colorblind. Race does matter, although increasingly at the level of the
subconscious.352 Social scientists have documented the existence of
implicit bias through numerous experiments using the Implicit
Association Test (“IAT”). The IAT documents the existence of implicit
bias by measuring the difference between the amount of time it takes to
process information that corresponds to well-established associations,
which can include stereotypes based on race, and information which is
contrary to those associations.353 Researchers have found that even
individuals who self-identify as holding egalitarian beliefs have a harder
time performing a simple sorting task when a word that corresponds to
a negative stereotype is paired with a pleasant word than when that
same word is paired with an unpleasant word.354
One of the first implicit bias experiments had nothing to do with
race. In that experiment, subjects were given a random list of words
representing flowers, insects, pleasant words, and unpleasant words,
and asked to sort these words into the appropriate category.355 If the
individual saw the word “tulip,” the individual would hit the key
Racial Attitudes, in MEASURES OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES 291, 297 (John P. Robinson,
Phillip R. Shaver & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1999) (“Today, there is
undoubtedly some cause for optimism about black-white relations, as surveys reliably
show that straightforward antiblack antipathy by whites has been on the
decrease . . . .”).
352
Charles Lawrence notes that “[i]ncreasingly, as our culture has rejected racism
as immoral and unproductive, [unconscious or] hidden prejudice has become the
more prevalent form of racism.” Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 335 (1987); see
also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995);
Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 406 (2007).
353
See Jerry Kang & Mazharin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1071-72 (2006); Jerry Kang,
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1509-10 (2005); Kristin A. Lane et al.,
Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 431 (2007).
354
See Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, WASH. POST MAG., Jan. 23, 2005, at W12.
355
Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464
(1998). The experiment also used musical instruments and weapons in lieu of flowers
and insects. Id. at 1466.
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corresponding with the label “flower.” If the individual saw the word
“wasp,” the individual was to hit the key corresponding with the label
“insect.” If the individual saw the word “love,” the individual was to
hit the key corresponding with the label “pleasant words.” If the
individual saw the word “rotten,” the individual would hit the key
corresponding with the label “unpleasant words.”
In the next stage of the experiment, subjects were again given a
random list of words representing flowers, insects, pleasant words,
and unpleasant words. This time, however, they were told to hit one
key on the left side of the computer if the word on the screen
corresponded with one of two categories and another key on the
right side of the computer if the word on the screen corresponded
with one of two other categories. When the individuals were told to
hit one key if the word flashed on the screen fell into the category
“flower” or “pleasant word,” and told to hit another key if the word
flashed on the screen fell into the category “insect” or “unpleasant
word,” the individuals did fine. When, however, the individuals
were told to hit one key if the word flashed on the screen fell into the
category “flower” or “unpleasant word” and to hit another key if the
word flashed on the screen fell into the category “insect” or “pleasant
word,” response times became noticeably slower.356 Understandably,
subjects found it easier to correlate insects with unpleasant words
than to correlate insects with pleasant words because of wellestablished associations between insects, such as cockroaches,
termites, and bedbugs, and unpleasant things, such as dirt, filth,
disease, bites, and decay.
The researchers then decided to replace flower names with whitesounding names such as Katie and Meredith and insect names with
black-sounding names such as LaTonya and Ebony. They found that
when black-sounding names were paired with pleasant words and
white-sounding names were paired with unpleasant words, subjects had
much more difficulty sorting the words into the appropriate categories
than when black-sounding names were paired with unpleasant words
and white-sounding names were paired with pleasant words.357 Implicit
bias in favor of Whites and against Blacks manifested even in subjects
who self-reported non-prejudiced beliefs.358
356

Id. at 1468.
Id. at 1474.
358
Id. at 1475; see also John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic
and Controlled Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 534 (1997) (finding
that subjects responded faster to positive words following White face than when those
words followed Black face and that subjects responded faster to negative words when
357
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Anthony Greenwald explains the theory behind the IAT.359
Consider a thought experiment, he suggests, in which a subject is
shown a series of male and female faces and told to respond as quickly
as possible, saying “hello” if the face is a male face and “goodbye” if
the face is a female face. In the next stage of the experiment, the
subject is shown either a male face or name or a female face or name
and instructed to say “hello” to male faces and male names and
“goodbye” to female faces and female names. The subject should have
no trouble responding quickly in either of these conditions. Next, the
subject is told to say “hello” if he or she sees either a male face or a
female name and to say “goodbye” if he or she sees a female face or
male name. To complete this task successfully, the subject will likely
respond more slowly than in the first part of the experiment. This,
Greenwald theorizes, “follows from the existence of strong
associations of male names to male faces and female names to female
faces.”360
Attempting to map the same response (“hello” or
“goodbye”) when confronted with opposite associations is
understandably more difficult than attempting to map the response
with given correlating associations. The difference in the time it takes
to perform the different sorting tasks “measures the strength of
gender-based associations between the face and name domains.”361
More than two million people have taken the IAT.362 Ninety percent
of the test-takers have been American.363 Eighty-eight percent of
Whites who have taken the IAT have manifested implicit bias in favor
of Whites and against Blacks.364 Nearly 83% of heterosexuals have
manifested implicit bias in favor of straight people over gays and
lesbians.365 More than two-thirds of non-Arab, non-Muslim test-takers
primed with Black face than when primed with White face).
359
Greenwald et al., supra note 355, at 1464.
360
Id.
361
Id.
362
See Vedantam, supra note 354, at W15.
363
Id.
364
Id. Studies have found that even African Americans exhibit implicit bias in
favor of Whites relative to Blacks. See, e.g., R.W. Livingston, The Role of Perceived
Negativity in the Moderation of African Americans’ Implicit and Explicit Racial Attitudes,
38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 405, 411 (2002) (finding that while African
Americans demonstrated strong evidence of in-group bias on explicit measures, they
showed out-group, i.e. White, favoritism on implicit measures); B.A. Nosek et al.,
Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP
DYNAMICS 101, 105 (2002) (noting that while Black respondents showed stronger
preference for Black over White on explicit measures, reversed pattern was observed
on implicit measures with Blacks showing weak preference for White over Black).
365
Vedantam, supra note 354, at W15. Gay men, however, manifest implicit bias

540

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:471

have shown implicit bias against Muslims.366 These results were in
sharp contrast to the test-takers’ self-reported attitudes.367
Recent advances in brain imaging techniques have enabled
researchers to confirm scientifically the implicit bias suggested by IAT
research. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) offers a
non-invasive way to examine the functions of the brain.368 Researchers
interested in measuring racial bias have used fMRI to measure activity in
the amygdala, a “small, almond-shaped structure in the medial temporal
lobe that is primarily known for its role in emotional learning and
memory.”369 Brain imaging research “suggests that amygdala activity
reflects arousal triggered by fast unconscious assessment of potential
threat.”370 Activity in the amygdala indicates “relatively automatic social
evaluation” without conscious awareness or intent.371
Researchers have found that exposing White subjects to Black faces
can affect their physiological responses in a number of ways, including
how much their skin sweats, how fast their hearts pump, and whether
their facial muscles twitch.372 Brain imaging allows researchers to
examine differences in amygdala activity when subjects are exposed to
different stimuli. In one experiment, Elizabeth Phelps used fMRI to
record neural activity in the amydgala of White subjects while they
were being exposed to Black and White faces.373 After the fMRI scan,
subjects took an IAT. They then answered questions from the Modern
Racism Scale, a self-report scale that measures explicit racial
attitudes.374 Phelps found that subjects with the most negative implicit
attitudes toward Blacks showed the greatest amygdala activation

in favor of homosexuality relative to heterosexuality. William A. Jellison et al., supra
note 182, at 629, 634.
366
Vedantam, supra note 354, at W15.
367
Id.
368
See generally Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 181
(2005) (noting that fMRI techniques “offer a noninvasive means of examining the
functioning of healthy brains”); see also Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging
Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 424-26
(2006) (discussing fMRI studies involving racial evaluation).
369
Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Intact Performance on an Indirect Measure of Race Bias
Following Amygdala Damage, 41 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 203, 203 (2003).
370
Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-Cognitive
Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotyped Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56, 56 (2005).
371
Id. at 57.
372
Eberhardt, supra note 368, at 182.
373
Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation
Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 729, 771 (2000).
374
Id. at 730.
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responses toward Black faces as compared with White faces.375 These
same subjects self-reported little or no prejudice, confirming that there
is little correlation between stated attitudes and actual implicit bias.
The fact that the subjects with the strongest implicit bias scores also
showed the greatest amygdala activity supports the view that the IAT
is an accurate measurement of implicit bias.376
Other fMRI
experiments have found that both Black and White subjects show
greater amygdala activity when exposed to Black faces than when
exposed to White faces.377
The fact that individuals consistently self-report more egalitarian
views than are reflected in their IAT scores and fMRI scans “suggest[s]
at least two modes of evaluation: one that involves conscious and
controlled modes of thinking and another that involves relatively
automatic processes that operate without deliberate thought or
sometimes without conscious awareness.”378 When a racial stereotype
like the “Black-as-Criminal” stereotype379 is activated by exposure to a
Black face, an individual is likely to experience an automatic stereotypecongruent response, such as fear. If, however, the individual has time
to think about whether it makes sense to equate Blackness with
criminality under the given circumstances, the individual’s cognitive
processes can mediate between the automatic stereotype-congruent
375

Id. at 732.
Interestingly, these results were not replicated when subjects were shown
pictures of familiar and positively regarded Black and White individuals. Id. at 733.
Phelps theorized that these findings suggest that amygdala response to Black-versusWhite faces “is a function of culturally acquired information about social groups,
modified by individual knowledge and experience.” Id. at 734. It is also possible that
greater familiarity with the face allowed subjects to consciously mediate and control
what would otherwise have been an automatic stereotype-congruent reaction to the
Black face.
377
See, e.g., Matthew D. Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race Related
Amygdala Activity in African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE
NEUROSCI. 720 (2005) (finding that both African-American and Caucasians showed
greater amygdala activity when exposed to African-American targets than when
exposed to Caucasian targets). But see Allen J. Hart et al., Differential Response in the
Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs. Ingroup Face Stimuli, 11 NEUROREP. 2351,
2351 (2000) (finding significantly greater amygdala responses when White subjects
were exposed to Black faces than when they were shown White faces and similar
results for Black subjects who showed greater amygdala activation when exposed to
White faces than when exposed to Black faces).
378
William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing of
Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806, 806 (2004).
379
See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 463 (1996) [hereinafter Lee, Race
and Self-Defense] (discussing Black-as-Criminal stereotype).
376
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response and the individual’s non-prejudiced beliefs, and control the
otherwise automatic stereotype-congruent response.
Given these two modes of evaluation (conscious versus automatic)
and knowing that the automatic mode tends to dominate when the
individual does not have time to think, William Cunningham decided
to test whether the amount of fear-response reflected in activation of
the amygdala would be different depending on how long subjects were
exposed to Black and White faces.380 Cunningham used fMRI to
measure amygdala activation in subjects who were presented with
Black faces for a short duration of time (30 milliseconds (ms) or barely
a flash on the screen), Black faces for a longer duration of time (525
ms), White faces for a short duration of time (30 ms), and White faces
for a longer duration of time (525 ms).381 After the experiment, all of
the subjects took the race IAT, which tested for implicit bias in favor
of or against Whites and Blacks. Next, they answered questions from
the Modern Racism Scale and the Motivation to Respond Without
Prejudice Scale (another self-report scale that measures motivation to
think and behave without prejudice).382
The self-reported measures of prejudice demonstrated little or no
prejudice. All participants disagreed with prejudiced statements and
agreed with non-prejudiced statements.383 Nonetheless, on the IAT,
subjects “showed automatic negative associations toward Black
relative to White faces . . . .”384 The fMRI results were consistent with
the IAT results. The more implicit bias the subject showed on the
IAT, the greater his or her amygdala activity for Black relative to
White faces in the 30-ms or short-duration condition.385 When
subjects were shown Black and White faces for a longer period of time,
however, there was no significant difference in amydgala activity.386
These results suggest that when individuals have the opportunity to
process the fact that they are being exposed to a Black face, their
cognitive processes can mediate their otherwise automatic stereotypecongruent responses. As Cunningham explains:
Greater Black-White difference in amygdala activation in the
30-ms condition than in the 525-ms condition is consistent

380
381
382
383
384
385
386

Cunningham, supra note 378, at 806.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 808.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 810.
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with the idea that unwanted prejudicial responses are most
likely to occur under conditions of distraction or cognitive
overload, when reflective cognitive processes that might
modulate an automatically activated evaluation are otherwise
engaged.387
In another study on stereotypes and prejudice, Patricia Devine
found that when racial stereotypes about Blacks were made salient,
low-prejudice individuals seemed to consciously mediate their
thoughts about Blacks and align their thoughts with their egalitarian
beliefs.388 When racial stereotypes about Blacks were not made salient,
both high and low-prejudice individuals responded in stereotypecongruent ways.389
To activate conscious awareness of the various stereotypes about
Blacks, Devine asked subjects to list as many alternate labels of which
they were aware for the social group Black Americans.390 Subjects
were told that the researcher was interested in how people think about
and talk informally about social groups, and were given a minute to
perform this task.391 Next, researchers asked subjects to list their
thoughts in response to the social group Black Americans and various
labels ascribed to Blacks.392 Subjects received two pages with ten
boxes; different labels associated with Black Americans were at the top
of each box, and subjects were told to put one thought in each box.393
They had ten minutes to complete this task.394 Finally, subjects were
asked to complete the Modern Racism Scale.395
Devine assigned subjects to either a high-prejudice or low-prejudice
group based on the subjects’ scores on the Modern Racism Scale.396
Devine found there was no difference in the proportion of negative

387

Id. at 811.
Patricia Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 14 (1989).
389
Id. at 12.
390
Id. at 13.
391
Id. Negative labels generated by this task included the terms “niggers,” “coons,”
“spades,” “spear-chuckers,” “jungle bunnies,” and “jigs.” Id. at 14. Devine
characterized the label “colored people” as non-pejorative, but I would put this label
in the pejorative or negative category. More neutral labels included the terms
“Blacks,” “Afro Americans,” and “Brothers.” Id.
392
Id. at 13.
393
Id.
394
Id.
395
Id.
396
Id.
388
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labels generated by each group in the first task.397 The proportion of
negative or pejorative labels generated by high-prejudice persons was
about the same as the proportion generated by low-prejudice persons.
This suggested that both high and low-prejudice individuals are
equally aware of the various negative stereotypes about Blacks.398
The two groups, however, revealed big differences in their responses
to the thought-listing task, which took place right after the stereotype
(label)-listing exercise had made racial stereotypes about Blacks salient
to the participants. High-prejudice subjects listed more negative than
positive thoughts about Blacks and low-prejudice subjects listed more
positive than negative thoughts about Blacks.399 Moreover, 60% of the
high-prejudice individuals’ responses to the thought-listing task
reflected themes of hostility, aggressiveness, or violence, whereas only
9% of the low-prejudice individuals’ responses reflected similar
themes.400 Making racial stereotypes salient encouraged the egalitarian
or low-prejudice subjects to inhibit stereotype-congruent responses.
In a study published in 2000, Samuel Sommers and Phoebe
Ellsworth tested whether making race salient would make a difference
in mock jurors’ perceptions of guilt and in the severity of their
sentencing recommendations.401 Subjects read a trial summary in
which the race of the defendant and victim were varied (White male
defendant and Black female victim or Black male defendant and White
female victim). The trial summary revealed that the defendant and a
group of his friends were at a bar celebrating his recent promotion
when his girlfriend stood up and started to make fun of his physique
and sexual performance.402 The defendant yelled at his girlfriend,
forced her into her chair, and slapped her across the face. The slap
knocked the girlfriend onto the ground and the girlfriend injured her
ankle in the fall. In the race salient version of the trial, the girlfriend
testified that the defendant yelled, “You know better than to talk about
a White (or Black) man in front of his friends” before he slapped her.
In the non-race salient version of the trial, the girlfriend testified that
397

Id. at 14.
Id.
399
Id. Negative thoughts were reflected in statements such as “Blacks are free
loaders;” “Blacks cause problems (e.g., muggings, fights);” and “Affirmative action
sucks.” Id. Positive thoughts were reflected in statements such as “Blacks and Whites
are equal;” “Affirmative action will restore historical inequities;” “My father says all
Blacks are lazy, I think he is wrong;” and “It’s unfair to judge people by their color –
they are individuals.” Id.
400
Id.
401
Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 325, at 1367.
402
Id. at 1372-73.
398
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the defendant yelled, “You know better than to talk that way about a
man in front of his friends.”403
Sommers and Ellsworth found that when race was made salient,
White mock jurors treated the White and Black defendant equally in
terms of guilt and severity of punishment.404 In contrast, when race
was not salient, White mock jurors gave the Black defendant a
significantly higher guilt rating than the White defendant.405 In their
sentence recommendations, White mock jurors were also more
punitive towards the Black defendant in the non-race salient
condition, recommending longer sentences for the Black defendant
than for the White defendant. When White jurors were simply aware
of the defendant’s race, but did not think race was relevant to the case,
implicit bias trumped their sincerely held egalitarian beliefs.406
Sommers and Ellsworth suggest the reason why White jurors acted
in more egalitarian ways when race was made salient stems from
Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio’s theory of aversive racism.407
Under this theory, most White Americans hold egalitarian beliefs but
still have implicit bias against Blacks.408 “[W]hen White people are
reminded of the possibility of racial prejudice in an interaction, they
may work to inhibit their own racial biases; if they are not reminded,
they might not notice, and their biases will often be expressed.”409
A year later, in 2001, Sommers and Ellsworth conducted another
study that confirmed that when race is made salient, White mock
jurors will treat Black and White defendants the same; when race is
not salient, White mock jurors are more likely to convict Black
defendants than similarly situated White defendants.410 In the 2001
study, a White experimenter approached 196 White participants in
waiting areas of a major international airport and asked if they would
read and complete a questionnaire about legal attitudes while they
403

Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1373-74.
405
Id. at 1374.
406
See id.
407
See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 62 (Dovidio & Gaertner eds., 1986)
(explaining that “aversive racism represents a particular type of ambivalence in which
the conflict is between feelings and beliefs associated with a sincerely egalitarian value
system and unacknowledged negative feelings and beliefs about blacks”).
408
See id.
409
Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 325, at 1371.
410
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation
of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 201, 217 (2001) [hereinafter, Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias].
404
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waited for their planes.411 Each participant read a trial summary that
involved either a Black defendant and White victim or vice versa. In
all of the cases, participants were aware of the defendant and victim’s
race, age, height, and weight. In some of the cases, race was made
salient. In others, race was not made salient.
The trial summary described a high school basketball player charged
with one count of battery with serious bodily injury after an
altercation with a teammate in a locker room.412 The government
argued that the defendant was upset after losing his place in the
starting line-up and attacked his replacement.413 The defense admitted
that the defendant verbally confronted his teammate in the locker
room, but claimed that when a third party tried to intervene and
restrain him, he panicked and accidentally made contact with the
victim when he tried to break free.414 In the race-salient version of the
trial, a defense witness testified that the defendant was one of only two
Blacks (or Whites) on the team and had been the subject of racial
remarks and unfair criticism throughout the season from his White
(or Black) teammates.415 In the non-race salient version of the trial,
the same defense witness testified that the defendant had been the
subject of obscene remarks and unfair criticism from many of his
teammates.416
In the race-salient condition, conviction rates for the White
defendant (69%) and the Black defendant (66%) were almost the
same.417 In the non-race salient condition, when the White mock
juror subjects were simply aware of race but race was not made
salient, they voted to convict the Black defendant 90% of the time and
the White defendant only 70% of the time.418
These studies by Cunningham, Devine, and Sommers and Ellsworth
suggest that when race is made salient, individuals who self-report
non-prejudiced beliefs will consciously mediate and control their
otherwise automatic stereotype-congruent responses.419 Conversely,
411

Id. at 216.
Id.
413
Id.
414
Id.
415
Id.
416
Id.
417
Id. at 217.
418
Id.; see also David A. Harris, The Importance of Research on Race and Policing:
Making Race Salient to Individuals and Institutions Within Criminal Justice, 6
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 5, 11 (2007).
419
Devine likens the process of inhibiting stereotype-congruent responses and
consciously replacing them with non-prejudiced thoughts to breaking a bad habit.
412
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when race is not made salient — when race is an obvious fact, such as
in a case involving a Black defendant or victim, but no one openly
discusses the racial implications of the case — individuals are likely to
respond in stereotype-congruent ways.
An example of how subtle appeals to racial bias can be effective
when race is not made salient is illustrated by the well-known New
York subway shooting case. In that case, Bernard Goetz, a white male,
shot four black youths after two of them asked him for five dollars on
a New York subway.420 At Goetz’s trial, no one openly talked about
the obvious racial dynamics present in the case.421 The defense,
however, cleverly activated the Black-as-Criminal stereotype by
referring to the victims as savages, predators, and vultures.422 They
also reenacted the subway shooting, ostensibly to show the jury the
path of the bullets.423 George Fletcher, a law professor who observed
the trial, noted that by bringing in four young, fit, and muscular
African Americans to play the part of the four victims, the defense
covertly appealed to racial bias and the jury’s fear of being mugged by
four young black males.424 The jury found Goetz not guilty on all but
the least serious charge of unlawful possession of a firearm.
One might question whether the research on implicit racial bias is
readily transferable to sexual orientation bias, especially when it seems
more people hold explicitly anti-gay attitudes than explicitly racist
attitudes. Even if more people are openly anti-gay than explicitly
racist, implicit sexual orientation bias is still a concern. As discussed
above, many egalitarian-minded heterosexual individuals sincerely
believe gays and lesbians should not be discriminated against and selfreport positive attitudes about homosexuality, yet manifest implicit
bias in favor of heterosexuality and against homosexuality. Implicit
Devine, supra note 388, at 15. She notes that “automatic stereotype activation
functions in much the same way as a bad habit.” Id. Both involve spontaneous and
undesirable consequences. Id. To eliminate a bad habit, an “individual must (a)
initially decide to stop the old behavior, (b) remember the resolution, and (c) try
repeatedly and decide repeatedly to eliminate the habit.” Id. To inhibit stereotypecongruent responses, one must initially decide that one wants to overcome stereotypetriggered responses. One must remember this desire, and one must make a conscious
effort to try repeatedly to replace stereotype-congruent responses with one’s
egalitarian beliefs. Id.
420
See People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 99 (1986).
421
See LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 80, at 148-154 (analyzing
Goetz case).
422
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE
LAW ON TRIAL 206 (1988).
423
See id. at 206-07.
424
Id.
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bias is a concern whether one is talking about race, gender, sexual
orientation, or age (bias against the elderly).
There are additional reasons to believe that the research on race and
implicit bias is applicable to sexual orientation bias.425 One study
specifically examined whether hearing positive opinions about gayrelated issues (in other words, making sexual orientation salient in a
positive way for gays) would affect whether individuals privately
expressed bias against gay men.426 Margo Monteith, Nicole Deneen,
and Gregory Tooman conducted an experiment in which an
experimenter would approach a student who was walking alone on
campus and ask whether he or she would participate in an opinion
poll for a class.427 A confederate would then walk past the
experimenter and the subject.428 The experimenter would stop the
confederate and ask whether he or she would also participate in the
The experimenter then administered two
opinion poll.429
questionnaires to the confederate and the participant.430 The first
questionnaire contained questions from a standard measure of
prejudice against gays called the Heterosexual Attitudes Toward
Homosexuals scale (“HATH”) and was completed privately by each
individual.431 The second questionnaire asked for the participant’s
opinions relating to issues involving gays on campus.432 In some
cases, the subject answered questions on the second questionnaire
privately without hearing the confederate’s views. In other cases, the
subject answered questions only after hearing the confederate answer
the same questions out loud.433 In the favorable ratings condition, the
confederate expressed non-prejudiced opinions about gay-related

425

See generally Monteith et al., The Effect of Social Norm Activation on the
Expression of Opinions Concerning Gay Men and Blacks, supra note 338 (exploring
influence of social norm activation on expression of opinions concerning gay men and
blacks).
426
Id. at 271-72.
427
Id. at 273.
428
Id.
429
Id.
430
Id.
431
Id.
432
Id. at 272.
433
In those cases, the experimenter explained that he or she had only one
questionnaire left and asked the confederate to answer the questions verbally so the
experimenter could write his responses on a separate sheet of paper. The participant
was then given the supposedly last questionnaire and asked to answer the questions
privately. Id. at 273-74.
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issues on campus.
In the unfavorable ratings condition, the
confederate expressed prejudiced opinions about the same issues.434
Monteith found that participants exposed to non-prejudiced
confederate opinions expressed opinions that were significantly more
positive toward gays than those in the no rating condition (where they
did not hear the confederate give any opinions).435 Moreover, both
low-prejudice and high-prejudice individuals expressed positive
opinions after hearing the confederate make non-prejudiced remarks
about gay-related issues on campus.436 Monteith concluded that
“making social norms opposing prejudice salient will likely have a
pervasive effect, curbing expressions of prejudice among people who
hold less as well as more prejudiced attitudes.”437
The existing research on stereotypes and prejudice suggests that
stereotypes, which are deeply entrenched in the subconscious, are
triggered more readily when not made salient. If one is concerned that
stereotypes about gay men will be used by unscrupulous attorneys, it
would probably be best to have claims of gay panic out in the open and
subject to the adversarial system. This would force argument and
counter-argument about the legitimacy of such claims above ground,
and allow jurors to cognitively process the validity of such claims rather
than react without reflection. Moreover, if jurors are exposed to nonprejudiced opinions about gay men (by the prosecutor or other jurors),
Monteith’s study suggests this significantly increases the likelihood that
even high-prejudiced jurors with negative private views about
homosexuality will publicly express non-prejudiced views.
D. Institutional Competency
A final consideration is which institutional actor — the legislature,
the judge, or the jury — is best suited to determine whether a
heterosexual male defendant’s claim of gay panic is credible and
should result in some kind of mitigation. This section evaluates the
strengths and weaknesses of each institutional actor and concludes
that the jury is best suited to make this determination.
A critic of the gay panic defense might contend that the simplest
way to deal with the problem would be for the legislature to pass a
statute stating that a non-violent homosexual advance does not

434
435
436
437

Id. at 274.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id.
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constitute legally adequate provocation.438 One benefit of legislative
action is uniformity and consistency. All judges in the relevant
jurisdiction would be required to follow the legislative rule, leading to
uniform results in similarly situated cases. Another benefit is that
legislatures can commission studies, take testimony, and conduct
continuing oversight investigations.
More than one state legislature has amended its penal code to reflect
the view that a certain type of arguably provocative act does not
constitute legally adequate provocation. For example, Maryland
provides that “[t]he discovery of one’s spouse engaged in sexual
intercourse with another does not constitute legally adequate
provocation for the purpose of mitigating a killing from the crime of
murder to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing was
provoked by that discovery.”439 Minnesota provides that a crying child
does not constitute legally adequate provocation sufficient to mitigate
a murder charge to manslaughter.440
The problem with relying on the legislature to determine what types
of activities should or should not constitute legally adequate
provocation is that legislatures tend to enact broad-based legislation
that will apply to many different cases based on an abstract
hypothetical set of facts. A one-size-fits-all rule is particularly ill
suited to address the question of which defenses the jury ought to hear
because such a rule, crafted in advance, cannot possibly take into
account the myriad ways in which an encounter preceding an
allegedly provoked killing may take place. The legislature cannot
possibly know in advance the precise facts of the case which will be
relevant to whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes
would have been provoked into a heat of passion. The judge and jury
sitting in judgment of a particular defendant, in contrast, can more
fully consider the factual context in which the killing took place and
thus are in a better position to decide whether the defendant’s claim of
gay panic is credible and worthy of some kind of mitigation.441
438
I am not aware of any such legislation in the United States, but such legislation
was proposed in New South Wales. See Santo De Pasquale, Provocation and the
Homosexual Advance Defence: The Deployment of Culture as a Defence Strategy, 26
MELB. U. L. REV. 110, 119 (2002) (noting that New South Wales Working Party
recommended legislation to preclude murder defendants from arguing that nonviolent homosexual advance provoked them into heat of passion).
439
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-207(b) (West 2002).
440
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(1) (West 2003).
441
Indeed, some might argue that the existence of social science studies suggesting
that homophobic men become more physically aggressive toward gay men after
watching a homoerotic videotape, see Bernat, supra note 49, supports the view that an
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Another problem with having legislatures enact statutes proclaiming
that a non-violent homosexual advance does not constitute legally
adequate provocation is that such an approach is a throwback to the
days when murder defendants had to fit into carefully defined
categories of legally adequate provocation to claim the provocation
mitigation.442 Under the early common law approach to provocation,
a murder defendant could receive the provocation mitigation only if
he was (1) engaged in mutual combat with the victim immediately
prior to the killing, (2) subject to an aggravated assault or battery
immediately before the killing, (3) observed the commission of a
serious crime upon a close relative immediately before the killing, (4)
illegally arrested, or (5) caught his wife in the act of adultery just
before the killing.443 This categorical approach was eventually
replaced with the modern “reasonable man” test because the
categorical approach was too restrictive and insensitive to context.444
Allowing the legislature to prohibit claims of gay panic through
legislation stating that a non-violent homosexual advance does not
constitute legally adequate provocation would lead to the same rigidity
problems inherent in the early common law categorical approach.
If the legislature is ill suited to the task of deciding whether claims
of gay panic ought to be allowed, should the judge or the jury make
this call? Unlike the legislature, the judge presiding over a given case
is aware of the factual context in which the claim of gay panic arises.
Without a superseding legislative rule instructing judges that they
must rule the same way in all cases, however, judges will have the
discretion to either take the question of provocation away from the
ordinary heterosexual man can lose his self-control if a gay man makes an unwanted
sexual advance upon him, and therefore the heterosexual man should be allowed to
argue provocation to the jury.
442
A proposal that encourages legislation banning gay panic defense strategies is
the converse of the early common law approach to provocation, which carved out
categories of things that could constitute legally adequate provocation. A legislative
approach would simply carve out categories of things that cannot constitute legally
adequate provocation.
443
See LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 80, at 19.
444
If the rationale behind the doctrine of provocation is that under certain
circumstances a person might understandably snap and do something that he would
not ordinarily do, then it does not make sense to allow husbands who catch their
wives in the act of adultery to receive the provocation mitigation, but not men who
catch their fiancées having sex with another man. The modern approach to
provocation addressed this concern, broadening the scope of the defense and allowing
the mitigation as long as a reasonable man in the defendant’s shoes would have been
provoked into a heat of passion. In its attention to context, the modern approach is
much more sensible than the early common law approach. See id. at 24-25.
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jury or allow the jury to consider the defense. This type of discretion
is not necessarily a bad thing, but one obvious problem with this
approach is that whether a requested defense is presented to the jury
will depend in large part on the luck of the draw.445 If the defendant
draws a judge who disapproves of homosexuality, then the
heterosexual male murder defendant wishing to argue gay panic is
likely to get the instruction he seeks and evidentiary rulings in his
favor.446 If the defendant draws a judge who believes gays and lesbians
should not be discriminated against, then the heterosexual male
murder defendant claiming gay panic may be less likely to get the jury
instructions and favorable evidentiary rulings he seeks.
Inconsistent rulings are to be expected, especially given the different
factual contexts that may be present under the umbrella of gay panic.
The bigger problem is that trial judges act alone and often have to
make evidentiary and other rulings with little time to deliberate. Trial
judges, unlike juries, do not have the benefit of co-equal partners
deliberating with them to ensure the fairest possible outcome.
There is another reason to be skeptical of relying on a judicial remedy
in this context.447 Social science research has shown that heterosexual
men on average manifest more anti-gay prejudice than heterosexual
women.448 If this is true, then relying on a judge who is likely to be a
445
Of course, a similar objection could be made against having the jury make the
decision. Many joke that having a case decided by a jury is like rolling the dice
because juries are so unpredictable. Nonetheless, rules governing jury selection give
each side some say over who ends up sitting in the jury box such that it is probably
more likely than not that one will have egalitarian-minded jurors on any given jury.
446
See Mison, supra note 10, at 163-64 (detailing cases in which trial judges made
disparaging remarks about deceased homosexual victims); see also Michael B.
Shortnacy, Comment, Guilty and Gay, A Recipe for Execution in American Courtrooms:
Sexual Orientation as a Tool for Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 51 AM.
U. L. REV. 309, 318-31 (2001) (noting empirical studies suggesting that judges are
hostile to gay defendants).
447
See Hutchinson, Dissecting Axes of Subordination, supra note 50, at 13, 18-24
(urging scholars in field of law and sexuality to conduct multidimensional structural
analysis of judicial bias against gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals that
exists as part of larger system of domination along race, gender, and class lines).
448
See Mary E. Kite & Bernard E. Whitley, Jr., Do Heterosexual Women and Men
Differ in Their Attitudes Towards Homosexuality? A Conceptual and Methodological
Analysis, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND BISEXUALS 39 (Gregory M. Herek ed., 1998); Mary E. Kite &
Bernard E. Whitley, Jr., Sex Differences in Attitudes Toward Homosexual Persons,
Behaviors, and Civil Rights, A Meta-Analysis, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
336, 337 (1996); see also Gregory M. Herek, Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Lesbians
and Gay Men: Correlates and Gender Differences, 25 J. SEX RES. 451, 452 (1988) (“One
of the most consistent findings is that heterosexual males manifest more anti-gay
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heterosexual male to decide whether the claim of gay panic has any
legitimacy seems less desirable than giving the question to the jury.
According to one source, only 24% of the state judiciary and 19% of the
federal judiciary is female.449 According to another source, there are
only 274 female judges (8.65 percent) and 2,894 male judges (91.35
percent) on the federal bench.450 Given these statistics, the odds of
drawing a male judge are much greater than drawing a female judge.
Additionally, it is more likely that a jury will be comprised of a mix of
men and women than be all male (or all female).
Even if an egalitarian judge presides over the case, he or she may not
see through all of the subtle appeals to homophobic bias that the
defense may try to make. A jury of twelve persons charged with the
task of deliberating to a fair and just verdict is better positioned to
question a claim of gay panic, especially if the defense makes that claim
openly and then the prosecution counters it. This is because the jury
has the distinct advantage of being able to engage in group deliberation.
In her important Harvard Law Review article on jury decisionmaking, Kim Taylor-Thompson describes the benefits of group
deliberation.451 She acknowledges that while “open communication
may introduce strongly held beliefs and prejudices into the
discussion[,] . . . the existence of competing beliefs and prejudices in
jury deliberations may help to reduce their significance.”452 TaylorThompson also notes that while “[a]n individual juror’s experience can
affect her perception of and reaction to the evidence[,] . . . interaction
among jurors will expand the range of issues to be discussed and
broaden the scope of information shared by the group.”453
A jury of twelve individuals, selected through a process that enables
both the defense and the prosecution to strike individuals they believe
would be biased against them, is likely to have at least one member
hostility on average than do heterosexual females.”) (citations omitted); Lester W.
Wright, Jr., Henry E. Adams & Jeffery Bernat, Development and Validation of the
Homophobia Scale, 21 J. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY & BEHAV. AWARENESS 337, 337, 345 (1999)
(noting that male participants scored significantly higher on Homophobia Scale than
female participants, confirming previous studies showing that men as general matter
are more homophobic than women).
449
THE AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION (Marie T. Finn et al. eds., ForsterLong, Inc. 18th ed. 2008).
450
See Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary, available at
http://www.fjc.gov (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
451
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1261, 1272-76 (2000).
452
Id. at 1276.
453
Id. at 1275.
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who is gay or lesbian or sympathetic to gays and lesbians. That
individual can remind the other jurors of the homophobic
assumptions that underlie a defense claim of gay panic.
There is, of course, no guarantee that this would happen. A gay
person who does not want others to know that he or she is gay might
not to say anything, especially if he or she thinks most of the other
jurors are homophobic. It is understandable that an individual juror
might choose silence in such a situation. Indeed, a gay person still in
the closet might become the most vocal supporter of a defendant’s gay
panic claim in an attempt to divert suspicion that he is gay.
Monteith’s study, however, suggests that if even one juror speaks up
and expresses non-prejudiced norms in the jury room, this can have a
significant effect on the rest of the jury.454 Therefore, as long as the jury
has at least one gay person who is out (not in the closet) or at least one
heterosexual who is sympathetic to gays and willing to speak up and
express non-prejudiced norms, there is a fair chance that the other
jurors will at least question and possibly reject the gay panic defense.
I realize that what may be true for gays, may not be true for
transgenders. Not all gays and lesbians are sympathetic to transgenders;
some may even be biased against transgenders. The odds of a
transgender person being on a jury where a trans panic claim is asserted
are fairly slim. Therefore, what may be a viable solution in the case of a
gay panic claim may not work against a claim of trans panic.
There is another reason why it makes sense to allow juries, rather
than judges, to decide the validity of gay panic claims: community
buy-in. The community where the crime took place and from which
the jury is drawn is more likely to view the verdict as legitimate if a
jury considered the gay panic defense and rejected it, than if the judge
prohibited the defendant from making the argument. This is because
the twelve laypersons serving on the jury have been chosen from the
community’s midst.455 If the long-term goal is changing social
attitudes about homosexuality, then starting such change in the jury
box is a better way of accomplishing the goal than trying to force such
change by legislative or judicial fiat.
One problem with letting juries adjudicate claims of gay panic is
that in some parts of this country, homosexual behavior is widely
viewed as immoral. If the jury is chosen from such a community, it
454

Monteith et al., The Effect of Social Norm Activation on the Expression of Opinions
Concerning Gay Men and Blacks, supra note 338, at 276.
455
See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional
Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2051-59 (2008) (discussing fact that
jury functions as voice of community).

2008]

The Gay Panic Defense

555

may be more inclined to believe that the defendant was reasonably
provoked into a heat of passion by the gay victim’s non-violent
homosexual advance. Research suggests that individuals who live on
the West Coast tend to have the most positive attitudes toward
homosexuality, while those in the Midwest and the South tend to have
the most negative attitudes.456 Similarly, individuals with strongly
religious backgrounds tend to have negative attitudes about
homosexuality.457
This problem suggests a reform that would account for regional
variations in attitudes. I am not, however, comfortable with proposing
a rule that would vary depending on the jurisdiction where the case is
tried. If the choice is between allowing or disallowing gay panic
arguments, I think the better choice is to allow gay panic arguments,
despite the fact that such arguments are reprehensible. Even if one
tries to bar gay panic arguments, they are likely to come in through
the back door as they did in the Matthew Shepard case.458
Even though there remains a lot of anti-gay sentiment in some parts
of the country, there is also reason to be hopeful that this will not
always translate into lenient verdicts in cases where the defendant
argues gay panic. First, even individuals who believe homosexuality is
immoral can be persuaded to see that beating someone to death for
making a sexual advance is wrongful and illegal.
Second, attitudes about homosexuality have seen fairly steady
improvement over the last thirty to forty years.459 A majority of
Americans today believe it is wrong to discriminate against an
individual based on his or her sexual orientation.460 In 2003, the U.S.
Supreme Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick by striking down a
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to
engage in intimate sexual conduct on the ground that criminalizing
such conduct violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.461 In addition, despite the controversy over same-sex
marriage referenced earlier in this Article, many states now recognize
456

See Loftus, supra note 6, at 765.
See id.
458
See supra text accompanying notes 274-307.
459
Loftus, supra note 6, at 778.
460
Id. (“While the public still overwhelmingly views homosexuality as wrong, the
majority is unwilling to restrict the civil liberties of homosexuals.”).
461
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
reversed Bowers v. Hardwick, the infamous decision in which the Court upheld the
constitutional validity of Georgia’s sodomy statute as applied to a man arrested for
having consensual sex with another man in the privacy of his own home. Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
457
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same-sex civil unions.462 In 2005, Brokeback Mountain, a major
motion picture about two men who fall in love while working together
herding sheep near Wyoming’s Brokeback Mountain, won four Golden
Globe Awards, including Best Motion Picture-Drama, and three
Academy Awards, including Best Director (Ang Lee), Best Adapted
Screenplay, and Best Original Score.463
Third, even prejudiced jurors can be encouraged to act in nonprejudiced ways. As discussed above, when non-prejudiced norms are
made salient by the expression of positive opinions on gay-related issues,
both low and high-prejudice subjects report less prejudiced opinions
about gay men.464 Apparently, “even high prejudiced persons . . . view
general egalitarian ideals as central to their self-concept.”465
Another problem with allowing juries to decide whether a claim of
gay panic ought to result in some sort of mitigation is that juries are
notoriously inconsistent. One jury may feel a defendant’s gay panic
claim is legitimate while a differently constituted jury may feel the
same claim is completely bogus.
While it is certainly true that an approach that leaves decision-making
in the hands of the jury will sacrifice consistency in results, I believe the
benefits of this approach outweigh its costs.466 The only way claims of
gay panic will lose their appeal in the long run is if the assumptions
underlying these claims are exposed for what they are: false negative
stereotypes about gay males as deviant sexual predators with little basis
in reality. One way to ensure that any change in social attitudes is long
lasting is to allow such change to take place gradually in individual
462
Six states (Vermont, Connecticut, California, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and
Oregon) provide the equivalent of spousal rights to same-sex couples within the state.
Three states (Hawaii, Maine, and Washington) and the District of Columbia provide some
spousal rights to same-sex couples within the state. See Human Rights Campaign,
Relationship Recognition in the U.S., http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_
Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf (last visited January 11, 2008); see also Anthony Faiola, New
Hampshire Is Set to Approve Same-Sex Civil Unions, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2007, at A1
(noting that in 2000, Vermont became first state to permit civil unions and that since then,
other states, including Connecticut, New Jersey, and even relatively conservative state of
New Hampshire, have established laws permitting civil unions).
463
See Brokeback Mountain (2005): Awards, N.Y. TIMES, http://movies.nytimes.com/
movie/301840/Brokeback-Mountain/awards (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
464
Monteith et al., The Effect of Social Norm Activation on the Expression of Opinions
Concerning Gay Men and Blacks, supra note 338, at 276.
465
Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications for
Progress in Prejudice-Reduction Efforts, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 483
(1993) [hereinafter Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses].
466
The “cost” here is a large one in that it involves allowing someone who has
killed a gay man to receive a reduced sentence or possibly no sentence at all.
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courtrooms across the country. Trying to force such change through
legislative or judicial bans will only succeed in driving these arguments
underground where they can appeal to subconscious bias.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A. Providing Guidance to Trial Courts
In light of the considerations discussed above, I suggest that when a
defendant wishes to assert a gay panic argument to bolster a claim of
provocation or self-defense, the judge should allow the defendant to do
so as long as there is some evidence to support the elements of the
defense.467 This approach is consistent with the general principle that a
defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to present a
defense.468 While this right is not absolute,469 a considerable number of
states already require trial judges to give a requested defense instruction
if there is any evidence (or some evidence) to support the defense.
For example, in Alaska, “the general rule is that the defendant is
entitled to a jury instruction on a defense theory if there is ‘some
evidence’ to support it.”470 As one judge has explained: “The
defendant’s burden of producing ‘some evidence’ in support of a
proposed defense is not a heavy one. If a defendant produces some
evidence to support each element of a specific instruction, ‘[a]ny
weakness or implausibility’ in that evidence is irrelevant.”471 In
Colorado, “[t]he quantum of evidence that must be offered by the

467
I have no objection to judges ruling as a matter of law that there is no support for a
temporary insanity or diminished capacity defense linked to gay panic given that neither
Homosexual Panic Disorder nor homosexuality constitute recognized mental diseases.
468
See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (“The right of an
accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity
to defend against the State’s accusations.”). For an excellent discussion of one way in
which the right to present a defense has been eroded, see Doug Colbert, The Motion in
Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1271, 1316-26 (1987) (arguing against increasing practice of using motion in limine to
preclude entire defenses).
469
See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 747-57 (2006) (holding that Arizona’s
judicial rule limiting evidence of mental disease or defect to proving insanity and
barring its admission to negate mens rea does not violate due process); Montana v.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (upholding Montana statute which precluded
evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication from being admitted to negate mens rea
against due process challenge).
470
Snyder v. State, 930 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alaska 1996) (emphasis added).
471
State v. Garrison, 171 P.3d 91, 95 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Toomey v. State, 581
P.2d 1124, 1126 n.10 (Alaska 1978)).

558

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:471

defendant in order to be entitled to an instruction on a theory of
defense is ‘a scintilla of evidence.’472 ‘Some credible evidence,’ an
alternative statement of the ‘scintilla of evidence’ standard, is necessary
to present an affirmative defense.”473
In Florida, the defendant “is entitled to have the jury instructed on
the rules of law applicable to this theory of the defense if there is any
evidence to support such instructions.”474 Similarly, in Hawaii, “a jury
instruction must be given on every defense if there is any support in the
evidence ‘no matter how weak, inclusive or unsatisfactory the evidence
may be.’”475 In Illinois:
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the
case if there is some foundation for the instruction in the
evidence, and if there is such evidence, it is an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to refuse to so instruct the jury.
Very slight evidence upon a given theory of a case will justify
the giving of an instruction.476
Likewise, in Kansas, a defendant “is entitled to an instruction on his
or her theory of the case even though the evidence thereon is slight and
supported only by the defendant’s own testimony.”477 In Maryland, a
defendant need only introduce “[s]ome evidence” to support his or her
proposed instruction.478 In Nebraska, a defendant is entitled to an
instruction “if there is any evidence to support . . . giving [it].”479
Similarly, New Hampshire provides that a “defendant is entitled to a
jury charge on his theory of defense if it is supported by ‘some
evidence.’”480 A judge who prohibits a defendant from arguing gay panic
goes against these rules requiring jury instructions on the defense’s
theory of the case as long as it is supported by some evidence.
472
People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez, 971 P.2d 223, 228 (Colo. 1998) (quoting People
v. Lundy, 533 P.2d 920, 921 (1975)) (emphasis added).
473
Id. (quoting People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834, 836 (Colo.1990)) (emphasis added).
474
Bryant v. State, 601 So. 2d 529, 533 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Hooper v. State, 476
So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1985)) (emphasis added).
475
State v. Davalos, 153 P.3d 456, 458 (Haw. 2007) (quoting State v. O’Daniel, 616
P.2d 1383, 1390 (Haw. 1980)) (emphasis added).
476
People v. Jones, 676 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ill. 1997) (citing People v. Crane, 585
N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ill. 1991)) (emphasis added).
477
State v. Bell, 80 P.3d 367, 373 (Kan. 2003) (citing State v. Barnes, 948 P.2d 627,
638 (Kan. 1997)).
478
Dykes v. State, 571 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Md. 1990).
479
State v. Nguth, 701 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added).
480
State v. Cote, 725 A.2d 652, 658 (N.H. 1999) (quoting State v. Aubert, 421 A.2d
124, 125 (N.H. 1980)) (emphasis added).
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Let me be clear. I am not advocating official recognition of a
freestanding gay panic defense. I am merely suggesting that attempts
to prohibit gay panic claims are not likely to succeed in shielding the
jury from considering the forbidden topic. As modern behavioral
research demonstrates, attempts to blindfold the jury in other
contexts, such as insurance and attorneys’ fees, do not work.481
Implicit bias research suggests that making bias salient can help jurors
cognitively process and reject stereotype-congruent responses. For
these reasons, judges should allow defendants to present gay panic
provocation or gay panic self-defense arguments to the jury when
some evidence of each of the elements of the traditional criminal law
defense is present.
To limit the effectiveness of gay panic defense strategies, I offer two
suggestions to prosecutors: (1) during voir dire, request questions
designed to identify closet homophobes, and (2) make the possibility
of sexual orientation bias salient throughout the trial.
B. Questions to Ask During Jury Selection
During jury selection, attorneys may have the opportunity to ask or
request questions designed to flesh out whether a prospective juror is
likely to be biased against one side or the other.482 If an attorney can
demonstrate that a prospective juror is biased, that attorney can
challenge the juror for cause.483 Additionally, an attorney can use one
of his or her peremptory challenges to strike a prospective juror for
any reason (other than race or gender)484 or no reason at all.
Additionally, during voir dire, the attorneys can remind jurors of their
obligation to decide the case without letting bias or unfair prejudice
influence their decision-making.
Prosecutors may wish to ask or request questions that are directly
relevant to sexual orientation to remind jurors of their duty to be fair
and unbiased. Such questions might include the following:

481

See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 234, at 1865-66.
See Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, The Jury in Practice: Avoid Bald Men and
People with Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Juror Selection,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1184-85 (2003).
483
A challenge for cause is a challenge “supported by a specified reason, such as
bias or prejudice, that would disqualify that potential juror.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
245 (8th ed. 2004).
484
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (gender); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (race).
482

560

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:471

This trial involves a gay male victim. How might this affect
your reactions to the trial?
Do you have any biases or prejudices that might prevent you
from judging this case fairly given that it involves a gay
victim?
In your opinion, should the sexual orientation of the
defendant influence the treatment he receives in the legal
system?
Social science research on race and the jury suggests that asking
prospective jurors about their racial attitudes during voir dire helps to
reduce racial bias during decision-making by reminding Category
Three jurors of their egalitarian values.485 In one study, for example,
researchers divided mock jurors into groups before showing them a
thirty-minute Court TV video summary of a trial involving a Black
defendant charged with sexual assault.486 Some groups of mock jurors
were subjected to racially relevant voir dire questioning and others
were not.487 The racially relevant questions included the following:
This trial involves an African American defendant and White
victims. How might this affect your reactions to the trial?
Do you have any biases or prejudices that might prevent you
from judging an African American defendant fairly?
In your opinion, how does the race of the defendant affect the
treatment s/he receives from police?
In your opinion, how does the race of a defendant influence
the treatment s/he receives in the legal system as a whole?488
Only 34.4% of those in the group that received racially relevant voir
dire voted to convict the Black defendant compared to 47.1% of those
in the group that received racially neutral voir dire questions.489 If
making race salient during jury selection helps reduce racial bias
during jury deliberations, a similar reduction in sexual orientation
basis may occur if sexual orientation is made salient.
485

Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 410, at 222.
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, On Racial Diversity and Group
Decision-making:
Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury
Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 601-02 (2006).
487
Id. at 602.
488
Id.
489
Id. at 603.
486
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Just as few individuals are likely to answer affirmatively if asked,
“Are you prejudiced against Blacks?,” few individuals are likely to
admit that they are prejudiced against gays and lesbians. Most
heterosexual individuals either will seek to hide their biases because
they know it is politically incorrect to be biased against gays and
lesbians, or will say positive things about gays and lesbians because
they sincerely believe these things. Even jurors who feel positively
about gays and lesbians, however, may be implicitly biased in favor of
heterosexuality and against homosexuality.
In cases where jurors might try to hide their sexual orientation bias,
the attorneys will want to think carefully about the different kinds of
individuals who might be in the jury pool. Using race as an example,
individuals are likely to fall into one of three categories.490 In
Category One are explicit racists, including members of the Ku Klux
Klan and other White supremacist organizations. Category One
individuals are not hesitant to express publicly their belief that the
White man is superior and the Black man is inferior. In Category Two
are closet racists, individuals who know that it is unacceptable to say,
“I think Blacks are inferior,” but who actually believe Blacks are
inferior. Finally, in Category Three are implicit racists, individuals
who hold egalitarian beliefs about Blacks, but also have implicit bias in
favor of Whites over Blacks.
Mapping sexual orientation onto these three categories, Category
One would include explicit homophobes or individuals who are not shy
about sharing their belief that homosexuality is abnormal and
homosexual behavior is immoral. Some deeply religious individuals
might fall into Category One. Category Two would include closet
homophobes or individuals who will not say publicly that they think
gays are immoral and deviant, but actually believe gays are immoral
and deviant. Category Two individuals might publicly profess to hold
egalitarian views about homosexuality but privately oppose having a
gay or lesbian as their child’s teacher. Finally, Category Three
individuals, implicit homophobes, would include heterosexuals who
believe gays and lesbians should be treated equally to heterosexuals
but who nonetheless would manifest implicit bias in favor of
heterosexuality and against homosexuality if they were to take an IAT
measuring sexual orientation bias.
In a gay panic case, prosecutors will want to weed out individuals in
Category One (explicit homophobes) and Category Two (closet
490
See JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 54-55 (Pantheon Books 1970)
(identifying three categories of racists: (1) dominative racists, (2) aversive racists, and
(3) unconscious racists).
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homophobes). It should not be difficult to find the explicit
homophobes in Category One because these individuals will not be
ashamed of expressing negative views about homosexuality in public.
Category One individuals would likely be subject to a challenge for
cause. It may, however, be difficult to ferret out Category Two
individuals because closet homophobes know that it looks bad to
appear biased against gays and lesbians.
To find the closet homophobes, prosecutors will want to ask
questions that indirectly measure a prospective juror’s attitudes about
homosexuality. Drury Sherrod and Peter Nardi conducted a study
designed to identify potentially homophobic jurors during voir dire.491
Recognizing that some jurors might try to hide their true biases to
“save face in the courtroom,” Sharrod and Nardi sought to identify
proxy or surrogate questions that correlate with homophobic attitudes
but are more likely to elicit a truthful response than direct questions
about a juror’s attitudes about homosexuality.492
Sherrod and Nardi found that as a general matter, the most
homophobic individuals did not have any close friends who were gay
or lesbian. They also thought the world would be a better place if
more people followed “old-fashioned values,” were politically
conservative, and attended religious services weekly or believed
religious beliefs were always important in guiding their daily
decisions.493 Additionally, many of the most homophobic individuals
thought that the federal and state governments were doing enough to
make sure industry does not pollute the environment, did not read the
local newspaper or any magazines on a regular basis, were not college
educated, had served time in the United States Armed Forces, and
lived in the South.494 Sherrod and Nardi concluded that if an attorney
wants to find out which persons on the venire are the most
homophobic, the following questions would be helpful to ask during
voir dire:495
Do you have any close friends who are gay or lesbian?
Politically, are
conservative?

you

liberal,

middle-of-the-road,

or

491
Drury Sherrod & Peter M. Nardi, Homophobia in the Courtroom: An Assessment
of Biases Against Gay Men and Lesbians in a Multiethnic Sample of Potential Jurors, in
STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 448, at 27.
492
Id.
493
Id. at 33-35.
494
Id.
495
Id. at 36-37.
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How important are your religious beliefs in guiding your daily
decisions?
Do you think the world would be a better place if more people
followed old-fashioned values?
Do you try to attend religious services at your church or
temple every week?
Are federal and state governments doing enough to make sure
industry does not pollute the environment we live in?
How thoroughly do you read your local newspaper every day?
Please tell me the postal ZIP code where you live.
What is your current marital status?
What is your religion?
Have you ever served in the U.S. Armed Forces?
Do you feel your life is more controlled by fate than by
planning?
Do you read any magazines on a regular basis?
What is your highest level of education?496
If prosecutors are able to identify both explicit homophobes and
closet homophobes, and strike all or most of these individuals, the
jury will be comprised of mostly egalitarian-minded jurors who want
to act fairly and not let negative stereotypes about gay men influence
the verdict.497 If the prosecutor then makes sexual orientation salient,
496
Social science research suggests that negative attitudes about homosexuality
tend to diminish with increased levels of education. See Wright, Adams & Bernat,
supra note 448, at 345.
497
The defense may try to use their peremptory challenges to strike all the openly
gay individuals on the jury. If this happens, the prosecutor should file a Batson
challenge. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986) (holding use of peremptory
challenge to discriminate on basis of race violates equal protection); see J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending Batson to prohibit use of peremptory
challenges based on gender). The defense will likely argue that Batson should not be
extended to sexual orientation because sexual orientation has not been recognized as a
special classification deserving of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause. The prosecutor can counter that Batson prohibits the use of peremptory
challenges to strike a member of a cognizable group, and that gays and lesbians are a
cognizable group because they share a common perspective arising from their life
experiences and have been singled out for different treatment under the laws. See
United States v. Castaneda-Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (defining cognizable
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the jury is likely to reject the defense appeal to negative stereotypes
about gay men as deviant sexual predators, and decide the case in an
unbiased manner.
C. Making Sexual Orientation Salient Through Gender and Sexual
Orientation Switching
Another way a prosecutor can make sexual orientation salient is to
use gender and sexual orientation switching during opening and
closing statements. The prosecutor can ask jurors to imagine the same
facts but with a gay male defendant who kills a heterosexual female
victim after she makes an unwanted sexual advance. If jurors would
think the gay man unreasonable if he were to respond the way the
defendant in the actual case responded, they should think twice before
deciding that the defendant was reasonably provoked. The prosecutor
can then ask jurors to imagine the same facts but with a female
defendant who kills a heterosexual man after he makes an unwanted
sexual advance. If jurors would think the female unreasonable, jurors
should again think twice about whether they should accept the
defendant’s claim of reasonable provocation.
Second, the prosecutor can ask the judge to give the jury a rolereversal jury instruction.498 Such an instruction would tell jurors that
it is inappropriate to allow bias on the basis of race, ethnicity, national
origin, gender, religion, or sexual orientation to influence their
decision-making. The jury instruction would then help make jurors
aware of the possibility of anti-gay bias operating at the level of the
subconscious by asking jurors to imagine the same facts but with the
defendant a gay man who kills a heterosexual woman after she makes
a sexual advance similar to the one allegedly made by the actual gay
male victim. Alternatively, jurors could imagine the defendant as a
heterosexual woman who kills a heterosexual man who makes a
sexual advance similar to the one allegedly made by the actual victim.
If jurors come to a different conclusion about the defendant’s
group).
498
In other work, I have proposed that judges give a race-switching jury
instruction to limit the influence of racial stereotypes. Lee, Race and Self-Defense,
supra note 379, at 481-82; see also LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note
80, at 252-59 (suggesting role-reversal jury instructions as means of illustrating
meaning of normative reasonableness). In recognition of the fact that racial
stereotypes and prejudice can adversely affect jury decision-making, the Supreme
Court has held that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to
have prospective jurors questioned on the issue of racial bias if the defendant
specifically requests such voir dire. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986).
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culpability in the imagined scenarios, this would alert them to the
possibility that they may have allowed anti-gay bias to influence their
decision-making in the first place. They would then want to
reconsider the actual facts of the case.
Some might doubt the efficacy of telling jurors not to be prejudiced
against the victim because of his sexual orientation.499 The proposed
role-reversal instruction, however, goes beyond merely telling jurors
not to be biased. It warns jurors of the possibility of sexual
orientation bias, tells them that such bias is inappropriate, and then
gives jurors a vehicle for checking themselves for such bias. It makes
sexual orientation far more salient than an instruction simply telling
jurors not to be biased.
Social science research suggests that the use of mental imagery can
help reduce implicit bias in all individuals500 and that the first step to
A role-reversal jury
overcoming implicit bias is awareness.501
instruction can make jurors aware of the possibility of implicit bias in a
very tangible way.502 Additional research suggests that motivation to be
non-biased can curb the otherwise automatic effects of anti-gay bias.503
It is particularly important in cases involving claims of gay panic to
allow such claims to be heard. Suppression of gay panic claims, like
suppression of bad speech, will not eliminate the underlying
stereotypes and assumptions that make such claims persuasive. Open
499
See, e.g., Bronwyn Statham, Note, The Homosexual Advance Defence: ‘Yeah, I
Killed Him, but He Did Worse to Me’ Green v. R., 20 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 301, 302, 311
(1998-1999) (arguing that jury instructions telling jurors not to be prejudiced against
defendant or victim on basis of their sexual orientation are unlikely to limit influence
of homophobic prejudice in Homosexual Advance Defense cases).
500
See Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit
Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 828
(2001) (finding that participants who engaged in counter-stereotypic mental imagery
showed weaker implicit bias than those who engaged in neutral, stereotypic, or no
mental imagery).
501
See Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses, supra note 465, at
472, 477-78 (finding that when low-prejudice individuals were falsely led to believe
that they had discriminated against gay male law school applicant on basis of his
sexual orientation and then read essay on reasons why people sometimes respond
more negatively toward gays than they think they should and how to reduce such
negative responses, they engaged in self-reflection and concerted attempts to control
future prejudiced responses).
502
The author is currently engaged in empirical research with Donald Braman, Dan
Kahan, and Jeff Rachlinski to test whether giving mock jurors a race-switching jury
instruction can reduce implicit bias in cases involving minority defendants.
503
See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic Antigay Prejudice to
Behavior: The Moderating Role of Conscious Beliefs About Gender and Behavioral
Control, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 268, 277 (2006).
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discussion and debate is a better way to combat those assumptions.
Making sexual orientation salient through role-reversal exercises can
help jurors consciously mediate and control what would otherwise be
automatic stereotype-congruent responses.
CONCLUSION
There is no question that when murder defendants argue gay panic,
they seek to tap into deep-seated biases against and stereotypes about
gay men as deviant sexual predators who pose a threat to innocent
young heterosexual males. The question is what role the law should
play in mediating the cultural conflict over what constitutes the
appropriate response to an unwanted homosexual advance.
Robert Post explains that some believe the law should only enforce
existing cultural norms, reflecting the current moral judgments of the
community.504 Post, however, also notes that while the law is
sometimes used to enforce existing cultural norms, it is also sometimes
used to revise and reshape, or constitute, culture.505 Because cultural
norms unfold over time, “law is perennially implicated in cultural
conflict, so that cultural change and disagreement is the ordinary state
of affairs rather than the exception.”506
“Controversies over the status of homosexuality are today the site of
intense cultural dispute.”507 I believe the law can and should play a
role in mediating this cultural dispute — not by dictating what jurors
can and cannot consider, but by making sure jurors are cognitively
aware of what exactly is at stake when a gay person is the victim of
fatal violence, and the person who killed him claims he did so in
response to an unwanted sexual advance.

504
Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 485-86 (2003)
(citing PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 10 (1965)).
505
Id. at 488.
506
Id. at 494.
507
Id. at 495.

